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I. ON THE ORIGIN OF LIFE.

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The chief criticism with which I was honored by competent judges in reference to my recent article, "On the Origin of Death," emphasized the fact that a preliminary "On the Origin of Life" ought to have preceded the discussion as its proper logical basis. I fully agree with the critics and appreciate the honor of their consideration, however, I have always had a horror of futile speculations preferring well-established facts to all "gray theories;" and a discussion of the origin of life as the logical basis of the origin of death would necessarily involve the introduction of assumptions from which to draw scientific deductions would have been ludicrous. Nevertheless, I have heeded the kind suggestions of my critics and studied the subject from the standpoint of pure science, offering now as a postscript what ought to have been an introduction.

The old question, What is life, has been answered by many thinkers in many ways. A perfect definition would, perhaps, require the summing up of all the views ever expressed on the subject and yet we might never approach in completeness the language of Christ's interpretation of eternal life. For my par-

ticular purpose it suffices to compare the living with the lifeless in order to obtain a definition for *life in its most primitive sense*. In discussing the origin of life we must logically take the environment into consideration within which we find life. The earth is generally supposed to be an unorganized body inhabited by living, organized beings which form a sharp contrast to it. The ultimate elements of matter are the same in both; the properties and changes of living bodies are strictly dependent on the same physico-chemical laws as those of mineral bodies, but there is this difference, that in the former we recognize an organization, a composition of unlike parts, called organs, in which matter exhibits its activity in a fluid and dissolved form, while in the latter we find a more uniform though not always homogeneous mass in which the various parts continue in a state of resting equilibrium, so long as the unity of the body remains undisturbed. Moreover, *living matter which apparently is not organized, i. e., a mere lump of protoplasm, still exhibits the same internal motion, capable of assimilating and secreting food, giving rise to those complex chemical compounds, called albuminoid bodies, never found in this combination in the inorganic substance. This is the essential difference.* The molecular arrangement of the minerals we definitely know, that of the material basis of living organisms we have not yet discovered, nor can we explain the conditions under which they exist. It is merely dealing in terms, when we say that living bodies are distinguished from minerals by the manifestation of certain functions, by the power which they possess of continually using up and renewing the matter composing the body, by the power of irritability, of growth and of reproduction. No one has as yet claimed to have scientifically demonstrated the existence of a vital force which would explain these conditions. But we can demonstrate the nature of the organic substances, *i. e., the ternary and quaternary carbon compounds which undergo the exchanges characterizing metabolism; they either decompose under the influence of oxidation into substances of simpler composition—as is the case with animals—or they are built up by substitution from simpler inorganic sub-*

stances as is the case with plants. All these elements are found in inorganic nature. A vital element, i. e., an element peculiar to organisms no more exists according to our present knowledge than a vital force working independently of natural and material processes. The fact that many of the so-called organic compounds, viz.: urea, vinegar, sugar, alcohol, etc., can now be artificially built up by synthesis from other elements indicates the probability that many other organic substances will be synthetically produced, especially albumin. We, therefore, find here the suggestion that in the origination of organized bodies the same forces must have been active which are sufficient for the formation of unorganized bodies, so that, from the scientific standpoint, we are compelled to refer the functions peculiar to organisms, viz., metabolism, growth, movement, etc., to the properties of the chemical compounds composing them, particularly to the complicated molecular arrangement of living matter. From this point of view the explanation of the origin of life must be sought in the mode of origin attributed to its environment, the earth, and my definition of life for present purposes would be, that *life is a function of the earth-development in the mathematical sense, i. e., "a mathematical quantity whose changes of value depend on those of other quantities called its variables."* It is only upon such a premise that I can discuss the subject at all intelligently, for the ultimate dictum, that all life comes from God permits of no further discussion, unless an enquiry into the probable methods of God is admitted.

It is generally agreed that the Nebular Hypothesis satisfactorily explains the origin of the earth. Astronomy and physics, geology and embryology, mineralogy and chemistry insist all upon this one point. Modern research has demonstrated *ad oculos* by means of the telescope and the spectral apparatus, that the same process of development which our globe passed through can still be witnessed in the universe on other celestial bodies; we find all stages of development from the gaseous nebular spot through the liquid fiery ball to the rigid ice-cold mass, the last phase, which will, in the end, be the fate of our earth, and is now ex-

hibited by our faithful companion the moon. The fact, then, that our earth, many millions of years ago, was a glowing sphere with a temperature which made the existence of organisms impossible must always be reckoned with as an important moment in all speculations on the origin of life, as the various views that have been advanced on this subject actually show. I may be permitted to present some of the most important theories hitherto held, state the objections to which they are exposed and finally give my own view on the subject.

The two theories which above all others have been most ardently discussed by scientific men are concisely stated by Helmholtz's alternative, viz., "organic life either began at some definite time or it has been in existence from eternity." They represent the extreme opposites, the former the theory of spontaneous generation, the latter the cosmozoic theory. According to the first, living matter must have arisen out of lifeless matter some time after the temperature of the earth had considerably decreased. The mode of origin as well as the form of the first organisms were for centuries objects of futile discussion and wild conjecture. Even a man like Aristotle had no particular difficulties in believing that animals, even as high in the scale of life as fish, could originate from the mud. Not until the microscope had reached a comparatively high degree of perfection did the old view give place to the theory that the lowest organisms were spontaneously generated by the infusion of hay or other organic substances in water. But Milne-Edwards, Schwann, Helmholtz and others proved by experiments that the organisms which so rapidly developed and multiplied in these infusions arose from germs already present either in the substances introduced or in the surrounding air. And when in later times with the discovery of the bacteria these speculations were revived, Pasteur and Robert Koch stepped forward and proved, that after the exclusion of all the germs which might come into contact with the preparation from the outside, even the most favorable culture medium would remain free from bacteria; but as soon as exposed to the air for only a few minutes it would be peopled with a

whole world of bacteria. However, experiments in the opposite directions have not yet ceased; men still harp on the idea of Goethe's *amanuensis* Wagner that it is possible to compose a human being from chemical mixtures in the retort, in spite of the fact that the molecular composition of living matter is still a *terra incognita*. To Haeckel belongs the credit of having pointed out the grain of truth contained in the theory of the spontaneous generation of life. He holds that it is absolutely immaterial whether living substance still arises spontaneously or not. He, however, maintains that there must have been a time when the living arose from the lifeless, because there was a time in the history of the earth when existence of organic life upon it was utterly impossible. When, however, water vapors condensed and fell in the form of drops from the atmosphere, the opportunity was at hand for the formation of the simplest organisms, not consisting of cells, indeed, but of "perfectly homogeneous, structureless, formless lumps of albumin." Yet Haeckel does not tell us how it all came about, because, he says, we cannot have any idea of the conditions of the surface of the earth at that time, and, therefore, do not know the opportunities offered for the autogeny of organisms.

The second theory, called by Preyer the theory of the *cosmo-zoëa*, has only lately (about thirty years ago) been advanced by H. E. Richter. Proceeding from the supposition that there are everywhere present in the celestial sphere minute particles of solid matter, which are continuously dropped by the celestial bodies in their constant evolution, he maintains that, together with these particles, living germs of micro-organisms are distributed, passing from one inhabited celestial sphere to the other. If perchance they meet conditions favorable to growth they begin to develop and thus become the starting point of a new world of organisms. Richter thinks that life in the form of cells has always existed somewhere in the universe and therefore changes Harvey's old dictum into "*omne vivum ab æternitate e cellula*." According to him life never originated but was always transferred from one planet to the other. The mode of transportation is explained

by his theory of cosmozoëa. Every now and then meteors have been found which contained traces of carbon, even humus and coal-tar substances, proving that in spite of the enormous friction not enough heat was generated to incinerate such organic remains. Therefore Richter thinks it possible that life-bearing germs could pass through the atmosphere without losing their vitality. That they could exist without water or food may be assumed from our observations on hibernating animals. Helmholtz and Sir William Thomson reached the same conclusion independently from Richter, only a few years later. The former has shown that large meteors are only heated on the surface but are cold within while passing through the atmosphere, so that they might be bearers of living germs, as the presence of carbo-hydrogen compounds and the spectrum of the light of comets further prove.

The objections to this theory lie in the composition of living substances themselves. We said above that their chemical elements are the same as those of inorganic matter, they only differ in the mode of molecular union. Albuminoid bodies are, therefore, not principally different from inorganic bodies, the difference is only one of chemical synthesis. A consideration of the origin of living substances must, therefore, be of such a character as to be applicable to minerals. From this point of view the cosmozoic theory becomes untenable. For, if we assume that the albuminoid bodies existed from eternity, we must likewise assume that inorganic bodies, *e. g.*, quartz and feldspar, have always existed somewhere in the universe and have simply come to us from some other planet. If this theory would be carried out for all chemical compounds we would be forced to the conclusion that our earth came into existence somewhat after the fashion of Minerva. No thinking mind would be willing to accept such a theory; on the other hand, all the leading chemists of the present day agree, that even our so-called chemical elements with high atomic weight were formed by condensation from elements with low atomic weight. Furthermore, the cosmozoic theory carried to its last logical conclusion would lead to the com-

plete denial, not only of living substance, but also of the whole earth as such and the idea of development would become an absurdity. I repeat, the principle governing the origin of feldspar is the same as that which determines the origin of albumin. Both are chemical compounds. This is especially well illustrated by the growth of plants. What an enormous mass of inorganic matter is every spring and summer transformed into organic living substance, and how regularly it returns to the inorganic kingdom at the approach of every winter.

Quite different from Richter's method of explanation is that of Preyer, the distinguished physio-psychologist. He also maintains that life has no beginning. He argues, that if spontaneous generation had taken place once in the distant past, it ought to take place to-day, for the same conditions for the maintenance of life must have prevailed then as now, otherwise the new product could not have remained alive. At the same time he cannot accept the cosmozoic theory, since it does not solve the problem, but simply transfers it upon some other planet. He says, our present experience teaches us the "*omne vivum e vivo*;" we also know that the living substance constantly excretes the lifeless or inorganic; why not, then, assume that in the beginning the lifeless originated from living substance; for, if we hold, that there must have been a time, when the living was generated from the lifeless, the "*omne vivum e vivo*" falls to the ground and the continuity of life is denied. What must be the deduction from Preyer's reasoning on the basis of the nebular hypothesis? If the living was before the lifeless, the earth must have contained life at the time when it was still in a glowing condition. This is, indeed, Preyer's conclusion. He looks upon the liquid fiery mass as living substance and advocates the surrender of our present conception of living matter in favor of his new proposition. He argues, that the whole body of the earth in its igneous condition was originally a single gigantic organism. The powerful motion of its substance was its life. In the process of cooling, the heavy metals, no longer capable of motion, were excreted and formed the first inorganic masses. Gradually the igneous mass on the surface of

the earth became cold and rigid, *i. e.*, died and the lightest elements in gas or liquid form finally entered upon new combinations, giving rise to what we now call protoplasm. And, as in the course of time the chemical combinations became steadily more and more complex, the primitive form of our modern plant and animal kingdoms arose. Protoplasm is, therefore, not the result of spontaneous generation nor has it been transmitted from the outside, but it is the necessary resultant of the primeval life of the planets which consisted of intense motion; "their breath was perhaps glowing ferric vapor, their blood liquid metal and their food meteorites."*

It is not difficult to see that the difference between Preyer's theory and the theory of spontaneous generation is merely a difference in the conception of life. To him life is motion in its widest sense. Is such a conception permissible? Our present idea of life has been derived from a careful comparison of our present living organic bodies with the existing inorganic bodies. We said above that the only essential difference between the living and the lifeless consisted in the metabolism of the albuminous bodies. No inorganic substance contains albuminous bodies, and no living organic substance is without them. This is not a principal, but an essential difference, sufficient for the proper definition of living matter. If we drop this difference then we surrender our whole vantage ground and we must recognize the glowing masses of the once igneous globe as living bodies.

However, here the question may be raised from Preyer's standpoint, if living substance is descended uninterruptedly from liquid igneous mixtures, where is that particular point which designates the beginning of living matter? This question presupposes an uninterrupted gradual transmission from the igneous mixtures to the albuminous bodies, a supposition which cannot be maintained. Stress has been laid upon the fact that there is no principal difference between the living and the lifeless that does not prove that there should be an uninterrupted transition from the igneous

* W. Preyer: *Die Hypothesen über den Ursprung des Lebens*. Berlin, 1880.

mixtures to organisms. For, we know, that in the reaction of two chemical compounds the resultants do not in any wise exhibit evidences of transitional steps. So can we hardly know anything about the conditions which existed on the surface of the earth at the time when the first drops of water fell from the atmosphere. Thus there is just as much ground for the assumption that living albumin resulted from the reaction of chemical compounds entirely different from it without transitional steps at the time when the conditions were at hand, as there is for the idea of a gradual uninterrupted descendance.

Preyer, furthermore, tacitly maintains that the glowing masses of which he predicates life exhibited the phenomena of metabolism. Even this assumption cannot be verified. They, indeed, possessed energetic motion, and life is nothing else but a complex of motions to which every other molecular process of motion is principally related. But, nevertheless, living motion is a process which essentially characterizes the living organism; living substance constantly dissociates spontaneously, throws out the products of decomposition and takes in new material for purposes of regeneration and of reformation of similar atomic groups. This characteristic phenomenon of living substance can have hardly been the property of the primeval glowing masses and then passed on to the protoplasm of to-day. The igneous eruptive masses of our volcanoes, however intense in their motion, have never yet been observed to manifest such metabolic changes in the true sense of the term, and therefore do not deserve the name of living substances. Preyer's theory, therefore, reduces itself practically to the claims of the theory of spontaneous generation.

Decidedly the most scientific and thoughtful view on the origin of life has been presented by the eminent German physiologist Pflüger in his essay: "*Ueber die physiologische Verbrennung in den lebendigen Organismen*," published in his *Archives*, Vol. 10, 1875. He starts from a consideration of the chemical properties of albumin, representing the essential basis of all life. There exists a fundamental difference between the dead albumin,

as it exists in the chick's egg and the living albumin as produced by all living substance. All living substance dissociates spontaneously to a limited degree and more profusely in response to external stimuli, while dead albumin remains undecomposed under favorable conditions. The active principle in the dissociation of living albumin is the intramolecular oxygen, *i. e.*, the oxygen which is a part of the living albuminous molecule, being constantly taken in from the air. This is proved by the fact that dissociation implies the constant liberation of carbon dioxide, formed not by the oxidation of the carbon and the subsequent separation of a molecule of carbon dioxide, but by simultaneous separation of the new atom groups constituting the carbon dioxide. The living substance must contain the oxygen already in the living molecule, undergoing in dissociation merely a separation by circumligation, otherwise frogs would not be able to exist for so long a time, even for more than twenty-four hours, in an atmosphere of pure nitrogen and still exhale carbon dioxide, an experiment repeatedly tried by Pflüger. There is no oxygen compound in all organic chemistry which would contain sufficient oxygen in its molecules to oxidize the hydrogen atoms present to water and the carbon atoms to carbon dioxide. This is only possible by the introduction of free oxygen sufficient to produce dissociation by intramolecular circumligation. Of vast importance is the fact disclosed by a comparison between the dissociation products of the dead albumin artificially oxidized and the living albumin; the non-nitrogenous products are the same in both cases, but there is no similarity whatever between the nitrogenous dissociation products. Now we know that the radical of these latter products is CN or cyanogen in living albumin, and that the most important among them all, *i. e.*, urin, can be prepared artificially from cyanides. This proves that the cyanide radical is likewise the basis of living albumin, whereby it is distinguished from the dead or food albumin.

Pflüger therefore says, that in the formation of living albumin, *i. e.*, of cell-protoplasm, from food albumin a chemical change takes place accompanied by intense heat absorption, the nitrogen

atoms combining with the carbon atoms, thus producing, together with the cyanogen, intense motion in living matter. Cyanogen being an endothermic compound is naturally unstable and therefore is easily acted upon by the oxygen taken into the body, which causes its carbon atom to pass from the nitrogen-sphere into the oxygen-sphere and thus produce carbon-dioxide. Cyanogen is, therefore, the cause of dissociation, while its condition is the intramolecular introduction of oxygen. Moreover, there are a great many analogous combinations, which induce Pflüger to call cyanic acid a half living molecule. The growth of living substances is the same in its chemical processes as the formation of the polymeric compounds of cyanic acid, *e. g.*, cyamlin has the same formula as protoplasm, viz., $H_n C_n N_n O_n$. Both compounds are, in the presence of water, decomposed into carbon dioxide and ammonia, both furnish urin, not by direct oxidation, but by intramolecular circumlignation. From these well-established facts we are compelled to draw the conclusion, that in the scientific consideration of the origin of life we cannot start primarily with ammonia and carbon dioxide, for they are the end of life, but that we must seek the beginning in the cyanogen. The whole problem resolves itself into the question, How does cyanogen arise? The answer is as important as it is interesting. Cyanogen and its compounds only arise at the temperature of white heat. This undoubted chemical fact forces us to the conclusion that they were formed at a time when the earth was still either partially or wholly in a liquid igneous condition. The same high temperature is necessary for the other essential constituents of albumin, viz., carbohydrates, alcohol radicals, etc., so that Pflüger stoutly affirms that fire is the force which has created living albumin through synthesis. "Life," he says, "is the child of fire, its fundamental conditions arose at a time when the earth was still a glowing fire-ball. During the immeasurably long ages required for the gradual cooling of its surface, cyanogen and its compounds had sufficient time to follow their strong inclination towards polymerism and with the aid of oxygen, water and salts to pass over into that self-dissociating albumin, which is living matter. I

would, therefore, say that the first albumin which arose was at once living matter, endowed with the property to attract with great force and inclination in all its radicals chemically similar components, in order to infuse them into the molecule and thus to grow *ad infinitum*. According to this view living albumin does not necessarily require a constant molecular weight, because it is a molecule, constantly forming and dissociating, bearing about the same relation to chemical molecules as the sun does to a small meteor. In the plant then living albumin continues to do what it always has been doing, viz., to regenerate itself, i. e., to grow; wherefore I believe that all the living albumin existing in the world to-day is directly descended from that first albumin. I therefore doubt the theory of spontaneous generation, for comparative biology unerringly leads to the conclusion that all life has only one single root."

However, on close examination, even Pfüger's ingenious view seems to prove an illusion and a snare. Living albumin, even, if accepted as the true basis of life, as that substance which distinguishes the living world from the mineral world, is after all not life as manifested even by the non-nuclear mass of protoplasm. Protoplasm is not a chemical but a morphological concept, it is not a chemical substance of a complex composite character, but it is a mixture of numerous chemical substances united as smallest particles into a wonderfully complicated structure. Chemical compounds exhibit in different conditions of aggregation uniform characteristic properties. Protoplasm cannot be changed into other conditions of aggregation without ceasing to be protoplasm. For, the essential properties by which its life manifests itself, rest upon a definite organization. Just as the properties of a marble statue consist of the form which the artist has given to the marble, ceasing to be a statue if the marble is broken into minute pieces, so also does protoplasm depend upon its organization and ceases to be protoplasm if this organization is destroyed. Chemistry may in the course of time succeed to manufacture by synthesis albuminous bodies exactly like those in protoplasm, but to undertake the manufacture of protoplasm would resemble

Wagner's attempt to concoct a homunculus in a vial. According to all our present experience protoplasm cannot be obtained in any other way than by reproduction from already existing protoplasm. And even though we would accept Pflüger's view as a satisfactory explanation of the living basis of life, we would be forced to go a step farther back and to inquire into the origin of this living basis, until we would finally confront the two great watchwords of the day, "ether" and "force." And here we would be challenged by the presence of immutable laws, which according to all our experience in the human world presuppose a lawgiver, compelling us to fall back upon the old, old story: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth."

Nevertheless, the very fact of accepting God as the author of the universe should lead us to respect both Preyer's and Pflüger's ingenious theories on the origin of life. Life is eternal, existing before the lifeless, inasmuch as it started in God. The forces of Nature are but different forms of His energy, principally the same both in the mineral and in the living world. According to our present experience His creations are not abrupt and disconnected, but gradual and harmonious. It is, therefore, likewise true that the mineral substance must have preceded the living. Coming from one author the earth and its inhabitants must be compared to a tree and its fruit. Living substance must be largely a part of earth-material. The combination of this earth-material into living substance must have been just as necessarily the product of His earth-development as the formation of water; an invariable sequence of the progressive cooling of those masses, which constituted the crust of the earth, and the chemical, physical and morphological properties of modern life must likewise have been the necessary results of the effects of present external conditions upon the internal conditions of the living substance of former ages. *Life then is a function of the earth-development in the mathematical sense and God is its author.*

II.

PROPHET AND SCIENTIST.*

GEO. W. RICHARDS.

In the realm of truth we meet two distinct persons—the prophet and the scientist. The achievements of the theologian and the philosopher, the artist and the mechanic, are the result of their respective labors. They represent two modes of mental activity with which men have tried to explore and subdue the universe of being. These functions may, and often do, co-operate in one person. He becomes a member of the prophetic or the scientific school as the one tendency or the other predominates in him. Faust is a type of men in general, when he says,

“Zwei seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner brust,
Die eine will sich von der andern trennen;
Die eine hält, in derber liebeslust,
Sich an die welt, mit klammernden organen;
Die andere hebt gewaltsam sich vom dust
Zu den gefilden hoher ahnen.”

There have been prophets since the world began. Scientists are by no means the boast of this age. Both have fashioned the life of nations and eras. The Hebrews were a prophetic people, though not devoid of scientific power. The Greeks were a scientific nation, yet the light of prophecy glorifies all their productions. “The ‘world unrealized’ of Plato is the counterpart in Hellenic phrase and form of the anticipations of the Hebrew prophets, the world explored of Aristotle is the counterpart on a colossal scale of the boundless knowledge and practical wisdom of Solomon and his followers.” † We may say, the prophet is the scientist of the “world unrealized” and the scientist is the prophet of the world realized.

* The Alumni Oration, delivered in the Chapel of F. & M. College, June 8, 1898.

† History of Jewish Church, Stanley, Vol. III., p. 201.

It is strange, yet true, that these persons have not always been on the best of terms. The prophet has looked upon his brother as an iconoclast, smashing the cherished faiths of mankind. The scientist found pleasure in the old phrase, "The prophet is a fool; the spiritual man is mad." Both, however, have vindicated themselves in the work they have done. If the prophet may be styled Jubal—the father of all such as handle the harp and pipe, of art with pen, brush, or chisel; the scientist may be called Tubal—the forger of every cutting instrument of brass and iron, the father of mechanics in its various forms. Both have won the praise of the ages. It is now felt, if not yet clearly discerned, that there can be no conflict between them. Some day, after they have properly wooed, they will be mutually won, and a richly dowered wedding will follow.

We can better understand their mission by observing their *origin*, their *method*, and their *results*.

I. *The prophet, like Topsy, was not manufactured, but grew.* "A spark disturbed his clod; a god though in the germ." This germ, which unfolds upwards, this spark, which burns skyward, slumbered in primitive man. He was

"A man for aye removed
From the developed brute."*

He felt a power in the air. He heard a voice in the forest. He saw a light in the gloom. "His gods were charioteering in the sun, presiding in the mountain tops and rising out of the foam of the sea." Man was the first denizen of two worlds. He arose above creation and found kinship with his creator. No sooner had the realm of spirit dawned upon him, than he began to grope in darkness for the growing light. The history of this process is the story of the growth of the prophet, and the revelation of God.

The savage, in his forest primeval, had sacred formulas and incantations with which he invoked or repelled the powers of the air. The soothsayer gradually became an officer in the tribe. His soul was in special touch with the mysterious realms beyond.

* Rabbi Ben Ezra, Browning.

Now he was enlightened by immediate communications, when awake, in trance, or in ecstasy. Then he obtained his message by research and study. Omens were given in answer to prayer. The flight of birds, the flash of lightning, the falling star, the entrails of sacrifice would shape the policy of a nation in peace or war. The position of planets decided the fate of the newborn babe. The soothsayer, the diviner and the magician explained the events and determined the activities of individual and social life in the light of a higher world. These were the crude attempts of the early mind to attain celestial guidance.

"Blank misgivings of a creature
Moving about in worlds not realized,
High instincts before which our mortal nature
Did tremble like a guilty thing surprised."

As the gift grew by effort and was strengthened by achievement, the soothsayer and the seer became the prophet. Even among the Hebrews, blessed above others with the prophetic gift, we find a slow process of development. It is difficult to distinguish the Hebrew seer from the Semitic soothsayer. It is not so difficult to distinguish the Hebrew seer from the Hebrew prophet. Between Samuel, Nathan, and Gad, on the one hand, and Hosea, Amos and Isaiah on the other, there is a wide gap. These latter left the plane of the heathen soothsayer, passed over the intervening portion of the Hebrew seer, and were crowned with the dignity of the Israelite prophet.

The prophet is no longer concerned with Kish's asses. He denounces the oracles of Baal. He stands in the presence of God. "Surely the Lord God will do nothing; but He reveals His secrets to His servants the prophets." His God is no longer confined to a tribe, but has jurisdiction over all tribes. He is the God of heaven and earth. His laws are the laws of the universe. His judgments affect the nations, and His ends involve the world. The prophet became in a profound sense the Man of God—God's mouthpiece in his age. He differed from his predecessors partly in the subjective operations of his mind; but mainly in the objective message which he proclaimed. The dis-

tinguishing characteristic of Hebrew prophecy was the Hebrew God. That determined his inspiration and his message. The message in fact always determines the inspiration. The sooth-sayer, the seer, the prophet were inspired in the degree the truth worked in them. *For what is inspiration, but the essence and vitality of truth possessing the mind and heart of man?* The question no longer is, have there been men who were inspired, but have there ever been men who were not inspired?*

But even these geniuses of prophecy were a type of one to come. There was still an effort and a sporadicness in their activity. They saw as through a glass darkly. Though their God reveals His secrets to the prophets, He is still a god that hideth himself. They were the forerunners of Him who should come from the bosom of the Father, full of grace and truth. He hath seen God. He was not merely in occasional converse with the divine, but in perpetual communion. The mysteries of heaven are as common to Him as the realities of earth. He spoke of spiritual things with the ease men speak of natural things. He was not limited by times and seasons, ecstasies, dreams and visions. His conversation was in heaven. What was sporadic and occasional in the Hebrew prophet became natural and continuous in the Son of Man. There is no sense of doubt, but positive assurance, when He says, I do nothing of myself, but as the Father taught me I speak these things. All this He affirms with the artlessness and simplicity of a child, who describes the home out of which he has come.

"Thou eye among the blind,
That, deaf and silent, readst the eternal deep,
Haunted forever by the eternal mind,
Mighty prophet! Seer blest!
On whom those truths do rest,
Which we are toiling all our lives to find." †

Jesus of Nazareth is the realization of the longings of man in the primitive forest, as well as the type of man in the celestial sphere, when all the Lord's people will be prophets.

* See *The Foundations of Belief*, by Balfour, pp. 338-340.

† *Intimations of Immortality*, by Wordsworth.

The scientist, too, is the child of time. He did not spring in full panoply from the head of Jove. He came not like Melchisedeck, without father or mother, beginning of days or end of years. He is born of human effort, as much as the prophet. Both developed in their attempted solution of the world problem from their peculiar standpoints. The prophet plants his feet on the sun and studies the earth; the scientist plants his feet on the earth and studies the sun.

It is a mistake to imprison the scientist in the laboratory and observatory, watching bugs by day and stars by night. These may be the microcosm through which he studies the macrocosm. But the name itself has a broader significance. He is *the man who knows*. From time immemorial men have tried to know. Their knowledge was not, indeed, scientific. Yet they began the movement which culminated in the scientific method, the glory of this age.

Men have, for example, observed the stars in the earliest times. They marked their movements, changes and relative positions. They were baby astronomers, who became the fathers of Copernicus, Newton and Herschel. Astrology became astronomy as men advanced from vague, inaccurate observations to exact and specific investigation, by which they discovered the laws which rule the heavens. No one knows when the phenomena of combustion were first noticed and the changes which followed. These crude observations were the beginnings of chemistry. In the same way we might trace to its sources the science of economics, when men first began to buy and sell; and of psychology, when the world within was studied like the world without.

The story of this growth is graphically described by Æschylus in his "Prometheus Bound."

" But those woes of men,
List ye to them,—how they, before as babes,
By me were roused to reason, and to think ;

* * * * *

For first, though seeing, all in vain they saw,
And hearing, heard not rightly. But, like forms
Of phantom-dreams, throughout their life's whole length

They muddled all at random ; did not know
Houses of brick that catch the sunlight's warmth,
Nor yet the work of carpentry. They dwelt
In hollowed holes, like swarms of tiny ants,
In sunless depth of caverns ; and they had
No certain signs of winter, nor of spring
Flower-laden, nor of summer with her fruits ;
But without counsel fared their whole life long,
Until I showed the risings of the stars,
And settings hard to recognize. And I
Found Number for them, chief device of all,
Groupings of letters, Memory's handmaid that,
And mother of the Muses. * * *
In one short word, then, learn the truth condensed,—
All arts of mortals from Prometheus spring."

Scientists, also, gradually became a distinct class, as their faculties and methods of research improved. They had a special mission in the realm of truth. It took ages before the world was ripe for an Aristotle. In him we have a clearer apprehension of the scientific method. Most of the modern sciences are rooted in the Greek philosopher. His accurate observations in biology and his deductions from the facts obtained are a marvel when compared with some of the latest results of German laboratories. He was the father of a great multitude, who may be called the aristocracy of science—pioneers of the heavens, the earth and the seas. Darwin, Spencer and Huxley have taken into their personality the rich legacy of the past, and in a larger sphere, with finer instruments, they have reproduced a rational system of the universe, expressed in their own language and from their own standpoints.

In man, then, slumbered the infant prophet and scientist. These twins of the mind and heart were rocked by the breeze, kissed by the stars, lulled by the rippling brooks, startled by the lightning and thunderbolts. The mountains wooed them, the meadows called them, the ocean enfolded them. They rose in the vigor of their youth with psalms on their lips and laws in their minds. These children of nature interpret their world. They glorify their God. They utter their heart's message to one another.

Their difference and relations will further appear in the consideration of their methods and fields of labor.

II. "The object of the scientist is the discovery of the rational order which pervades the universe. The method consists of *observation and experiment* (which is observation under artificial conditions) for the determination of the *facts of nature*; of *inductive and deductive reasoning* for the discovery of *their mutual relations and connections*."*

"In the spirit of the prophet the spirit of God awakens an immediate certainty, an inward perception of things, which elude the testimony of the senses, and which can never be known by the meditative or speculative reason, except as approximate probabilities."† He has the power to share God's vision, entertain his design, and behold his plans for mankind. He reads the ethical order of the world. His method is intuitive. He beholds God in the mount, in the lily, in the star.

According to these definitions, the methods of prophet and scientist are totally different. Corresponding to this difference is their field of investigation. We may best understand their methods in the study of the universe, by observing their mental operations in the study of an individual person. Take, for example, a child's knowledge of a mother. It is not scientific; not the result of observation, comparison and reflection. It transcends the scientific method. It is a mysterious communion of soul with soul. It is impossible to trace the steps in the process. The child looks into the heart of the mother and has an immediate knowledge of her nature. *He does not know the woman, save as mother.* Her whole life, words and acts, are interpreted in the light of motherhood. Love is the explanation of every motive.

The scientist finds in the same individual an aggregation of cells, bones, nerves, veins, flesh. The phenomena of the various organs are traced to a vital principle or force, which no one can explain. *He finds and studies the woman; but cannot find the*

* Science of Last Half Century, by Huxley.

† O. T. Theol., by Schultz, Vol. 1, p. 237.

mother. His microscope and his scalpel fail to discover what the son saw and felt—a mother's love. It eludes his eye and escapes his hand.

Both the processes and the results are different, yet equally legitimate. The one may be mystified by the terminology of the other. They may doubt each other's conclusions. *They will not be reconciled before the son becomes scientist and the scientist a son.*

In a similar way men studied the world. The prophet is the son, who looks into the heart; the scientist studies the frame of things. The latter has no ear to hear the Father's voice. He sweeps the heavens with his telescope, and studies the atoms with his microscope, but cannot see God. He sees the operations of an infinite and eternal energy, but cannot break through the bounds of time and space into the throne of Jehovah. The prophet, however, beholds the source of this energy—God. Heaven and earth are full of the majesty of His glory. Whither shall I go from Thy spirit? Or, whither shall I flee from Thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven Thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall Thy hand lead me and Thy right hand shall hold me. (Ps. 139:7-10.)

The prophet stands at the center of being and studies things towards the circumference. He reads love, justice, and mercy in the cosmical structure. He construes the universe in terms of Fatherhood and Brotherhood. He speaks as a son, and, accordingly, uses the language of the home. The scientist begins at the circumference and studies towards the center. He construes the world through the atom and the molecule. He finds force and motion, order and law. But he cannot find the Father. He is not composed of atoms. Flesh and blood will not reveal Him. "Neither doth any know the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him." The one may be altogether ignorant of the wonderful world structure, the system of laws and interaction of forces. He finds the solution of all his problems in the ultimate person, God. The other may be so absorbed

with the frame of things, that he fails to reach the heart. He who observes both will find a rational order in which the physical and ethical blend in the vast system of nature as harmoniously as in the life of a mother ruling her home.

Le Conte says: "Suppose, then, I could remove the brain cap of one of you, and expose the brain to active work—as it doubtless is at this moment. What would I see? Only decomposition and recompositions, molecular agitation and vibrations; in a word physiological phenomena, and nothing else. There is nothing else there to see. But you, the subject of this experiment, what do you perceive? You see nothing of all this; you perceive an entirely different set of phenomena, viz.: consciousness—thought, emotion, will; psychical phenomena; in a word a self, a person. From the outside we see only the physical, from the inside only the psychical phenomena.

"Now take external nature—the cosmos—instead of the brain. The observer from the outside sees and can see only physical phenomena. But must there not be in this case, also, another side—psychical phenomena—consciousness, thought, will? In a word, a person? And if so, we must conclude, an infinite person and therefore the only complete personality that exists."*

In this illustration we find the spheres in which the prophet and scientists labor. The former is in communion with the person. He sees the inner side of the cosmos, and to him it appears in the form of consciousness—thought, emotion and will. The latter sees the outside of the cosmos, decomposition and recompositions, physiological phenomena and nothing else.

Perhaps we find the best expression of these respective methods in the Christ of John and the synthetic philosophy of Spencer. Their conception of God and the world show their limitations. The one lays his ear upon the bosom of things and hears the heart throbs of the eternal love; the other traces with his fingers the reign of eternal law. Robert Browning reconciles their messages when he sings, "All's love; yet all's law."

III. In considering the result of their work we call to mind a

* "God and Connected Outlines in the Light of Evolution," by Le Conte.

statement in Kant's *Traume eines Geistersehers*: "Der gesunde verstand bemerkt oft die wahrheit, eher als er die gründe einsieht, dadurch er sie beweisen oder erläutern kann." The same truth is expressed by Zezschwitz: "This is the way of a spiritual development of man, that what was once consciousness of living possession of nature is found again in the path of science." In comparing the results of their work it becomes clear that the one has often directly seen what the other after patient research has discovered. This constitutes the difference between the poet, the mystic, the prophet on the one hand, and the philosopher and scientist on the other.

Some old prophet speaks of the time when God breathed the breath of life into man and he became a living soul. That was indeed an epoch in the evolution of the race and in the onward movement of life. Then he leaped from the miry clay and broke the bondage of animalism. The earth became a paradise. Divinity flashed into humanity, and men could entertain God. Through the veil of matter gleamed the light of spirit. God walked in the garden in the cool of the day. He whispered in the breeze, He thundered in the sky, He trembled in the earthquake. With soul in man appeared soul in the world. The great person was recognized by his offspring, and the communion of love, the highest relation of the soul, was begun.

When the scientist proclaims the truth he speaks with another tongue. "The mind or psyche of man has developed together with and as the function of the medullary tube. Just as even now the brain and spinal marrow develop in each human individual from the simple medullary tube, so the human mind or the mental capacity of the human race has developed gradually, step by step from the mind of the lower vertebrates. Just as even now in every individual of the human race the wonderful and complex structure of the brain develops step by step from exactly the same five simple brain bladders as in all other skulled animals, so the human race has gradually developed in the course of millions of years, from the mind of the lower skulled animals. And as now the brain of every human embryo differentiates according to

the special type of the ape brain, so also the human psyche has historically differentiated from the ape mind."* Both proclaim the dawn of mind. The one declares the fact. Ages pass away, when the other is prepared to define the organic process.

Again, some one describes a scene in Arabia. For grandeur of conception, for artistic balance between form and idea, it is unexcelled in literature. The great genius of the Hebrews leaves the multitude on the barren plain. He climbs the rocky peak, cloud-capped and thunder-riven. Hidden from the gaze of man by clouds of glory, he lives in communion with the Eternal. The lightnings flash and the foundations rock, and the multitudes tremble, when a voice thunders in the depths of his being—*Thou shalt*. It was the first glimpse of an ethical order. Out of Egyptian bondage, from the seething flesh pots, man stepped into the inner life of God. Upon barren hills he found the land of promise, a moral world for which he was fashioned, and in which he was to rest forever. The voice of Sinai was the voice of God in the soul of man, spoken and heard as never before.

This process was repeated in a more prosaic way, centuries afterwards, by the sage of Königsburg—Immanuel Kant. Under the influence of Locke and Hume, men regarded all knowledge, as acquired by the senses and by reflection upon what was thus secured. They were going back to Egypt. Kant, however, convinced the thinking world that the mind is endowed with capacities transcending the reach of the senses and reflection. Pure reason is superior in its scope to the speculative reason. In the practical sphere he found something analogous to this. *The sense of duty is an original and native endowment of the Soul*. Moral obligation cannot be explained by referring it to experience, education, or reflection. "*Thou shalt*" is the unconditional imperative from a higher than a sensual sphere, in obedience to which man rises, victorious over the world of matter, into the freedom and life of the spirit. Fichte speaks of him as the Columbus of a new world within us, of the existence of which all deeper minds had a presentiment, which, however, had not yet

*The Evolution of Man, Haeckel, Vol. 2, p. 451.

been proven by science. He found the place where the real, eternal, supersensible world reached down into the phenomenal world of sense and consciousness. The point of union was the voice of conscience—*thou shalt*, which overcomes all sensuous impulses, brings to pass a new disposition, and produces new aims and purposes in man.

Like a new Moses, he ascended Mt. Sinai, and stood at the entrance of the spirit world. The mind of man was again freed from the bondage of sense. Moses and Kant joined hands across the gap of ages and proclaimed the key to the real world to be the will of man in obedience to the will of God. Both might unite in the words of the Deuterronomist; "Oh that there were such a heart in them that they would fear me and keep my commandments always that it might be well with them." * Obedience is the condition of blessing. Prosperity and peace are the children of Law. This is equally taught by Hebrew prophet and modern scientist.

Strange and mysterious was the voice of the peasant Rabbi, who had not learned letters, crying: "I am the light of the world." Men could not understand Him. Some said He was a Samaritan and had a devil. Others said He is beside Himself. Is not this the carpenter, Joseph's son? It has taken the world almost two thousand years to analyze, define and understand the words of the Nazarene. Whenever a principle of a purer and a nobler humanity has been won, whether in the silence of the cloister, or in the noise of the senate chamber; in the solitude of the desert, or in the din of the battle field, brought forth in travail and baptized with blood, it was only the naturalization, the reincarnation of some phase of the life of Jesus. The scientist finds Golgothas in the geologic strata; all nature red in tooth and claw in a struggle for life and the life of others. The cross of Calvary is impressed upon the countless æons as they come and go.

Political economists, turning from the dreams of Plato, More and Bellamy, have by a more rigid method of scientific research sought the ideal state. John Stuart Mill voices their conclusion

* Deut. 5: 29.

when he says : " Not even now could it be easy, even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of virtue from the abstract to the concrete, than to endeavor so to live that Christ would approve our lives."

The voice of the age, restless and tumultuous, reaching after a better and truer life will find expression in one of its greatest poets :

'Tis weakness in strength, that I cry for ! my flesh that I seek
In the Godhead ! I seek and find it. O Saul it shall be
A face like my face that receives thee : a man like to me,
Thou shalt love and be loved by, forever : a hand like this hand
Shall throw open the gates of new life !—See the Christ stand !*

We may rejoice in the fact that the prophet and the scientist are returning to reality. They stand face to face with the whole realm of phenomena and are divinely equipped for the exploration of the body and soul of the universe. The scientist is thinking God's thoughts after him. He finds a plan in the structure of the world. Everywhere he is convinced of a reign of law. In short, things are constructed after the scientific plan, or method.

The prophet should gratefully recognize the discoveries of science. His god is not less real because he is a God of law. The child need not love the mother less, when he learns the laws of her physical and moral life. *The prophet must point the scientist to the love that works in the law.* He shares the vision of the divine plan. To-day he can be prophet only as he sees this plan in the constitution of nature, man and history. He can be scientist only as he finds the consummation of things and their source in the great personality, which the laws of his being demand.

One man, however, can not grasp all truth. Each is to deliver his message and live his life accordingly. Then only will his nature be satisfied. All the tendrils of his being will twine around some branch of the tree of life. Not one man, age, or nation, can claim a monopoly of truth. *The organism of humanity, not the individual,* is the recipient of the fulness of God.

* Browning's Saul.

Never in the history of the world have the prospects been brighter than now. Out of the East, the home of primitive prophecy, comes a spirit to the West, the home of modern science. The geniuses of the hemispheres meet and coöperate in the solution of the great world problems. They will write new theologies, more commensurate with the mind of Christ. They will sing new psalms, throbbing with deeper loves. They will paint new pictures, carve new statues, breathing the life of a better age. Out of this great, chaotic movement, so mysterious and profound, will emerge a "humanity bound with golden chains around the feet of God."

ALLENTOWN, PA.

III.

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNCHURCHED.

BY THE EDITOR.

It is generally understood that a very large proportion of the population of the United States is at present without church relations. The precise number of this unchurched population, however, it is not easy to tell. According to the eleventh census of the United States, taken in 1890, the total number of communicant members of all the Christian denominations in the country amounted to 20,437,871, while the total population of the country was 62,622,250. This makes the proportion of communicant church members to the population 32.63 per cent. In this enumeration the Mormons and Spiritualists are counted among Christian denominations; and the total number of denominations is put down at 143. How complete this count is may be seen from the fact that an apology is presented for not counting one denomination of 21 members, because it had no definite organization. Everything entitled to be called Christian was counted. Of the Christian communicants 14,180,000 are Protestants, 6,257,871 Roman Catholics. This leaves 67.27 per cent. of the population, or 42,184,379 persons, who are not communicant church members; and by communicant church members are understood all persons who are so related to some church as to have the right to commune. Since the census was taken the population of the country has probably increased by ten millions; but the relative proportions of church members and non-church members has doubtless remained about the same. Certainly the percentage of church members has not increased.

But, now, these people who are not communicant church members, are not by any means all un-Christian; nor are they even all non-church members. Many of them are baptized members

of the various churches, though not yet in full communion; and many are adherents of the churches, either by birth or inclination, attending more or less regularly upon their services, without having become regular members. This makes the question as to the precise number of unchurched people in the country a question difficult, if not impossible, of solution. Dr. H. K. Carroll, one of the commissioners of the eleventh census, in "*The Religious Forces of the United States*," proposes to multiply the number of Protestant communicants by 3.5 in order to get the whole number of Protestant Christians; that is, he supposes that for every communicant church member there are two and a-half adherents, who will most likely sometime become full members. According to this method of computation we should get 49,630,000 Protestant Christians. Adding to this number the total Catholic population, which is 7,362,000, their unconfirmed membership being 1,103,000, we should have a total Christian population of 56,992,000, leaving 5,630,250 persons without any church relations at all; and these latter would not by any means be all irreligious persons. That would be a pretty good showing for a land in which religion is entirely free, and in which the non-profession of it entails no civil disabilities.

But is this method of computation trustworthy? Notwithstanding the high authority by which it is commended, we can not think that it is. The assumed proportion of two and a half to one between the adherents and communicants of the various Protestant denominations, we believe to be altogether too large. Take, for instance, the case of our own Church. Our "unconfirmed" members represent substantially our "adherents." But now, in 1890, the year in which the census was taken, our confirmed or communicant membership was 202,833. Multiplying this number by 2.5, we should have 507,082 unconfirmed or adherent members. But in the same year the number of our unconfirmed members was only 111,240; while the number of people not connected with any Church habitually worshipping with us was comparatively small—at least nothing like 500,000, as it should have been on the above supposition. The proportion

of unconfirmed to confirmed members in our Church is fifty-four per cent. And we presume that about the same proportion holds in the Lutheran and Episcopal Churches. In the Catholic Church the proportion is only fourteen per cent., owing to the fact that this Church confirms her young people at a much earlier age than is customary in most Protestant Churches. In the various branches of the Presbyterian, Methodist and Baptist Churches the proportion of the number of adherents to that of communicants is probably considerably larger. But here also a much larger number of adherents fail ever to connect with the Church. A very considerable number of the members of Methodist and Baptist households, as we know, never become members of the Church; and the case is still worse among the smaller sects, like the Dunkards, Mennonites, etc. It may be said, indeed, that most of the people who are "adherents" of the Church only, and not members, are in some sense Christians, and therefore lose no substantial benefit of Christianity. That, however, is not the question with which we are now concerned. Our question now is, not what is the benefit of church membership, but how many church members are there in this country.

If the proportion which exists in our own Church between unconfirmed and confirmed members, or between adherents and communicants, were universal, then the total number of adherents would be 11,036,450, which, added to the number of communicants, would make a total of 31,474,320 church members in the widest sense, leaving an equal number who are without any Church relations at all. We believe, then, that we shall not be far wrong if we estimate the number of persons in the United States who are not connected with any Church to be at least from 20,000,000 to 25,000,000. Of this unchurched population 132,000 are members of religious bodies that are not Christian—Jews, Buddhists, Ethical Culturists, etc. The balance are, for the most part, people whose ancestors were once members of the Church, and who, from various causes, have drifted away from the Church. The majority of these people, of course, are not infidels or atheists, and many of them may

even not be opposed to Christianity as such, but they are outside of the Church and the Church has no influence over them. And these unchurched masses are found prevailing in our urban population. In the country and in the smaller towns and villages the number of the unchurched is not nearly as large as it is in the larger towns and cities. In 1890 the number of Protestant churches compared to population in seven of the largest cities of the country was as follows: Boston, 1 to 2,581; Brooklyn, 1 to 2,890; Buffalo, 1 to 2,650; Chicago, 1 to 3,601; Cincinnati, 1 to 2,195; St. Louis, 1 to 2,930; New York, 1 to 4,361. Of course, in these places there are Roman Catholic churches, but their influence upon the religious and moral life of the nation is usually not believed to be of the most desirable character, and even if they are counted for all that they are worth, the religious destitution of these cities will still be enormous. And besides all this, it must be remembered that even in Protestant Churches there are many merely nominal members, who never attend church at all, or at least very irregularly. Any one passing through the streets of a city like Lancaster on a Sunday morning or evening, when the church bells are ringing, and looking at the crowds, especially of *men*, who are *not* going to church, may get some idea of the esteem in which the Church is held by a great mass of American people.*

There is no question, then, that the number of the unchurched masses in this country is very large, and that a mission field is here presented to the Churches which is of vast proportions. And it is a field in which both Christian love and patriotism should move us to labor with energy and zeal. Our love to Christ and to the souls of men should inspire us to labor with all our might for the salvation of those who in our own land are out-

* On the religious condition of the United States compare, besides the work already referred to, namely, "The Religious Forces in the United States," especially the two works by Dr. Josiah Strong, "Our Country" and the "New Era." These works depict the condition of things which existed about eight or ten years ago. But there has been no material change since, and what was true ten years ago is substantially true still, while in some respects the condition is worse now than it was ever before.

side of the fold of Christ. But our love to our country and our desire for its future prosperity should be an equally strong motive in the same direction. The perils to which the country is exposed—perils arising from ignorance, from superstition, from intemperance, from the greed of gain and the lust of power, from the discontent of the poor, and from the violence and tyranny of the rich—these perils can be avoided only by the dissemination of the principles of the Gospel, and by securing for these principles sentiments of respect and reverence. The so-called dangerous classes, whether found in the ranks of the proletariat or of the plutocracy, can only be made harmless by converting them into upright and conscientious Christian citizens. The planting of churches, the preaching of the Gospel, and the lifting up of men and women to a higher life, in the crowded cities, will in the end be found to be the only sure method of abolishing the saloon, the sweat-shop, and the low tenement house. As we, therefore, love our country and desire its future prosperity, we should labor earnestly for the evangelization of the unchurched masses around us.

But how shall we reach these masses? That is the problem now before the American churches. All the churches are more or less engaged in doing missionary work among those who are outside; but their success, it must be confessed, has not thus far been very flattering. The reason of this is probably that the work has not been adapted to the condition of those in whose behalf it has been carried on. In order to successful missionary work we need first of all to understand the condition and history of those in whose behalf we would labor. This is true of foreign missionary work. The man who would be successful as a missionary among the heathen must understand their mental, moral and religious condition and be able to sympathize even with their very superstitions and errors. And it is true also of home missionary work. The estranged masses can only be won to the Church by coming into real and earnest sympathy with them; and that is only possible on condition of a thorough understanding of them. In all cases a careful diagnosis must

precede successful treatment. Now there is one circumstance to be considered in relation to our unchurched masses, which differentiates them from the masses of un-Christian lands, and which must condition any Christian work in their behalf; and that is the circumstance that, with few unimportant exceptions, these people are the descendants of persons who were members of the Church either in this country or in Europe. Either they or their ancestors one or two generations back were members of the Church, and for some cause they have ceased to be such. Robert G. Ingersoll is the son of a Congregational clergyman, and his case is a typical one. Among the unchurched masses numerous individuals could be found, whose ancestors once occupied high places in the Church. Now we think that the first question involved in the problem of bringing back to the Church these estranged masses, is the question as to the cause of their estrangement. Manifestly that cause must be removed before anything very important can be accomplished in the way of bringing them back. What is it, then, that has driven out of the Church these masses, whose ancestors for many generations were members thereof, and in whose very blood Christianity might have been supposed to have had an existence?

Now we may not be able perhaps to enumerate all the causes that have contributed to this result, but we think that among them the following have been the most influential: 1. The unbelief of wickedness; 2. Skepticism occasioned by the antagonism of theology and science; 3. The preaching of an unchurchly theology; 4. The economic pressure and social discontent of the times; 5. The divisions of the Church.

First, then, there is the *unbelief of wickedness*, or of mere bad will, that is keeping some people out of the Church. For this we can assign no cause. Sin has no cause other than the self-determination of the created will. If sin could be referred to some cause outside of the will, as a disease may be referred to a sudden change of temperature, or to the presence of a deleterious influence in the atmosphere, then sin would be taken out of the realm of the moral and become merely a physical effect. Least

of all would we dare to refer the origin of sin to a divine ordination or decree; for in that case God Himself would be the responsible author of it. Any attempt to escape these conclusions, while admitting the principles to which they are related, must be counted among those prevarications of theology, which have themselves done much to make the Church odious to many active minds. Now for people who are out of the Church from mere badness of will the Church can, of course, have no responsibility; and they form no important element in the problem of the unchurched. Under a State-church system, where civil privileges are connected with church membership, such persons might be in the Church; but they would not in that case be any better than they are now. But people of this kind are not numerous in a community; and the assumption which the Christian minister is bound to make, is that all sinners are capable of being saved, if only the Gospel is brought to them in a form adapted to their mental and moral condition. Any Christian minister who assumes that the half of mankind consists of reprobates who are "ordained to destruction for the glory of God," has mistaken his calling, and ought to get out of the sacred office through which God commands men that they should *all everywhere* repent.

A second cause that is keeping people out of the Church is *skepticism* as to some of the dogmas of the Church, if not some of the truths of the Bible. The progress of historical and physical science in modern times has made belief in some of the accepted dogmas of Christianity difficult, and the consequence is that there is in some of the noblest minds a degree of doubt that is keeping them out of the Church. But doubt is not unbelief, and it is the business of the Church so to present the Gospel to the doubter as to turn his doubt into belief. Honest doubt, like that of Thomas, will give way when it is shown either that the thing doubted is not an essential part of Christianity, or that, if it is essential, it is of such a nature that doubt in regard to it is irrational. We do not believe that the number of people who are kept out of the Church by this cause is very large; but among them are included some of the most intelligent and conscientious

men in the country. And the number is large enough to cause the Church at least to consider the question whether she ought not to revise her creeds and her methods of interpreting Scripture in such a way as to bring them into harmony with the critical and scientific thought of the age. The present age is not an age of easy credulity. And yet it is an age of deep seriousness, and an age that wants to believe something and have something to rest in. Mysteries may still be believed, but impossibilities will not. Men are not now willing to say with Tertullian, "I believe, because the thing which I believe is impossible;" and the Church must no longer make such demands upon the credulity of those to whom she preaches the Gospel. The Church, of course, cannot surrender anything essential of her faith. She could not, for instance, give up any of the foundation articles of the Apostles' Creed. But when the confessions teach doctrines which are contrary to common sense or to the best ethical sentiments of the age, and when church membership is made conditional upon subscription to these confessions, then we think the Church is responsible for some, at least, of the skepticism which is keeping people out of her pale. And if that be so, then it is time for her certainly to think of revising her confessions and adapting her Gospel to the conditions of the living mind of the age to which we belong. The fact that some of her best and most conscientious children are falling out of her ranks, and that her ablest and most active-minded young men refuse to enter her ministry, certainly calls for a study of the subject here under consideration; and the Church will not be able to fulfill her destiny until she shall have attended to this duty. It is said of Christ that, when He preached, "the common people heard Him gladly;" and we firmly believe that when Christ shall be preached again in the direct and living way in which He preached Himself, without the lumber of unintelligible scholastic formulas, the same thing may be said again. The people do not doubt Christ so much as they doubt the interpretations of Him to which they have been so often treated.

In the third place, we believe that an *unchurchly theology* is a

cause that keeps out of the church great numbers of people who are not hostile to Christianity. The theology which has reigned in most of the churches of this country for more than a century past, has taught that the Church is not of much account in the "plan of salvation"—that one can be saved quite well without the Church, and that without the conviction of having been saved, or converted, no one ought to think of joining the Church. In this theology salvation is simply a matter of private arrangement between the soul of the sinner and God, and the question of "joining the Church" should never be seriously entertained until that private arrangement has been attended to. Indeed, to join the Church without having "experienced religion" is believed to be an act of the highest kind of sacrilege. And as religion is not a thing that can be experienced at will, but a thing that can only be gotten when it pleases the Holy Spirit and the managers of the Church to get up a revival, and not by everybody even then, it comes to pass that there are numbers of people who are outside of the Church, not because they want to be outside, but because they think they have no right to be within. They would like to be in; and some day, when they have gotten religion, they expect to join. But for great masses of men that day never comes, and they live and die outside of the Church. According to the theory now under consideration this fact in itself, of course, involves no disadvantage; for to have died without the Church is no positive proof that one may not have had religion; and at funerals of outsiders the hope is usually expressed that in some secret way the departed may have experienced religion and be all right. Now we say nothing of the merits of this view. It may be true, or it may not. What we are concerned with now is simply its bearing upon the question of church membership; and that this must be unfavorable can easily be understood.

This unchurchly theory of Christianity came into currency, in Great Britain and America, in connection with the revival which began in the latter part of the last century and continued on into the third quarter of the present. And it came as a reaction against the heartless ecclesiasticism of former times. It was a

protest against the doctrine that church membership and the performance of Church rites secure salvation irrespective of character. The notion was too prevalent that, no matter how a person lives, he will be all right if he has been baptized, has had a bishop's hands laid upon him in confirmation, goes to communion at Easter, and supports the Church. But another equally unhealthy form of ecclesiasticism maintained that salvation depends merely upon the diligent attendance at "Sabbath meetings," upon holding the "sound doctrine," and upon praying much through the nose. Over against these extremes of ecclesiasticism the doctrine was proclaimed that there is no benefit at all in objective Christianity, that the Church is merely an arrangement for the safe-keeping of Christians after they are made—the communion of saints, but not the mother of saints, and that the sacraments are not means of grace but only badges of profession, whose value lies in their being performed according to what was supposed to be a divinely instituted form, and in the pious sentiments which one brings to this performance. Baptism, for instance, does not help a person to become a Christian; but on the contrary one ought to be baptized in order to show that one is a Christian, provided he can find out from the New Testament what is the right form of baptism. So with all the ordinances of the Church: they are not means of grace, but only signs of profession after one has obtained grace; and grace is like the wind which no one can tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth, except that it has usually been supposed to have some connection with the mourner's bench.

It is this theory which, more than anything else, has landed outside of the Church so many of her own children. They are outside because they have been taught to believe that they have no right to be in it. They are not opposed to the Church or to Christianity; they are outside only because they conscientiously believe themselves to be unfit to be within. This kind of conscientious people often present the most serious difficulty to the Christian minister or missionary. To the minister's appeal to enter the Church they will answer perhaps that they can be as

good outside of the Church as in it, that it is not church membership that secures salvation, but conversion, and that there are already too many people in the Church who are not Christians. Now, in order to meet the wants of this class of outsiders, the Gospel must be presented in a more churchly and sacramental form than has been the fashion in a large part of the Protestant Church during a century past. Whatever may be said of the possibility of salvation outside of the Church in a community in which Christianity is known, it is certain that Christianity itself can not exist long except in the form of the Church. And however noble the motive may have been in the preaching of an unchurchly Gospel, the result has been disastrous. That motive was the realization of a pure Church in which there should be no unconverted members. But now, instead of one pure Church, we have a large number of warring sects on the one hand, and a great mass of unchurched people on the other. A certain sect whose preachers we used to hear exhorting the members of the Churches "to come out of Sodom and join the hosts of salvation," was a few years ago rent asunder by internal disputes, and its highest officials were trying to establish each other's mendacity in the civil courts. Their argument for getting members from the other Churches used to be that there is no good in church membership, and that people must come to them to get religion. That argument has been accepted by a great many people and turned even against those who first used it. There is no use in church membership, people say; and hence the masses of the unchurched are growing larger every day.

Now the Gospel that shall be successful in bringing back these masses must be a churchly Gospel; that is to say, it must attach some importance to the Church in the economy of Christianity. This does not mean a repristination of the ecclesiasticism of the middle ages. The time for that is past. This age cannot, to any considerable extent, be made again to believe in priestcraft, or in the efficacy of magic formulas and rituals. Bells, and lighted candles, and incense, and holy water will no longer be believed much to affect the character and fortunes of the soul.

But this age can be made to understand that Christianity is after all something more than subjective feeling and sentiment. Christianity is an organic, vital constitution in the world, having its fountain of regenerative power in Christ, and the sphere of its energy in the Church, which is for this reason called the body of Christ, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all. The Church is not only the organic medium through which the divine life is quickened in the individual soul, but also the appropriate environment under the stimulating influence of which that life is developed. The Church, then, is not merely a voluntary association, but a society created by the spirit and power of Christ, serving as a bosom of gracious influences and operations, in the active presence of which the individual is transformed into the image of Christ. The individual sinner is not required to transform himself, but to allow himself to be transformed by mirroring the glory of the Lord, that is, by receiving into himself and reflecting the ethical and spiritual power of Christ, which dwells in His body the Church. Hence, church membership is not an idle thing in the process of the development of the spiritual life; and the sacraments are not empty ceremonies with which the spiritual life of the Christian has nothing to do. On the contrary, they are efficacious means of grace, stimulating and helping the development of the Christian life. They do not create the Christian life by a mere physical operation. That idea would be no better than the notion which supposes the same result to be accomplished by a mere blow struck by the Holy Spirit out of the universal ether. The sacraments are holy ordinances of the Church in connection with which, or by means of which, the Holy Spirit acts upon men's souls in the way of moral and religious stimulation, helping them, through the spiritual activity thus aroused and maintained in them, to become more and more conformed to the image of Christ. This construction of the Gospel, which makes due account of this agency of the Church and her ordinances in the economy of salvation, is the churchly construction of the Gospel; and this we believe to be the form in which the Gospel is presented in the New Testament.

And it is the form also in which the Gospel was preached by the Reformers, in whatever varying terminology it may have been couched. And if the Gospel were now generally preached in this form, we are sure that the number of the unchurched masses would be very much smaller than it is.

Again, *economic and social depression and dissatisfaction* form one of the causes which in our day contribute to the separation of numbers from the Church. Society is in a ferment of discontent in consequence of what is supposed to be an unequal distribution of the products of industry, and an increasing pressure of the struggle for existence upon the less favored classes. The laboring classes are convinced that they are not getting a fair share of the wealth which they are helping to produce, and that they can not satisfy their daily wants in the highly advanced society of the present day. What were luxuries a century ago are necessities now, and yet they are beyond the reach of a large part of the laboring classes. Hence there is a continual feeling of discontent among them, and a struggle to improve their condition, which frequently rises into conflict with the exploiting capitalists. Now in this struggle to improve their condition the laboring men are persuaded that the Church does not sympathize with them. She is supposed to be on the side rather of wealth and power. She is an institution of the rich, supported by their money, and believed to be managed in their interest. Hence, in the great industrial centers, the laboring men, even if not positively hostile, are for the most part indifferent to the Church. They do not attend church. One of the most striking features of city congregations is the small number of the men who attend, and the almost total absence of laboring men. This is due doubtless to social causes. The employees of a great manufacturing institution would no more think of going to their employers' church, than they would think of eating at their employers' tables or sleeping in their beds. The style and fashion of the Church would prevent them from doing this, even if they had no other considerations. But they do not look upon the Church as a helpful ally in their struggle for existence. They

think they are getting more benefit from their associations and lodges; and the lodge room consequently has more attractions for them than the church. Many, moreover, claim that they could not afford to attend church, even if they desired to attend. They could not pay pew rent, and meet the demands for money which the churches are continually making. They need all that they can earn in the uncertain condition of the labor market, to keep soul and body together. They can not afford to clothe themselves and their children as the church people clothe themselves, and would therefore feel out of place in church. And the case is not helped by the establishment of chapels for their benefit, supported by the pockets of the rich. That would be a sort of living of the crumbs which fall from the tables of the rich, a thing which dogs may do, but men will not do.

This condition of the laboring classes presents one of the most difficult problems which confront the Church at the present time. A full discussion of this problem would belong to a treatise on Christian sociology; and in this place we must content ourselves with stating merely a few general principles. If, then, we would influence to any large extent the mind of the laboring classes, in their present attitude towards the Church, they must be made to understand, in the first place, that the Church is not merely an institution of this world, with merely worldly ideals and aims. Her main object is to prepare men for blessedness in a world to come. Men must be made to comprehend that they may be poor in this world's goods, and yet blessed. Neither manhood nor blessedness consists in the abundance of the things which men possess, but rather in what they are. And it is the office of the Church to labor for the making of the man, not for the procuring of riches for him. It is not the business of the Church to furnish the bread which perishes, but the bread which endures unto eternal life. And if men are caring for nothing but loaves, then the Church is not the place for them. To those who followed Jesus to Capernaum after the miraculous feeding in the wilderness, He said: "Ye seek me not because ye saw signs, but because ye ate of the loaves and were filled. Work

not for the meat which perisheth, but for the meat which abideth unto eternal life, which the Son of man shall give unto you," John 6: 26-27. Christ does not want disciples who follow Him merely for bread and butter. This is a truth upon which the Church must ever insist. We do not agree with the Roman Catholic doctrine that the Church is merely a supernatural institution which is concerned only with men's lives beyond the earth; but we must hold nevertheless that it is the main end of the Church to care for the moral and spiritual development of men, and that it can be concerned with temporal affairs only so far as they minister to that development. In so far the Kingdom of God is not of this world.

But, secondly, the laboring classes and the suffering classes must be made to understand that the Church is after all not indifferent to men's condition in the present life, that she desires the well-being of all men alike and labors for it, and that the Gospel which she preaches is the only means for the realization of this condition. Whatever may have been the actual shortcomings of the Church in the past, it is nevertheless true that the ethical principles of the Gospel which the Church preaches are the only principles that can bring relief to this sinful and suffering world. If the central doctrines of the Gospel were universally recognized and obeyed among men, they would soon effect a regeneration of society as well as of individuals, and make life even in this world vastly better and happier than it is. The doctrine of the universal fatherhood of God and of the brotherhood of men, the doctrine of the value and dignity of human personality apart from any earthly conditions, the doctrine of the impartial righteousness of God who desires that all men should be treated with fairness, justice and love, and who will punish any violation of the principle of humanity by rich or poor—these doctrines of the Gospel are the only principles that will ever serve to realize that condition of society in which unity, equality and fraternity shall be actual qualities. The preachers who treat the principles of fraternity and equality as extravagances of the French revolution, and who represent the Gospel as

a contrivance which makes it possible for sinners, especially rich sinners, to be saved along with the gains of their ungodliness, do but misrepresent the Gospel as well as the Church. They are not inspired by Christ and the New Testament, and they are not true servants of the Church. And this is what the laboring classes, the oppressed and suffering classes, should be made to understand. They should be made to understand that the Church after all is their best friend, and that there is no other institution in the world that is so deeply interested in their welfare as the Church.

But in order to accomplish this result the Church must not merely preach the Gospel of universal love, and humanity, and fairness, but she must also practice it. She must show by her works that she has not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ with respect of persons, James 2:1. The people who grow rich by the exploitation of the labor of the poor, and who fare sumptuously every day and make a display of their fine apparel, must not be treated with more distinction by the Church than the humblest Christians who have neither money nor fine clothes. But in order to accomplish her mission in the world the Church must even go farther than this. She must have the courage to raise her voice against oppression and wrong in times of public excitement and clamor. It is not sufficient at such times to exhort those who have not the necessities of life to be content with their lot and obedient to the laws, while not a word of disapprobation is spoken in regard to the rich and powerful who are the other party in the contest. Too often have the ministers of the Church been led to pursue this unchristian and cowardly course; and the consequence is empty churches. A writer of sacred scripture manifests another spirit and a higher courage when he says to the rich oppressors of his day: "Go to now, ye rich, weep and howl for your miseries that are coming upon you. Your riches are corrupted and your garments are moth-eaten. Your gold and your silver are rusted; and their rust shall be for a testimony against you, and shall eat your flesh as fire. Ye have laid up your treasure in the last days. Behold, the hire of the laborers

who mowed your fields, which is of you kept back by fraud, crieth out: and the cries of them that reaped have entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth. Ye have lived delicately on the earth, and taken your pleasure; ye have nourished your hearts in a day of slaughter. Ye have condemned, ye have killed the righteous; he doth not resist," James 5: 1-6. Possibly if a Christian minister were now to use that kind of language some circuit court judge might be found who would serve an injunction upon him to keep silent; but we are sure that he would not be preaching to empty pews. Would not, however, in that case the rich withdraw from the Church and leave her without means to carry on her work? We do not believe that they would. We should not give the rich credit for being more depraved than they are; and we believe that the plain and positive testimony of the Church would in many cases serve to prevent those causes which contribute so much to the embitterment of the masses against the classes, and to the separation of the former from the Church.

But, finally, *the division of the Church* forms another cause of separation between her and great numbers of people. The question, which is the true Church, is often asked by people who are not insincere. Here are a variety of denominations—their number in the United States is 143—all of which claim to be the true Church, and some of which deny this quality to others. One claims to have the only correct mode of baptism, all others being wrong; and another claims that it alone has the correct method of conversion; another, that it alone possesses a legitimate ministry; and still another, that it alone confesses the true doctrine. What in these circumstances are humble souls to do, who want to be in the true Church, but can not make up their minds as to where the true Church is to be found? No matter where they may go, somebody will tell them that they are not in the true Church. The Lutheran will tell the Reformed that his religion is not satisfactory because he does not hold to the "sound doctrine;" the Methodist will tell the Lutheran that he is not converted and that his church membership will not save him; the Baptist will inform all three of them that they are outside of the

pale because they were not rightly baptized, although he may admit that they may still be Christians ; the Episcopalian will assure the whole company that they can have no true sacraments and consequently no true religion, because they do not have ministers of "apostolic succession;" and the Catholic, finally, will serve notice upon all parties, the Episcopalian included, that he as the successor of St. Peter holds the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and that none will enter except by his door. In this confusion of voices, and pretensions, and claims, what are honest and serious people to do? What many of them are doing is to stay out of the Church altogether. They say it will be time enough to join the Church when the Church people shall have settled the question, what and where the Church is.

But the divisions of the Church help to swell the number of outsiders in another way. It is impossible for each denomination to be everywhere. There are thousands of places in which but one or two churches can be supported. It must often happen, therefore, that, when people move about from place to place, they get into localities where no church of their denomination exists. What are they to do? In many cases they cannot connect with any of the existing churches. The Baptists, Episcopalians, as well as Catholics, for instance, would exact conditions which no self-respecting Christian of the Reformed or Lutheran Church could accept. Some of the smaller sects would do so likewise. In these circumstances people who have moved into places where their own Church does not exist, will generally for a time keep up a sort of connection with their home church, but after awhile they become indifferent, and their church membership ceases altogether. This cause is doubtless responsible for the present separation of large numbers of people from the Church. Is there any remedy for this condition of things? None other than the more general preaching of an unsectarian Gospel, and the lowering of the fences between the denominations. Denominationalism itself is no necessary evil, nor is it even inconsistent with the unity of the Church ; but sectarianism is something else. Sectarianism consists not in the separate existence of any body of

Christian believers, but in the spirit of exclusiveness which denies the quality of Christian to other equally pious bodies of believers. And this is a demon in American Christianity that must be exorcised before the success of the Gospel can become complete.

Besides these general causes of estrangement from the Church, which have now been enumerated, others also may be mentioned which, though less general in extent, are nevertheless not without considerable effect. One of these is *Sunday work*. In furnaces, rolling mills, and factories, on railroad trains, and trolley lines, and in numerous other capacities, large numbers of men are employed every Sunday. But men who are compelled to work every Sunday can not be expected to be very good church members. Sunday *amusements* and *excursions* are another cause which keeps many people out of church. During the summer season especially, the Sunday excursion trains carry hundreds of thousands of people from city, town, and country to places of amusement; and the trolley lines perform the same service on a smaller scale. It is in this way that rich and powerful corporations on Sunday filch from the pockets of the poor the little that is left of their small earnings during the week, at the same time that the officers of these corporations with their wives are in church perhaps hearing eloquent essays on "the divine legation of Moses," or "the blessings of Apostolic succession." The use of the *bicycle* also keeps many people out of the Church. Many young men who have gotten so far as to have possessed themselves of wheels, can not resist the temptation of a ride into the country on Sunday morning when the church bells are ringing. These are causes, however, which operate not so much to prejudice the minds of the masses against the Church, as rather to poison their morals and gradually wean them away from their spiritual mother. What the Church needs to do in the face of these circumstances is simply to exercise a more watchful care over her members, and utter more loudly her protest against these forms of evil; which, however, will not be entirely abated until the rights of Christians on Sunday shall be better protected by the civil law than they are now.

From what has now been said it will appear that the problem of the unchurched is largely a sociological as well as a theological and ecclesiastical problem. The Church, however, can not suspend her efforts to regain the unchurched masses until the sociological conditions shall be so changed as to eliminate this element of the problem. We believe that that change will come, and that the Church herself will be an important factor in bringing it to pass. But meanwhile it is her duty to do something towards reaching and gaining the unevangelized masses. What, then, can she do in order to this end? The only answer that we can think of is this, that, bearing in mind the causes which have landed these masses outside of the Church, she must preach to them the Gospel in a way adapted to their mental and moral condition. We believe that the Gospel, when rightly administered, with due consideration of the intellectual, moral and religious conditions of those to whom it is administered, will not fail to accomplish its result. Only we must be sure that what we preach is the Gospel, and not something else in place of it. But the Gospel means Christ—not a doctrine about Christ, but Christ Himself in His mind and person. It is not the evangelist's business to convert the world to any system of dogmas, or to any order of Church polity, or to any ritual of worship, or to any theories of science, but to Christ. But Christ must be presented in His adaptation to the moral and religious wants of men at the present time. If the masses are to be won, Christ must be preached now with the same directness and simplicity as He once preached Himself. The message of the preacher must be the same as that which Christ brought. It must be good tidings to the poor, the proclamation of release to the captives, the recovering of sight to the blind, and liberty to them that are bruised. Let this be the burden of the preacher's message, and let that message be clothed in a churchly and sacramental, not merely in a dogmatic and unethical form, and we believe that the masses will now hear the preacher as gladly as they heard the Master nineteen centuries ago. What is needed is that the Gospel be presented in such way as to bring regenerating and sanctifying

power to the hearts of men, just as the words of Christ Himself did. In that case men will come to hear. No flock of sheep could be kept to the fold by giving them *lectures* on the advantages of having food; but they can be kept to it by giving them food itself. That is a parable, and the interpretation of it is easy.

A few words may here be devoted to the question as to what extent, if at all, any departure from the regular order of administering the Gospel, for the sake of reaching outsiders, may be lawful and expedient. The revival system, once relied upon as the power of God for this end, has proven a failure. It is this very system that is responsible to a large extent for the fact that so many people are now outside of the Church. This system is not diminishing, but increasing, the number of outsiders. And, besides, it has lost its power. An old-fashioned revival can now only be gotten up in out-of-the-way places, and among the rudest and most uncultured people. In its ruder forms this system has, therefore, been abandoned even by the churches that once practiced it exclusively. And the milder and more quiet system of Mr. Moody does not answer as an efficient substitute; and, besides, Mr. Moody, too, has lost his power. In the days of his strength the result of a campaign was always the conversion of a great number of people; but the difficulty was that the majority did not stay converted nor come into the Church. The essential vice of this system is that it is subjective, unchurchly and unsacramental.

But what shall be said of the educational or catechetical system, which we are wont to regard as the opposite of the revival system? This, we believe, to be the best Church system. It is the best system for retaining within the Church her own children, and training them up into good and pious members. It is, moreover, in most essential agreement with the nature of Christianity as an objective system of divine nurture. It belongs essentially to the churchly and sacramental conception of Christianity. But it presupposes the existence of the Church, and of a well ordered Church life. It does not presuppose that every generation must be won for Christianity anew. It presumes that Christianity has

become a social power, and that the Church is co-extensive with the community. It is only under such conditions that the catechetical system can produce its best results. The proper subjects of catechization are not without, but within the Church—those who were born within the Church and carry the seal of their Christian citizenship in their Christian names received in baptism. These are the kind of catechumens especially presupposed by the Heidelberg Catechism.* In a somewhat modified form, indeed, the catechetical system may be applied in the training of unbaptized young people in the Sunday-school. Careful catechetical instruction concerning the leading articles of the Christian faith, emphasizing especially the necessity and benefit of Church membership, may do much towards diminishing the number of outsiders; and in this way the Sunday-school may be made to be much more of a missionary help to the Church than is the case now. But while the children and young people may to some extent be reached through the Sunday-school, the masses of unchurched adults cannot be thus reached. No minister would succeed if he should go among the churchless masses in mills and factories, with catechism in hand, and ask them to attend a six months' course of catechizing as a condition of connecting with the Church. In order to reach these masses, in places where they are found, some quicker and more direct method must be adopted. The systematic emotional revival campaign will not answer. But a more rational system of "missions," consisting in protracted series of services with sermons more or less of an apologetic character, adapted to the comprehension of the masses, will be likely to accomplish more. These, however, must be supplemented by constant personal effort on the part of the preacher. The preacher is to go out and compel men to come in. That is his duty. But that does not mean that the provisions of the feast are to be taken out into the highways and hedges, and

* It should be remembered that the catechetical system of the modern Protestant Churches is essentially different from that which prevailed in the early Church. The latter had for its end the preparation of the heathen for baptism; the former looks to the preparation of the baptized children of the Church for full membership.

served there. The abandonment of the consecrated house of worship, and the resort to halls and theatres for the sake of bringing in outsiders, must always be of doubtful propriety and effect. And the campmeeting, which was once supposed to be a powerful missionary institution, as it is conducted in modern times, we are sure, is doing far more evil than good. With its concomitants of Sunday excursions and traffic, it is demoralizing to any community in which it is held.

We have, then, no specific to offer as a remedy for the evil of a vast churchless population. The only effectual method of bringing outsiders into the Church and keeping them there, and thus making this really a Christian country, is to administer the old Gospel and the old Sacraments in such way as to adapt them to the mind and to the wants of this new and modern age.

IV.

JAPANESE BUDDHISM.

BY REV. D. B. SCHNEDER.

The growth of Buddhism after the death of its founder was rapid. Very soon after his first sermon Buddha sent out sixty converts with this commission: "I am delivered from all fetters human and divine. You, too, O monks, are delivered from the same fetters. Go forth and wander everywhere, out of compassion for the world, and for the welfare of gods and men. Go forth, one by one, in different directions. Preach the doctrine in its beginning, its middle and its end, in its spirit and in its letter. Proclaim a life of perfect restraint, chastity and celibacy. I will go also and preach this doctrine." Buddhism was from the beginning, therefore, and has been more or less throughout its history a missionary faith. For this reason, the new way of salvation became known before many centuries in regions beyond the land of its birth, Ceylon, Siam, Burma, Anam and the islands of the South; also Nepal, Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria, China, Korea and Japan in the course of time accepted the new faith, and Buddhism became the great religion of Asia. Curiously enough, however, it could not retain its ground in India, the land of its nativity. There Brahmanism reasserted itself, though not without becoming materially modified through its contact with Buddhism, partly owing to which it is now known under the new name of Hinduism. Another remarkable feature of the history of Buddhism has been its failure to displace certain native religions with which it came in contact in other countries. In some instances it succeeded in gaining the control over only a part of the territory, so to speak, of man's spiritual nature. In China, for example, it holds the ground conjointly with Confucianism and Taoism in such a way that most Chinese are Confu-

cianists, Taoists and Buddhists at the same time. A similar state of affairs prevails in Japan and Korea. For this reason there is great divergence in the estimates made of the strength of Buddhism, Rhys Davids, for instance, making the number of Buddhists in Asia about 500 millions, while Monier-Williams puts the figure at only 100 millions. The discrepancy is produced by counting, or refusing to count, people who belong to other faiths at the same time.

Hand in hand with the growth of Buddhism, however, went a profound change in its character. Primitive Buddhism was an atheistic humanitarianism, being without a God, without a revelation, without priests, without temples, without sacrifices, without prayer, insisting on the boldest simplicity, the most rigorous self-denial, and the extremest negative purity, and aiming at the extinction of personal existence. The Buddhism of to-day, while existing in Protean forms, is a cult that can nevertheless be generally characterized as an idolatrous polytheism with theistic tendencies. It has been an approach toward, rather than a movement away from, the true conception of a religion. Buddha is worshipped as a god, as are also many other beings, in the forms of numberless images. Both the historical and the legendary teachings of Buddha and of his early followers are held in abjectest reverence as being divine revelations. Vast hordes of priests perform the rites and ceremonies of an elaborate sacerdotalism in thousands of gorgeously built temples, making offerings and chanting prayers for the living and the dead. The glitter and pomp of hierarchy impress the vulgar mind. A great show of ascetic self-denial is but an ostentatious form devoid of reality. Ideas of purity are relegated to a secondary place. A paradise as sensual as that of the Mohammedans is held before the devotees, and Nirvana is transformed from a state of non-existence into a condition of hazy, dream-like beatitude. Why this change? Why this recoil to many of the features of the Brahmanism from which Buddhism sprang and against which it was a reaction and a protest? Because Buddhism ran counter to the eternal instincts of the human heart. Man craves for

home and property, for the presence and protection of a divine being—for life, in short, with all that helps to make it worth living, rather than for death and the emptiness of total extinction. And Buddhism with all the elaborateness of its programme for humanity found itself driven to pay its humblest respects to these human cravings.

As early as 337 B. C. a great schism occurred, out of which grew the two great divisions, variously known as Northern Buddhism and Southern Buddhism, or the Greater Vehicle and the Lesser Vehicle, or Mahayana and Hinayana. These main divisions exist until this day, the southern type of the faith being found in Ceylon, Siam, Burma, Anam and Java; the northern in Nepal, Tibet, China, Korea and Japan. Of Northern Buddhism the sacred literature is in Sanskrit; Southern Buddhism retained the original Pali. Southern Buddhism is the simpler, the more nearly like the original form of the faith; Northern Buddhism is such a confused mass of modifications and accretions as would probably make it unrecognizable to the founder were he somehow to reappear upon the scene. Other schisms followed this great one. Divisions and subdivisions occurred, the differences hinging largely on the question of a less or greater divergence from the simplicity of the early form of the faith. Generally the side of greater divergence gained the day. Modification followed modification, every new development being supported by the continuous weaving of new legends, or new and one-sided emphasis upon some particular portion of Buddha's doctrine. Religions of the lands which Buddhism entered, like the Shamanism of Tibet and the Shintoism of Japan, were taken up into it and assimilated. New deities were added; image worship increased; temples, pagodas, relics and charms were multiplied, until Buddhism became what it now is—the most elaborate system of idolatry in the world.

To all this Japanese Buddhism is no exception. The year 552 A. D. is generally agreed upon as the year in which Buddhism was brought to Japan. What was Japan when Buddhism knocked at its doors? That is an important question, for the successful

entrance of a religion into a new country depends very much on the religious, social, political and intellectual condition of the people to be won. Let us attempt a hurried answer. The population at the time consisted possibly of one million people—hunters, fisherman and farmers, divided up into many different clans. There was a dominant tribe whose head, called Mikado, exercised authority over a considerable portion of the main island, and there were already the beginnings of government, law and literature. The people were intellectually well gifted. Their latent æsthetic endowments later proved to be of a high order. The prevailing religion was Shinto, or the Way of the Gods. It was a cult whose soul was reverence and obedience toward the Mikado, combined with the worship of ancestors and of nature. It identified patriotism with religious devotion. It fostered the *Yamato Darmashii*, that is, the spirit of unconquerable Japan. It thus became a useful engine for the conquest, unification and civilization of the outlying tribes. It looked upon Japan as the sacred land of the gods, and it peopled its mountains, trees, rivers and clouds with deities innumerable. But it was then already an unsatisfactory religion. Before the real religious cravings of the soul it was dumb. The rising tide of civilization demanded something better, and altogether Japan was, for the new and more elaborate faith of Buddhism, an inviting field.

Buddhism came in by way of Korea. The story runs as follows: In the year 552 A. D. a Korean king sent over to the Court of Japan some golden images of Buddha, together with some sacred books. The Mikado called a council to determine what should be done with the idols. The majority feared that the worship of these foreign gods would be a dangerous insult to the native ones, and decided to have nothing to do with them. However, one of the Ministers of State set up the images in his country residence, which he thus converted into the first Buddhist temple in Japan. Soon after the land was afflicted with a grievous pestilence, and this was attributed to the wrath of the native gods incurred by the harboring of these new rivals. War broke out, the temple was burned, and the idols thrown into a river.

Whereupon still greater calamities followed, seeming to indicate that Heaven was after all on the side of the new gods. Then the tide turned. Priests and missionaries were invited over from Korea in large numbers. Later, emissaries came also from China, and still later Japanese monks went over to China to drink at what was considered more nearly the fountain of the new faith. The emperors became patrons of Buddhism and helped to build great temples and monasteries. Still questionings as to the temper of the native deities occasioned some uneasiness, until early in the ninth century the great Kobo arose, who did successfully for Buddhism what Philo unsuccessfully attempted between Judaism and Neo-Platonism. He brought the two together through the supernatural discovery that all the Shinto deities were incarnations of Buddha, and, therefore, belonged to the Buddhist pantheon. The only thing that remained to be done was to re-christen the native deities with Buddhist names, and to give them due recognition as members of the already greatly overgrown family of Buddhist divinities. The scheme was a success. Temples acquired a mixed character, partly Buddhist and partly Shinto. Upon the family god-shelf sat cheek by jowl Buddhist and Shinto idols dispensing supposed favors to their happy devotees with equal alacrity. This *Ryobu*, or mixed Buddhism, lived in Japan for a thousand years. Out of the trunk of this mixture of the cults grew, however, about the thirteenth century, several new shoots, which together soon exceeded the parent trunk both in size and vigor. But the old and the new flourished together until the year 1870, when a crash came. The revived spirit of nationalism led the country to a consciousness of the wrong done not only to the old native faith, but much more to the government by retiring the emperors to lives of sacred and harmless seclusion, leaving the actual control of affairs for many centuries to those most capable of seizing it. The day of retribution was severe. Buddhism was disestablished. The priests were left to find their own rice. The *Ryobu*, or mixed temples, were purged of all Buddhist idols, as well as of every vestige of Buddhist furniture, decoration or symbolism. A strong

and persistent effort was made to revive Shinto, the native religion, and the effort was so far successful that this religion holds a place of comparative importance even now, owing, indeed, largely to the fact that it is the religion of the imperial household. And, yet, in spite of all, the religion which dominates Japan to-day is Buddhism.

So much by way of a brief glance at the external history of Buddhism in general and of Japanese Buddhism in particular. Turning now to the inner development of the cult in Japan, its present condition and its effects upon the people of the Empire of the Rising Sun, we find much that is interesting.

The inner history of Japanese Buddhism is interesting, not only on its own account, but especially through the light which it throws upon the religious structure and tendencies of the Japanese mind. For in the history of a religion in any country there is always a process of interaction between the forces represented by the religion itself and the forces of the national life, and sometimes the religion is modified as much as it modifies. The history of Buddhism in Japan is a history of sects. These sects represent all sorts of one-sided emphasis, on one or the other element of the Buddhist teachings, all sorts of deviations from these teachings, all sorts of foreign ideas superadded to, or substituted for, the original teachings. As has been said, it is the Northern type of Buddhism that prevails in Japan. However, the Southern, or Hinayana, type was not without its trial here. Early in the history of the introduction of the new religion three sects of the Lesser Vehicle found their way into the country and gained a considerable following. But they have long since ceased to be. The Japanese mind was not sufficiently lethargic and listless to offer a permanent welcome to a form of teaching so utterly negative and hopeless. Later came two sects that occupied a middle ground between the extremes of Northern and Southern Buddhism. But even of these the one has already died out, while the other, though still living, is doing so at a dying rate.

The sects that have held their ground are those distinctively

representing the Greater Vehicle. Of these there are seven in Japan to-day (not counting sub-sects), four of them having been imported, the other three being native to the soil. Of the four imported ones three are of Indian origin, while one is a native of China; all, however, entered Japan through China. The general characteristics of these four are that they came in a more concrete form than their predecessors, and were thus better fitted to appeal to the ordinary mind. They came beating drums and flaunting colors. They set up their numerous idols and welcomed the native deities into the crowd. They performed rites and ceremonies. They paraded the pomp of hierarchy. They sold charms and amulets. Instead of the dry husks of abstraction they interested the people in saints, sacred places and relics. Instead of austerities in this life they offered them prosperity and health; and instead of the nihilism of Nirvana in the hereafter, they depicted to them a paradise sufficiently sensuous to meet their liveliest appreciation. As to peculiarities distinguishing the individual sects, one, the Kegon, is noted for its very close resemblance doctrinally and practically to Brahmanism. Another, the Tendai, through the profundity of its speculations, on the one hand, has earned the name of the metaphysical sect, while on the other, by its wily practical methods, it has drawn upon itself the epithet of the Jesuits of Buddhism. The Shingon sect consummated the absorption of the Shinto deities into the Buddhist pantheon, and in doctrine is largely a reproduction of the ancient Yoga philosophy of Brahmanism, one of the most interesting phenomena of the intellectual and religious life of India, and the main philosophical basis of the modern phenomenon of theosophy. Still another, the Zen sect, may be denominated the Quaker sect, both on account of its pronounced mysticism and of its opposition to an excessive use of idols, sacred books, ceremonies and religious externals in general.

Most important for our study, however, are the three sects that are native to Japan, namely, the Jodo, the Shin and the Nichiren sects. These three sects arose during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when Japanese Buddhism was approaching the zenith

of its glory. Their rise forms an epoch in the history of Japanese Buddhism. Three strikingly new things manifest themselves in connection with them, namely, first, emphasis upon paradise as practically the goal of human striving; secondly, the idea of salvation by faith; and, thirdly, an approach to the theistic conception. An opposite tendency, however, also manifested itself in a doctrine of the Nichiren sect resembling somewhat the modern theory of atheistic evolution.

The first of the sects named, the Jodo, is based upon the teaching of the Indian philosopher Memio. But as a religious sect it originated in Japan. This was the first Buddhist sect to announce the doctrine of paradise, or heaven, and of salvation by faith, though it did so in a rather negative way. Owing to a conviction that men were no longer as earnest in matters of religion as formerly, and that thus few would attain to Nirvana according to the noble eight-fold path of original Buddhism, it was decided to lower the standard, and to find, not "a more excellent," but an easier way. This lower standard or goal was paradise, or the Pure Land, where Amida, the deification of boundless light, dwells, and where the saved abide in supreme bliss. The easier way was that of faith in Amida. It was the first appearance in Buddhism of the principle of salvation through the aid of another. Faith in Amida secures from him the compassionate help which man's weakness needs in order to reach paradise. According to the Jodo doctrine, however, this faith was to be supplemented by works. The works consist of the acquisition of merit, mainly by the endless repetition of the formula, "*Namu Amida Butsu*," or "Hail Eternal Buddha!" The founder of the sect himself is said to have repeated the formula sixty thousand times a day, and to-day priests in the temples, farmers and mechanics at their toil, wives at their needles and old men and women taking care of their grandchildren keep up an incessant hum of *Namu Amida Butsu*, *Namu Amida Butsu*.

But while the Jodo sect thus halted at the position of faith and works, it was not long before a new sect arose which planted itself squarely upon the doctrine of salvation by faith alone.

This was the Shin, or True, sect, which sect represents the crowning manifestation of Buddhism in Japan. The sect is a sort of Protestantism in relation to the older sects, and its founder, Shinran, is a sort of a Luther. The soteriological views of Buddhism experienced a revolution. Amida, the object of the faith upon which this and the previous sects built, is a Buddha-to-be according to most scriptures, according to some a Buddha already. Practically, among the adherents of the Jodo and the Shin sects he has transplanted the original Buddha, and occupies the highest place in their pantheon. "In preparation for his office as the saviour of men (I quote from Nanjo's 'Short History of the Twelve Buddhist Sects'), he practised good deeds during many periods of transmigration, with the purpose of bringing his stock of merits to maturity for the sake of other living beings. All his actions, words and thoughts were always pure and true, so that he achieved the fulfilment of his great compassionate desire." And he uttered what is known as the Original vow, as follows: "If any of the living beings of the ten regions, who have believed in me with true thoughts and the desire to be born into my country and have even to ten times repeated the thought of my name, should not be born there, then may I not obtain the perfect knowledge." This practice and this vow, it is said, gave to Amida an excellence surpassing that of all other Buddhas, and made him immeasurable light as well as boundless wisdom and compassion, the saviour of all who turn to him. "To rely upon the power of the Original vow of Amida," to quote again from Nanjo, "with the whole heart and give up all idea of self-power is called the truth." This reliance upon the all-merciful Amida was proclaimed by Shinran as the sole means of immediate and full salvation, in opposition to the synergism of the Jodo sect. Not antinomian, however, was the new doctrine. Good works were to be done, and they did not consist in the mere senseless repetition of formulas. It is the glory of the Shin sect that in its emphasis upon common morality it exceeds every other sect. And the motive is not, as in the case of the Jodo sect, the acquisition of merit, but the view is that purity of morals is only a

necessary proof of faith in Amida. It is not a meaningless coincidence that this view of salvation by faith and of the necessity of purity of life led Shinran, the founder of the new Buddhism, as it did Luther, the reformer, three hundred years later, to reject the practice of celibacy. Shinran married a lady of the imperial court.

Like Luther, moreover, Shinran together with his disciples, translated the most important of the sacred scriptures of Northern Buddhism, hitherto existing only in Sanskrit and in Chinese, into the vernacular of the people, and had them printed in the simplest form. He also inaugurated the practice of preaching to the people. He gave to women access to paradise, or the Pure Land, without being re-born first as men. Idols, relics and charms, cloister, pilgrimages and ascetic austerities were to a large extent discarded. The temples of the new sect were located right among the people, along the principal streets in the heart of cities and towns, so as to be easily accessible to all.

Much can be said in criticism of this great phenomenon in the history of Japanese Buddhism, resembling Protestant Christianity, as it does, so closely in its external features that the former might be called a caricature of the latter had not the Shin sect been in existence three centuries before Protestantism. It is true, for example, that Amida, the all-merciful Saviour of Buddhism, has no historical basis. He is not the original Buddha who was Gautama of India. He is a pure figment of the imagination created to satisfy a blindly groping religious instinct. Moreover, he is not a saviour from sin, but only a saviour from suffering. If the soteriology of the Shin sect were efficient it would not be sufficient. It would not deliver from the guilt and power of sin. And while the doctrine of this new Buddhism is an approach to a theistic form of faith, it still falls far short. Amida is not the Creator, not the omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent One, not the absolute. He does not bear distinctly the marks of personality. He is spoken of as exercising the functions of a person, but the deeper teaching is that he is a thing or a condition.

Yet when all is said it still remains true that of all manifesta-

tions among the ethnic religions of the Orient the rise of the Shin sect is one of the most remarkable and one of the most hopeful. And the facts that the birthplace of this new development in the ancient faith of Buddhism is Japan, and that this sect has nearly as many adherents in Japan as all the other Buddhist sects put together, speak volumes for the religious future of this most interesting land of the Far East.

So long as human conditions are so varied and human tendencies so divergent as they are now, probably the division of religious believers into sects is inevitable. Japan did well in the origination of her first native sect, much better still in the origination of the second. But there was also material among her people for the origination of a third division which fell far below the first two in quality. This was the Nichiren sect, or the Sect of the Sun Lotus. It is a sect of extremists and fanatics. Of all the other Buddhist sects none is so nationalistic, none so polytheistic, none so idolatrous, none so bigoted, none so controversial and fiery as this one. Its political motto is: "Japan for the Japanese." It includes in its catalogue of gods nearly every saint and hero of Japanese history. Its idols are the most numerous, various and hideous. It even worships its sutra, or sacred book, as a god, believing of course most devoutly in its verbal inspiration. The adherents of the sect regard themselves as the only true sect; and certain of their priests warned the authorities of the Parliament of Religions at Chicago against all the other sects as false and as misrepresenting Buddhism. Their controversies with other sects have been marked by violence and unscrupulousness. A thousand years in the lowest hell is the reward prescribed by them for the priests of all other sects—surely a sad departure from the spirit of the gentle Buddha. So far as doctrine is concerned, they reject the principle of salvation by the aid of another, and insist that every man must work out his own salvation. Their description of paradise is most sensuous. Their chief dogma is an extension of the theory of transmigration to such an extent as to include every form of existence from the gods down to mud. The clod, no less than the man is capable

by means of successive re-births of becoming a Buddha—a sort of evolutionary process uncontrollable by design.

Thus it will be realized that the manifold ideas and practices which have entered into the history of Japanese Buddhism constitute a grotesque compound. Certain elements, however, run through all the sects and throughout the whole history of the faith. Foremost among these is the doctrine of transmigration. Buddhism in all its forms rests unreservedly on this strange idea, the only variation consisting in the extent of its application. The universal acceptance accorded this theory in the Orient is something that to us is incomprehensible. Certain modern Japanese scholars have attempted to explain transmigration as nothing other than the doctrine of evolution. But between the two things there is a hopeless difference. The doctrine of transmigration is one of the things that helps to reveal the vast gulf between the Oriental and Occidental mind.

Another principle that is coextensive with Buddhism is pantheism. Primitive Buddhism, indeed, was only indistinctly pantheistic, but the early reaction toward the Brahmanism from which Buddhism sprang, everywhere accorded to pantheism again a large and avowed place. The idea of personality is nowhere clearly grasped. Men are phenomena, links in the chain of transmigration. The gods represent forces, or conditions, or principles, rather than distinct personal beings.

Another feature that is almost as general as the first two is the practice of religious contemplation. This is another of the strange phenomena of the Orient. It is of a piece with the pantheism of the East. The contemplation, or *dhyana* in Sanskrit, and *zen* in Japanese, connected with the religious life of the East is a mystic sinking of the individual mind into the great All, or rather, in Buddhism, into the great Nothing. The practice of it requires the subject to sit for long periods quite motionless, the legs crossed in the manner shown in nearly every image or picture of Buddha, the hands in a certain position, and the body erect. The thoughts must be withdrawn from the things of sense and from definite conceptions, and fixed upon vacancy. Gener-

ally the results aimed at are not definite truths that can be uttered in words, but rather a mental condition, a state of tranquillity, an absolute imperturbability, an ecstatic quietude. In some forms of it, as in the case of the zen, or contemplation sect, the aim was to secure by direct mystic transmission from Buddha certain secret revelations which gave an insight into the deepest truth. Often, however, it became what has been aptly called "mind-murder," ending in indolence and listlessness.

The pessimism which was so fundamental with original Buddhism still lives in all Japanese Buddhism, though in a weaker degree in the three native sects. Polytheism finds an extreme development. Idolatry, which was discarded by Buddha, is universal in Japanese Buddhism, restrained in some sects, rampant in others. The acquisition of merit occupies a large place in religious practice, but is spurned by the largest, that is, by the Shin sect. There is taught the doctrine of self-dependence and of salvation by dependence on others. There is Universalism, Quakerism and Methodism. As to metaphysical principles, Japanese Buddhism furnishes examples of all sorts of manifestations—of absolute idealism and absolute nihilism; of a pantheism that would rival that of Spinoza, and of realism that goes to the utmost extreme. Its ethical thought, as was the case with original Buddhism, is controlled by both Stoic and Epicurean principles, though the fundamental ethical motive of Japan, as of the whole Orient, is endæmonistic. Amid all, however, must be remembered the fact that Japanese Buddhism answers much more nearly to the conception of a religion than its Indian original. In comparison with the latter it was in its best days not only a modification, but an elevation.

II. The present condition of Japanese Buddhism next claims attention. If in relation to its original the past of Japanese Buddhism was a modification and an elevation, its present condition must be called a modification and a degeneration. The actual condition of Buddhism as it exists in Japan to-day is, indeed, in part a reflection of the past. It is the logical result of the mixture of heterogeneous forces which has already been re-

ferred to. Although in 1870 the government made a strenuous effort to disentangle Shinto, the primitive Japanese faith, from the Buddhism into which it had been taken up, the result, so far as the people at large were concerned, was far from successful. The people of Japan to-day are, with a small exception, adherents of three systems of teaching, namely, Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism. The demarkations between these three, in the minds of the common people, are far from distinct. Many of them worship deities and observe rites without knowing or caring whether they are of the Buddhist or Shinto kind. This confusion is well evidenced in the case of the little group of deities called "The Seven Gods of Happiness," whose images are to be found upon the god-shelf of almost every home; whose names are upon the lips of the people everywhere; who are spoken of sometimes with reverence, often familiarly and even with merriment, in a land, however, where merriment by no means always implies disrespect; and who are so extensively used to exorcise the evil spirits from the home on New Year's Day. All of this popularity is enjoyed by these seven happy gods in spite of the fact that, though nominally a Buddhist group, only two of them are of Buddhist origin, while of the rest there are two of Brahman, two of Taoist and one of Shinto origin.

So far as the differences between Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism are recognized, however, Shinto is the cult for the living, Buddhism for the dead, and Confucianism is the moral code. For worldly prosperity people pray to the Shinto household idols or at the Shinto shrines; for things pertaining to the dead, or to the prospect of death and the future life, they pray to the Buddhist idols and go to the Buddhist temples; for moral guidance they study the literature of Confucianism. Neither Shinto nor Buddhism has for the Japanese any definite ethical import; that belongs entirely to Confucianism.

Practically, therefore, all Japanese are Buddhists. The forty-two million people of Japan can properly be added to the Buddhist column, though they must at the same time be placed also in the Shinto and Confucian columns. But this means much less

than saying that all Japanese are received into the Buddhist community by a formal ceremony resembling those by which monks, novices and lay-members were received into the Order in the early history of the faith. There is no ceremony of admission into Buddhism in Japan, except for priests, as they are now properly called, rather than monks. Nor does it mean that all Japanese are believers in Buddhism, for there is no formal profession of faith. It means rather that the Japanese are born into Buddhism, and, especially, that they die in Buddhism. When a child is born it is registered in, and is looked upon as belonging to, the temple in whose vicinity it is born. By way of preparation for death people go to the temples and under the direction of the priests endeavor to acquire merit. At death itself Buddhism has much to do. The cemeteries are controlled by the priests, the granting of whose privileges is one of their sources of revenue. The evil spirits which are always supposed to congregate about a corpse must be dispelled by the priests. The funeral ceremony must be conducted by priests, in whose hands the safe passage of the spirit through the realm of shades is supposed to be to a large extent lodged. Lastly prayers for the dead must be said by the priests. The tendency of Japanese Buddhism, even more than that of original Buddhism, has been democratic. There is a decided disposition toward a doctrine of universal salvation. Originally it was very difficult to become a Buddha, but under Japanese Buddhism it became very different. Theoretically, indeed, it is held that there are two main states into which people may enter at death: the state of the good, who immediately enter paradise and become *hotoke*, or Buddhas; and the state of the wicked, who must pass through a long series of transmigrations yet, some of which may take them through the bodies of animals or the state of demons in hell. Practically, however, all people can become *hotoke* when they die, especially with the help of the priests. They may be obliged to linger in some intermediate state, or purgatory, for a while, but they can be delivered by prayers and offerings. When, therefore, a person dies priests are called, as many as the family can afford, who set

up the tablet bearing the new name of the dead. For, just as an individual on being born into the present state receives a new name, so birth into the next world requires a repetition of the process. Incense is then burned before the tablet and prayers are intoned. For seven successive days after the funeral the priests come to the house of the deceased to burn more incense and to say more prayers before the tablet, and after that they come once a week for a year. When the stage is reached when the deceased is supposed to have entered paradise and become a *hotoke*, or Buddha, the prayers may not yet cease. For the *hotoke* is a supernatural being, a deity, who needs to be honored accordingly. The priests must offer food to the *hotoke*, or spirit of the departed, and give him news about the home from which he went forth. Not only, however, is devotion to the dead a matter of the priests; the relatives also visit the temple at which the dead is buried, on the monthly recurrence of the date of death, for the first year, and on the anniversary of the death after that. The object of these visits is, first, to serve the dead by bringing him food and flowers; secondly, to pray that he may be truly born into paradise, and, thirdly, to pray that the dead may keep in peace and prosperity the house from which he departed. All these acts of the relatives, of course, take place under the direction of the priests.

Though nearly the whole population of Japan is Buddhist, it is in large part only so in name. The people of the country may be divided into three classes on the question of their relation to the faith. There is first the class of the religiously indifferent or sceptical. They have nothing further to do with Buddhism than to have their dead buried and perhaps also prayed for by the priests. A large proportion of those who are to-day crowding the government colleges and the two imperial universities of Japan, or who have gone forth from these institutions, belong to this class; they have no religion. There is a second class who, though they have no positive faith in Buddhism, yet give alms to the mendicants, support the temples, and occasionally pray to the idols, as a mere matter of decency, or with a vague idea of being

on the safe side by so doing. And there is a third class consisting of those who endeavor to fulfil their religious duties faithfully, as prescribed by the priests. These worship their household gods faithfully. They visit the temples regularly. They show the spirits of their dead all due reverence. They worship, besides the seven gods of happiness, the images of Amide, the Eternal; Kwannon, the goddess of mercy; Hachiman, the god of war; Dharma, the god of wisdom, and others, according to the customs of the place in which they have been reared or the particular sect under whose influence they happen to be. A general idea that prevails is that it is good policy to be on friendly terms with all deities, so that the traveller often stops to make his obeisance before a wayside idol or at a wayside shrine without asking any questions as to character or relationship of the god he is thus honoring.

What proportion these three classes hold to each other it is difficult to tell with any degree of accuracy. There are no statistics on the subject. There is much reason to believe, however, that the class of the strictly faithful is not the largest, and that it consists mainly of the very ignorant and of people who have retired from the active duties of life. Altogether, the impression that the situation makes upon the mind of the observer is that the day has come when the ancient religion sits lightly upon the Japanese heart. The Japanese still goes to the temple, but often only out of tender feelings for the dead. He keeps his idols in the house, but often largely as a matter of good luck, or custom, or even ornamentation; for in general the idols of Buddhism do not partake of the hideous character that has characterized the images of other idolatrous religions; the colossal image of Buddha at Kamakura has won high praise as a work of art. Alms to mendicants are often mere acts of commiseration. Gifts to temples, posted up as they always are in conspicuous places, may be shrewd business advertisements or bids for political favors. Pilgrimages to famous sacred mountains or shrines often possess to a large extent the character of pleasant summer outings, such as might furnish inviting themes for some Japanese Chaucer.

The *matsuri*, or religious festivals, held at almost every temple several times a year, are jolly religious picnics, which are often enlivened by very amusing theatrical performances, resembling possibly the miracle plays of European mediæval history. So far as knowledge of their religion is concerned, there is among the common people a woful lack. There is no reading of sacred literature in the house, no teaching of religion to the young. Even the more educated know little about the specific doctrines of the faith. The large body of the people only believe that they will go to paradise and become *hotoke* when they die; they talk about worshipping this or that idol as a means of securing this or that end, just as people talk about the comparative merits of this or that medicine for the cure of this or that disease; and they perform certain acts, such as repeating the formula, "*Namu Amida Butsu*," to secure merit and help toward entrance into paradise.

That the existence of superstitions should be another feature of such a state of things is not surprising. A great deal of trouble is occasioned the Japanese by evil spirits. In front of many a Japanese gate stands the beautiful holly tree; it is there to keep the demons out. When a dead body is carried out of a home the floor is quickly swept after it; it is the sweeping out of the evil spirits. Sick people are often supposed to be possessed of demons, sometimes in the form of foxes, badgers or cats, and it is one of the functions of the priest to exorcise them. To find a suitable day for a wedding is exceedingly difficult, owing to the existence of a very large number of unlucky days. Altogether, superstition in Japan has been well described as a vast undergrowth which it is as impossible to classify as to account for.

Let us turn now from the people to the priests. First of all, it is to be noted that the priests in Japanese Buddhism no longer occupy the important place proportionately that the monks did in early Buddhism. There are only about 100,000 Buddhist priests in Japan to a population of forty-two millions. Still they occupy an important position. Most references to Buddhism in

the secular or religious press are references, in fact, to the priesthood. What of the priests, then? So far as their doctrinal views go, it can be said in general that while Japanese Buddhism is "polytheism for the unshorn" it is "pantheism for the shorn." That is, there is in Japanese Buddhism an exoteric teaching for the people and an esoteric teaching for the priests, and the esoteric form is above all things pantheistic. As to particular doctrines the priests hold what has been handed down to them by the tradition of their respective sects. As to general intelligence the state of things is far from ideal. There are schools now for the education of candidates for the priesthood, as there were not in the early days of Buddhism. But the result is not the improvement that might have been expected. The general intellectual condition of Japanese Buddhist priests is shamefully low. There are, indeed, notable exceptions to this statement, of which such names as those of Nanjo, Inonye, Murakami and Nakanishi stand as guarantees. There are men among the Buddhists who have traveled extensively in Occidental countries and who hold degrees from some of the best universities of Europe. But about the generality of the priests there is much complaint, not only by the secular press, but even by Buddhist periodicals themselves. And the dissatisfaction is not only with the ignorance, but also with the immorality of the priests. Priests frequent prostitute quarters or keep harlots in the temples. A high priest of the greater of the two branches of the Shin sect—a sect which above all others has stood for morality—who died a few years ago kept, besides his own wife, a number of concubines, and the story is told that once a Japanese father journeyed many miles to bring his extraordinarily lovely daughter to the Japanese pope as a gift, and returned to his home filled with life-long joy that his offering had been condescendingly accepted. Even the government itself in 1895 felt impelled to issue a warning on the subject of the ignorance, the indolence and the immorality of the Buddhist priesthood.

The occupation of the priests, far from being that of the early monks, is well described by the one word—priestcraft. The cere-

monies over the dead are a cunningly devised scheme to filch money from the pockets of the people. The selling of prayers and charms, the practice of blessing certain objects and of exorcising evil spirits, are all inventions with the same end in view. Their methods savor so strongly of trickery that to a very wide extent the respect of the people has been totally forfeited. Much of their time is spent in sheer idleness. Preaching or pastoral visitation are scarcely dreamt of, except by the priests of the Shin sect, who are to a limited extent in the habit of delivering discourses to their people. Taking into consideration all these things and many more that might be added, the conviction forces itself upon one that, while there are many men of intelligence and character among the Japanese Buddhist priests of to-day, the life of the great body of them is such as to be to the people of Japan not a blessing but a curse.

To sum up, then: Considering the lack of religious fervor among the people and the low intellectual, moral and spiritual status of the priesthood, it is not too much to say that Japanese Buddhism is a decaying faith. Intelligent Buddhists themselves declare that unless the religion can be reformed it is doomed.

III. Japan owes much to Buddhism. It was under the influence of Buddhism that her civilization grew up. For a thousand years Buddhism was at work silently, patiently, persistently inculcating that gentleness, that peculiar kindness, that extreme regard for life, that boundless courtesy which have made the Japanese people famous. Harsh speech and rough, excited action are highly repulsive to Japanese feelings. There are Buddhist priests who still will swing a brush before them when they walk, so that no insects may be left in their path to be crushed by their feet. Japanese etiquette is not mere hollow ceremony, as has been charged; there is much genuine politeness underneath it all.

Buddhism fostered education. When there were no other schools, excepting, perhaps, the training schools for the young *samurai*, or warriors, Buddhist priests whiled away the tedium of their monotonous lives by gathering in the children of the

neighborhood and teaching them to read and write. The monasteries were often the only place where libraries were to be found. The native alphabet was brought into general use through the priests. Printing and the circulation of literature received much encouragement from them.

Moreover, Buddhism called into play the æsthetic activities of the people. Buddhism, in its highly polytheistic form, fed the imagination of the people and furnished many subjects for the art which gradually arose under its influence. The striking fondness for flowers, as well as for the beauties of landscape scenery, are probably not unconnected with the teaching of him the favorite seat of whose images is the beautiful lotus flower.

In its polytheistic modifications Buddhism, through long centuries, sustained the religious instincts of the people of Japan. Between Shinto and Buddhism the latter is far superior as a religion, and so far as it displaced the former it conferred upon Japan a positive benefit. In its highest form, that of the Shin sect, it is a decided and remarkable "feeling after God" and a vast preparation toward finding Him.

On the other hand, when one contemplates the totality of the effects of this caricature of religion upon the life of so large and gifted a portion of the human race as the Japanese nation is, the impression can not be other than that of melancholy and unspeakable havoc. While Buddhism was kind to animals it was often cruel to men. It is largely responsible for the existence of the *eta*, the pariahs of Japan. Its political influence, while generally peaceable, was destructive of the national spirit. And it was not always for peace; often it instigated internal strife. It kept woman relegated to a position of unnatural inferiority. It palsied the aspirations of men, and trained them into a state of hopeless resignation and of widespread fatalism which grew out of its inexorable law of cause and effect. The very temple bells, hung low as they are, instead of pealing forth the glad notes of joy and faith and hope, send abroad the low, melancholy sounds of a gloomy pessimism. "Sad as a temple bell," is a Japanese saying. The little music that is heard is all in the minor key.

With pessimism pantheism is linked. "How can you worship idols?" you ask the priest who has studied at Oxford. "God is in everything; He is in the image; the image is a helpful representation to the common mind; therefore we use them." Of the prevalence of the pantheism the loss of that greatest essential necessary to make man man, namely, a sense of personality, has been a consequence. An indistinct sense of personality implies the loss of the key to the whole fabric of higher truth. Japanese Buddhism has thus, not indeed to the same extent as original Buddhism would have done, but still to a profound degree, robbed the people of Japan of their self-consciousness, of their sense of individuality, and of their appreciation of individual worth and individual responsibility. And it has, not, indeed, as completely as original Buddhism would have done, but still to an appalling extent, atrophied their God-consciousness, and hardened them in their abnormal state of mind. To sum up all, under the influence of a thousand years of Buddhism, the Japanese spiritual nature has suffered amazing distortion, and it has become fixed and hardened in this distortion.

V.

TRUSTS AND OTHER COMBINATIONS OF CAPITAL.
THEIR RELATION TO THE PUBLIC GOOD.

BY REV. STANLEY L. KREBS, A.M.

(Works consulted in the preparation of this article: Report of the Commission appointed by the New York State Legislature to Investigate Trusts; "Monopolies and the People," by Chas. W. Baker; "Practical Christian Sociology," by W. F. Crafts, D.D.; "Wealth vs. Commonwealth," by H. D. Lloyd; "The Public Ownership of Monopolies," by Professor Frank Parsons; "Our Country," by Dr. Josiah Strong; "Railways and the Republic," by J. F. Hudson; "The Decadence of Public Functions," by F. O. MacCartney; articles in Johnson's Cyclopedia by Geo. W. Krichwey; "Social Reform," by W. D. P. Bliss; "The Labor Movement," by Geo. E. McNeill; "Principles of Sociology," by Professor F. H. Giddings, A.M.; Professor Ely's works; writings of Henry George; and "History of Monetary Systems," by Alexander Delmar.)

The history of the first industrial trouble that ever perplexed and plagued mankind, at least so far as we know, is found in Genesis, the 13th chapter. The economic friction therein recorded was caused by a dispute between two men of immense wealth, involving their respective dependents and partisans. From that hour to the present the problem thus for the first time discovered and felt has been growing in proportions and importance with the increase of the world's population, until now it imperatively challenges world-wide attention, and in this age, for the first time in all history, is man seriously rousing his best talents and enlisting his highest wisdom in an effort to solve this century-long gigantic problem, of which the subject stated in the

caption of this article forms an integral and highly important part, if not the *vital center* of the whole.

In this paper we shall treat the subject under the following heads, and in the order stated: Definition, Cause or Origin, Arguments against, Arguments for, Ineffective Remedies, The True Remedy, and Economic Significance.

DEFINITION.

We waive legal refinements and come at once to a practical definition of the industrial phenomenon. W. D. P. Bliss defines a trust as a case where "by a device of trusteeship various corporations practically form one monopoly without losing their separate corporateness." The Committee appointed by the New State Legislature to Investigate Trusts defined them as combinations "to destroy competition and to restrain trade through the stockholders therein combining with other corporations or stockholders to form a joint-stock company of corporations, in effect renouncing the powers of such several corporations and placing all powers in the hands of trustees." C. H. Baker says, "A trust is a combination to restrain competition among producers, formed by placing the various producing properties in the hands of a board of trustees, who are empowered to direct the operations of production and sale, as if the properties were all under a single ownership and management." Ex-President Cleveland defines them as "huge aggregations of capital, the object of which is to secure the monopoly of some particular branch of trade, industry or commerce, and so stifle wholesome competition." Associate Justice Henry B. Brown, of the Supreme Court of the United States, and Professor Ely agree independently of each other in calling them simply "combinations of corporations." Now if to this last brief definition we add the clause "for the purpose of eliminating the suicidal policy of competition and substituting the conserving policy of corporate coöperation" you have, it seems to me, the best and *most liberal* definition that can be given. Trusts are the most prominent factor in the present-day economical and industrial aggressive movement.

CAUSE OR ORIGIN.

The cause is found in the fierceness of modern industrial competition; the favoring conditions in prohibitory tariffs and in the invention of labor-saving, distance- and time-annihilating machinery; the motive, in a mingling of a good and a bad element, namely, that of self preservation and greed. I remark incidentally in this connection that for the above reasons we must all think less of the individuals who form trusts, and more of the underlying conditions out of which they spring and to which they lead. The physician, psychologist and clergyman may and must examine individuals; the political economist examines systems, general conditions and broad tendencies.

To illustrate the above points: "Consider for a moment the process of railroad pooling—a process similar, in a general way, to trust-formation. The spirit of competition prompted the building of parallel lines of railway from and to great distributing centers, and these parallel lines find that in the struggle for traffic their freight rates are forced down below the actual cost of transportation. In order not merely to reduce the cost to themselves, but also to raise rates high enough to meet their expenses, they are obliged to enter into agreements with one another, which fix charges to shippers and determine the percentages of freight each may carry."

The above is a case where we see competition *forcing* men to trust-formation. The competitive system is responsible for them. The mother of the first trust has had a prolific progeny since, and her womb is big with triplets, quadruplets, sextuplets, etc., to day. The first trust formed was the Standard Oil Trust in 1882. Since that date and precedent, so rapid has been the multiplication that Mr. H. D. Lloyd, in the appendix to his book, gives a list of articles in commerce affected by trusts or combinations of capital of one kind or another, and the list occupies eight pages. The Committee of Congress which investigated trusts in 1889 did not report any list, "for the reason that new trusts are constantly forming, and that old ones are constantly expanding their relations so as to cover new branches of the business and

invade new (economic) territories." The *Philadelphia Times* a few years ago gave a list of trusts numbering 137, representing a capital of \$1,507,000,000.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST TRUSTS.

1. They artificially and despotically raise the prices of necessities and thus tyrannize over consumers and the masses of the people, all of whom are forced to pay tribute, and thus swell enormously the exchequer of the "plutocrats" or trust-barons. The New York State Investigating Committee, after careful investigation, came to the conclusion that the purpose and effect of trusts were "to control the supply of commodities and necessities; to destroy competition; to regulate the quality, and to *keep the cost to the consumer at prices far beyond their fair and equitable market value.*" We have a sugar and coffee trust, which holds up the prices of these commodities and dictates to every breakfast table. "There is a leather trust, so that, from the sole of your foot to the crown of your head, every day, whichever way you turn, if you live the life of a civilized man in America, you must pay tribute to trusts. You cannot put a rubber band on your letters or put a shoe upon your feet without paying a tribute to trusts. You cannot paint the house you live in or the carriage you ride in without paying a tribute to the lead trust and the linseed-oil trust."

In fact, we live, move and have our being in trusts. That is, they *permit* us to live, move and have our being. We live, move and have our being *by their grace!* Some people think the trusts deserve the profound thanks of humanity for not squeezing *all* our being out of us altogether. Indeed, and in all seriousness, it is becoming a problem whereunto their power may grow. Associate Justice Brown, of the U. S. Supreme Court, sounds the note of non-sensational, cool and deliberate alarms as follows: "If no student can light his lamp without tribute to one company; if no housekeeper can buy a pound of meat or coffee or sugar without swelling the receipts of two or three all-pervading trusts, what is to prevent the entire productive industry of the

country becoming ultimately absorbed by a hundred gigantic trusts?"

Their profits are enormous. Labor Commissioner McDonough, of New York State, shows from figures gleaned from the confidential reports of gas and electric-light companies that, while their total annual cost and running expense is \$9,000,000, their receipts from consumers were \$19,000,000, a profit of *far over 100 per cent.* In 1896 the coal combine raised the price of coal 20 cents a ton, and thus levied a monopoly tax of \$9,000,000 on the people of this country, and they deliberately did this although the cost of running was diminishing and the price already high. The Western Union Telegraph Co. has averaged from its organization to the present time *300 per cent.* dividends per annum on its original stock! No wonder that when it developed in the Lexow Committee's work that Mr. Havemeyer wanted 20 per cent. profit on his investments *some* men thought he was *very modest* in his demands! During the year 1887 the linseed-oil trust, which was formed in January of the same year, raised the price of the oil from 38 to 52 cents per gallon. That is to say, every purchaser of oil pays to this trust 14 cents per gallon over and above the sum he would pay if free competition were allowed to do its work. (For some suggestive and pertinent Scripture references along this line see Is. 5 : 8 and Ezk. 5 : 9.) Many other examples of arbitrary price-raising might be cited, but the above exhibit the principle and power.

I have often wondered what would happen if the farmers would form a trust and retaliate upon manufacturers and others, paying them in their own coin! And the fact is that such a trust is said to be now under way. The movement originated in Lancaster, Pa., and expects to be in working order by 1899. Surely if one economic factor may resort to this power, all may.

2. The formation of a trust generally results in the closure of a number of mills or other productive plants, and consequently throws many hands out of employment, entailing loss and suffering upon families and entire communities. This injury is so patent that it needs no further elaboration.

3. The power they possess over the labor market. The trust is a combination for more than producing and selling purposes merely. It is able to "introduce the economics" into its management in the way of forcing down the wages of its employees, as Pullman did in hard times, but *kept up the house rent of his wage-earners* and the salaries of his superintendents.

Being by the very nature of its organization monopolistic, and therefore despotic in its particular line, it can do practically as it pleases. The only influences at work to check it are the trades-unions and other organizations of workmen. But they grind the wages down to the lowest notch that will be tolerated by workmen. They have the power to do this and they exercise that power, whether morally right or not. (Amos 2: 6-8; Mic. 2: 1-2; Is. 3: 15; Jer. 22: 13ss.)

4. One of the strongest arguments against them is their political power, secured by bribery of legislators, municipal councils, school boards and other public officials.

Professor E. W. Bemis, of the University of Chicago (formerly), in a paper before that national convention for Good City Government held in Minneapolis in 1894, tells of a corporation voting \$100,000 to buy the Chicago city council as coolly and calmly as it would vote to buy a new building. President George A. Gates, D.D., LL.D., has a two-page article in the *Kingdom*, a Christian Socialist paper of the West, in which he cited eight cases of what he calls bribery of school controllers by trust agents in order to get their text-books into public schools.

Trusts carry this corruptionism into higher bodies than these. When important Mormon legislation was impending in Congress certain New York merchants, members of combines, telegraphed to members of Congress as follows: "New York sold \$13,000,000 of goods to Utah last year. Hands off." (!!!)

When the President of the Sugar Trust was asked for data concerning the political contributions of the Trust he replied by claiming that he did not carry the data in mind, and to get them would require a search of the books, which he declined to produce. He was then asked whether the Trust had made political contri-

butions in the Presidential campaign of 1892, and he again declined to answer. And now, although the Supreme Court has confirmed the right of an investigating committee to *compel* testimony, Mr. Havemeyer goes scot-free. It seems almost beyond question and cavil that it was the money of the Sugar Trust operating in the Senate which thwarted the purpose of the great majority of the House and re-established the odious sugar tax. It has been charged that 30 Senators were the paid agents of corporations and trusts. With a Senate constituted of 60 per cent. of lawyers and a House of Representatives of a like proportion, and realizing whence a successful lawyer to-day must draw his *large fees*, it is only too evident what must be the character of our legislation.

"The most conspicuous of all is the complete control which a great corporation has had for twenty years or more over the State of Pennsylvania. The old joke of moving to adjourn the Legislature 'if the Pennsylvania Railroad has no more business for this body to transact' dates from the early stages of corporate development," says Mr. J. F. Hudson in his book, to which Mr. J. D. Lawson adds, in "Leading Cases Simplified," "The Pennsylvania Railroad appears to have run the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania during the last ten or fifteen years with as much success as it does its own trains."

The power of the Standard Oil Trust in the Legislature of Ohio is too well and notoriously known to require anything but an allusion. That Legislature was deliberately bribed, *i. e.*, the majority of its members were, and the agent of the crime has acknowledged it. The case was carried to Congress, and there as will be remembered was quashed, *i. e.*, the Senate *refused to investigate*. When this action was taken, it was then that Senator Edmunds turned to his neighbor in the Senate and said, "This is a day of infamy for the Senate of the United States."

Charges were brought against the Secretary of the Treasury in 1891 and against the Secretary of the Navy for the intimate relations held by them with trusts and their operations, but space forbids entering into details. It seems to prove that trusts were

trying to project their corruptionism into the very Cabinet itself. Whether they succeeded or not, every man must be his own judge.

5. Another strong argument against them is that they subsidize, intimidate, muzzle and mould our educational agencies (or are at least attempting to do so) in their own interests. I refer to their power over the press, the colleges and even the pulpit.

OVER THE PRESS.

In 1895 the Bell Telephone Company attempted to pass through the General Court of Massachusetts a bill authorizing the increase of capital stock from twenty to fifty millions of dollars, without placing such shares of increased stock before the public for sale at auction. The scheme was to have those on the "inside" buy up the increase at 100 % and then sell it at market price, 170 %. This project was pushed by an ex-Governor. The attorney for the people was "a veteran reformer, who, without 'pay,' fought the corporation and attempted to have the interests of the people protected." In his presentation of the case he boldly made the charge, in the ex-Governor's presence and before the special committee, that the newspapers of Boston had published the ex-Governor's speech, ostensibly as news, but that they had in reality received *one dollar per line for the insertion*. This charge was never denied either by the ex-Governor or by the newspapers. Again. During one year of the administration of Mayor Pingree, of Detroit, so completely were the papers of that city under the domination of the corporations, which the Mayor was attacking, that they *refused to publish his proclamations*. The only way the Mayor could get his manifestoes before the people was by the use of bill boards and posters.

A gentleman who is acquainted with the metropolitan papers and with the men who manage them asserts that they *suppress their inmost convictions* on social and economic questions, remaining silent on public questions of vital importance to the people, or else prostituting their powers by *actually writing against their convictions*. (Hab. 1:15-17; Jer. 5:26-28; 17:11; Ezk. 22:12-12.)

THEY ATTEMPT TO CONTROL SCHOOLS AND CHURCHES.

The book trust (although its officers assert it is not a trust—perhaps it would like mightily to be one?) was trying last summer to introduce into our high schools and colleges a new work on sociology. The work contains 400 pages, and wherever trusts, combinations and monopolies are mentioned in it they are defended and excused, even as they exist at present. This is the kind of political economy the combinations of capital want our sons and daughters to study. They would, if they could, not only dictate prices, but dictate principles.

The President of the Standard Oil Company is a multi-millionaire, a member of the Baptist Church, attends prayer-meetings, and gives immense donations to colleges and universities, whose professors, rumor has it, are discharged if they disagree with this money-king in their political, economic or currency views. The stories of Professor Bemis and of President Andrews are still fresh in the public mind, and I hope will never fade therefrom. Those events were a stigma and blot upon our boasted civilization. Nay, they are more than that; they constitute a veritable threat to its permanence and continuity. It is the old papal spirit of shackling the liberty of speech and thought. It was a most disgraceful effort to shackle the liberty of speech and the liberty to teach honest, intelligent and scientific convictions. Mark you, this evil tendency, this effort to transform professors into slaves, issues from the money-power pure and simple, from the gigantic capital-power in the land. Every well-bred, moral, intelligent, Christian man in the country should take it as an affront to his manhood, and let his loathing and disgust be known whenever opportunity offers. May God preserve our schools and colleges in the glorious atmosphere of intellectual and moral freedom! "If the Son make you free, ye shall be free indeed."

THE PULPIT.

"One of the ablest and brightest young clergymen of the city of Boston, after having listened to a portrayal of the present alarming economic conditions of this country, and after having

admitted that the presentation was essentially trustworthy, was asked by the lecturer why the ministers did not reveal these facts to their congregations. He replied, "we dare not—we are cowards." What are the clergy afraid of? Certainly not of the people. Only and solely of the wealthy pew-holder or large contributor to the parish expenses and salary. "The great number of the ministry," writes one of their own number, the author of "The Decadence of Public Functions," "are doing nothing in this great economic struggle. They are either culpably ignorant, and therefore incompetent to have an opinion, or they are partially informed, thus vacillating and ineffectual in treatment and presentation, or they know the truth and are recreant," intimidated into connivance or silence by the proximity of gigantic wealth or capitalistic combination, which projects its chilling shadow into their congregations in the person of some wealthy and financially influential parishioner connected personally therewith. Many clergymen are studying the problem, learning the facts and courageously speaking out. But the above statements are on the whole correct. (Jer. 5:30-31; Mic. 2:11; Matt. 23:23 ss.)

We have now rehearsed the main argument against the trusts. Fairness and truth demand

THE ARGUMENTS ON THE OTHER SIDE.

1. Trusts and combines of capital are necessary and natural to our present wonderful economic and industrial development. The multitude of little capitals that once did the work of the world can never do it again, that is certain. We shall not need horses and mountain geer to carry us to and fro in the world, nor sail boats across the sea. Hand weavers will no longer furnish us with our cloth, nor cabinet-makers with our furniture. New and expanded methods and facilities for work and production absolutely demand new and expanded forms of business organization. The steam engine, electric power and automatic machine are compelling men to coöperate in larger commercial relations. Combines of capital are therefore suggested and induced by the scientific advance of the age, and are necessary to the further evolution of society.

2. Trusts and combines substitute the fraternal principle of coöperation for that of suicidal and cut-throat competition. For instance, the railroad pool was forced to formation by the fierce competition between parallel lines. After the pool was formed the business was much simplified, and a number of advantages accrued to both road and patrons, *e. g.*, every shipper is assured of fairness in the freight rates he has to pay; unusually heavy traffic over a particular line may be relieved by shifting a part to another line; freight reaches its destination more promptly, and it costs the railroad less to handle it.

The same statement can be truthfully made with reference to all lines of business that have been obliged to form trusts for self-preservation. Take the petroleum refineries prior to 1875. There was numerous disasters and failures among them, owing to imperfect methods of refining, want of coöperation, cut-throat competition, etc. These disasters, together with the invention of improved machinery, led to a declaration of peace between the rival refineries, led to coöperation, to union, *i. e.*, to the formation of the trust, with the result that the business has been simplified, perfected and developed, while at the same time the price to the consumer *has been reduced*. And this remark leads us to

3. The third argument for trusts, namely, that they reduce the price of their produce to consumers. The oil trust, by uniting knowledge, experience and skill, by building manufactories on a more perfect and extended scale, with improved machinery and appliances, all legitimate means surely, has been enabled to manufacture a better quality of oil, at a reduction of 66% in its manufacture, and of 9 cts. per gallon to the consumer. Similarly the sugar trust has been enabled to give the people their sugar at a great reduction over old prices. Sugar that was selling at 18 cts. per pound is now selling at wholesale at 5½.

These are the leading arguments for the trusts: that they are the natural products of advancing science and civilization; that they are necessary; that they substitute the principle of coöperation for that of competition, and that they inure to the good of the consumer.

Nevertheless, in the minds of the people and of the public the arguments against them predominate. The evils of the present status of trusts and other combinations of capital are all too real and apparent, and the perils too patent. Therefore

VARIOUS REMEDIES

have been proposed, which we must now briefly review.

1. *Anti-trust Laws.*—Georgia probably passed the first anti-trust law as early as 1887. Thirteen States, mainly in the West passed such laws in 1889, and five more States in 1890. New York passed one in 1893. Pennsylvania has none. All of these statutes are penal and appear to be sufficiently explicit and drastic. They declare all combinations or agreements regulating the supply or price of commodities to be a criminal conspiracy, and that all such contracts are null and void. But these laws are ineffective. True, by a momentous decision of the Supreme Court on the Sherman Anti-Trust Law rendered April, 1897, the Trans. Missouri Freight Association was compelled to dissolve, and other similar associations, except the biggest one of all, namely, the Joint Traffic Association. So that trusts have gone on multiplying, until now there is a mighty list and a formidable phalanx of them, seemingly stimulated into existence rather than electrocuted out of it by these flashes of legislative lightning.

2. *The Policy of Laissez Faire.*—The advocates of this remedy believe that if you simply let the trusts alone and give them plenty of rope they will eventually hang themselves. The disintegration of the nail trust, for example, in 1896, has fortified the belief of the laissez faire optimists that unrestricted competition, let-aloneism and "natural law" will in the long run limit the power of great combinations, cause their eventual collapse, and thus render all artificial or legal interference unnecessary. They also point triumphantly to the collapse of the Steel Rail Pool in February, 1897, as a further object-lesson in point. "Conceding for the moment that the combination was contrary to the public good and ought to have been suppressed, what conceivable statute, Federal or State," ask the laissez faire philosophers,

"could have suppressed it more quickly, effectively and easily than those natural, self-acting laws which govern all trade? We have heard much talk of the gigantic Carnegie steel monopoly, and how it was able by its immense resources to control the market for steel, on the one hand, and the market for labor, on the other. But in the Steel Rail Pool the Carnegie was only one of several powerful companies united in an effort to control output and prices. And yet in a single day the combination fell to pieces and the price dropped from \$25 down to \$17. The Pool had been in existence many years, and it was considered too strong to be successfully attacked. How was it that it was broken so suddenly? Two theories have been advanced to account for it. The belief that some of the companies were violating the agreement and secretly selling at cut prices is one; the fear that a new enterprise was about being started to undersell the Pool and get contracts is the other;" both of which the laissez economists catalogue as "natural" laws.

The reply to these let-alone economists is this: Your policy or remedy has proven itself miserably ineffective. That two trusts have crumbled by internal corruption is no argument that *all* will eventually. Such reasoning is a total misinterpretation of the facts. The true theory is that artificial monopolies may thus come to an end, but natural monopolies never. There is not one case on record of a natural trust or monopoly committing economic suicide, and only two cases even of artificial monopolies doing it. (See differentiation between "natural" and "artificial" below.)

No, trusts that are clearing from 10 to 100 per cent. on their capital are not likely to tumble over each other in their incontinent haste to go hang themselves. Moreover, to let your garden alone to its own sweet will is a poor way, indeed, of uprooting the weeds or of transforming them into flowers or parterres.

3. *The Single-tax Remedy.*—The single-taxer asserts that were natural opportunities taxed to their full rental value private monopolies would disappear, because then the value of all natural opportunities, like building sites, mines, oil wells, railroad beds,

streets, etc., would go to the community ; other monopolies, they assert, could not be developed, because if *all* had access to land or its equivalent even the weakest competitors could exist and so prevent the stronger from gaining a monopoly. Till the great parent trust or monopoly of private ownership in land is destroyed, it is hopeless to fight lesser monopolies, say the single-tax men.

We admit the logic of this argument and the beauty of this remedy, as it lies before us on paper ; but it is a remedy so remote in the misty folds of the future that the most powerful prophetic telescope which we possess fails to catch sight of its realization in law and in fact, however ardently we might wish it and do wish it. But there seems to be a growing probability of the not-remote realization of

THE TRUE REMEDY, NAMELY THE GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION OF ALL NATURAL MONOPOLIES.

We distinguish between natural and artificial monopolies. Natural monopolies may be defined as those industries in which the number of competitors who can engage in the business *on equal terms* is limited to a very few. Artificial monopolies are those in which the number of possible competitors is large, but the advantages and economies arising from production on a large scale are so great as to induce concentration of the industry into one organization under a centralized management. The above is Mr. Baker's differentiation. It is a good one, clear, easily remembered, comprehensive and comprehensible. Professor Ely subdivides natural monopolies into two classes, which he does because the classes actually exist ; the first class consisting of the means of transportation and communication, including street franchises (for all highways belong of right to the people of the City, State or Nation) ; the second class composed of industries which become monopolies because the supply of *raw materials* is so limited that it can all be acquired by a single combination of men. Anthracite coal is an illustration, and mines generally. Now the writer's belief is that all *natural* monopolies should be owned and controlled by the municipality, State or Nation respec-

tively. We believe this for certain philosophical or general and certain practical reasons.

GENERAL REASONS.

1. Any *large* business necessarily becomes a corrupting element in politics on account of government efforts to control it, for the simple reason that those controlled attempt to defeat the ends of control and they strive to enter politics to do this. President Eliot, of Harvard, has pointed this out already regarding the liquor business. Hence, when the number of businesses controlled increases largely, as is the case with the multiplication of enormous trusts, the corruption becomes more widespread and the difficulties of government control infinitely greater. It has been urged that we should establish commissions to exercise control over trusts and combinations. But the point above noted should afford sufficient objection to anything of the kind, for the trust would control the commission by the glitter and the gleam of gold. This idea of government control of *private* business has been pushed to an extreme. But if the people, that is the government, would *own* these great natural monopolies, the people, *all* the people, would be *equally interested* in their *successful and equitable operation*.

2. "At the present time (we quote Professor Ely) we have no satisfactory equilibrium between private business and public interests. The great prizes of life in the United States are in the *private* field, and it is this field which tends to attract the brains and energy of the youth of the land. Public employment is disparaged, and young men of capacity are warned against it. How can we expect a *noble* public life under such conditions. These conditions are quite different from those described by Josiah Quincy in his delightful book, 'Figures of the Past,' for he tells us that in 1825 the strongest men in the country were in Congress and were *proud to be there*. Now there are many men not at all distinguished who are so absorbed in immense private business that they would consider an acceptance of an election to Congress a condescension on their part. We must enlarge the field of public

life and render it more important in order to secure a proper balance between private and public life and the prizes which they respectively offer."

Government ownership of these gigantic businesses would effect this desirable end. The best business talent would here find wide fields for its exercise stimulated, too, by the patriotic ambition of doing good to the Nation at large, similar in importance to, if not greater in responsibility than the position of Postmaster-General at present.

But these general or philosophical reasons for an advance from government control to government ownership are fortified by eminently

PRACTICAL REASONS.

1. Government control by statute law or otherwise *without* ownership, which is the present and has been the past régime, has been tried and has failed to remedy the situation. The experience of the Interstate Commerce Commission shows that the United States cannot, for example, control the railroads unless it also owns them. This indicates a *fundamental principle*. Government control should be looked upon as a *shift in an emergency, a temporary arrangement in a transition age*, and therefore we would expect it to have, as it really does have, many of the *difficulties*, but few or none of the *advantages*, of government ownership, to which, therefore, reason would urge, it should give place as rapidly as possible. I repeat, therefore, that public control without ownership has been tried and *has failed*. Trusts are becoming more and more self-conscious (if that is possible), more despotic and powerful. It is now simply, without any exaggeration whatever, a question of whether they will eventually own and control the government or the government own and control them.

2. Of the practical working and perfect feasibility of the public ownership and operation of natural monopolies we are happily furnished with numerous examples. This remedy is no longer in the speculative or *experimental* stage. Railroads, telegraphs, telephones, are publically owned and managed in most of the civilized countries of the world, and usually with complete sat-

isfaction. Take, for example, England's ownership of the telegraph. From the report of our Consul to the State Department in Washington we summarize the benefits as follows: (1) a ten-fold increase in the messages sent; (2) a more than doubling of the lines, thus giving many new communities telegraph service; (3) a reduction of over three-fourths in cost of a message; (4) a large indirect pecuniary benefit to people and government; (5) an enormous decrease in time of sending a message. In Germany the public ownership and operation of the railroads has succeeded better than its own advocates anticipated, and the opinion of experts in Germany favors them almost unanimously. There are a few individuals who would like to return to the old system; but they are few, indeed, and are those who would be apt to derive some special personal advantage from the change.

There is scarcely an instance where an industry which has once reached the stage of public ownership and management has reverted to private hands. The tendency is *all the other way*. Public ownership is almost invariably cheaper, and serves the public convenience and necessity adequately and fully, and on a sounder and safer basis to all related interests and industries. In a few instances, such as carrying mails, private companies can do it cheaper, but simply because they carry them *only where it pays*, while the government delivers the mails to small towns and villages where it would not pay a private company. This fact but furnishes another argument for public ownership and management.

There is one standing argument against this remedy which we must notice. I call it a "standing" argument not because of any intrinsic strength, but simply because it still stands in some minds like a scarecrow in a stubble-field. The argument is this: Government ownership would be dangerous because of the political corruption it would introduce or create. The answer is simple and easy. *Private* ownership and control of monopolies is the *main cause* of public corruption. For example, in proof of this I refer the reader to the earliest part of this paper under the head "Arguments Against Trusts." Moreover, government

ownership and operation of the mail business is not a source of great political corruption, if of any at all; but were it a *private monopoly* we would certainly be furnished with the spectacle of its managers, not for the public, but for their own selfish weal, leading many of our Congressmen and Senators in dire financial temptation. But this demoralizing element is eliminated from the Postoffice Department simply because it is owned and controlled by the government. If, therefore, other natural monopolies should happily pass under government ownership their respective and collective contributions to the sewer-stream of political corruption would similarly disappear.

In view of these facts many are willing to admit that government ownership of *natural* monopolies might be wise and advantageous, but they say the scheme would not work with *artificial* monopolies. In reply we say that we are beyond the speculative and experimental stage even here; for Mr. Sydney Webb, in the *Fabian Essays*, gives hundreds of instances of all kinds of industries successfully conducted by government. The examples belong to Great Britain. Step by step the community has absorbed them and the area of private ownership and control has been lessened.

We refer to Mr. Webb's list, not as commending government ownership of artificial monopolies, but simply as a confirmatory fact showing that such ownership is *not* impracticable or chimerical, as so many ill-informed people suppose. The writer, however, is personally in favor of the government ownership and operation only of *natural* monopolies. His economic creed on this subject is that the telegraphs, telephones, railroads and mines should be owned and operated by the State, and that the street-car lines, water, gas and electric-light plants should be owned and operated by the municipalities. (The necessary steps required to effect this change from government control to government ownership are neatly summarized in Dr. Craft's work, page 182, to which the reader is referred.) If the reader calls this municipalism, nationalism or socialism, then the writer is glad to avow himself a municipalist, a nationalist or a socialist.

A word in conclusion as to

THE ECONOMICAL AND SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE

of this striking industrial phenomenon, namely, the rapid development and multiplication of gigantic combinations of capital. We believe that such combinations must and will multiply, all statute laws, labor demagogues and public agitation, misconception and vituperation to the contrary notwithstanding. The remedy or reform needed is NOT THEIR ABOLITION, THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE. The roots of this gigantic oak sink too deep into sociological soil. The reform needed is not to try to uproot this oak, BUT TO UPROOT FROM THE PUBLIC MIND the erroneous conception regarding it, namely, THE PERSISTENT IDEA THAT TRUSTS AND MONOPOLIES ARE ESSENTIALLY WRONG, EVIL PER SE, AND TO PLANT IN ITS STEAD THE TRUTH THAT THEY ARE THE INEVITABLE ACCOMPANIMENTS of the *new civilization of coöperation* on which the world is entering. The arguments against trusts, WHICH ARE VALID AND SOUND, simply prove the *mal-adjustment* of their *present status* or relation to the public. The arguments for them, WHICH ARE ALSO VALID AND SOUND, prove that combination, consolidation, concentration, coöperation is an industrial *vital necessity*, and IS GRADUALLY SUPPLANTING THE VENERABLE BUT SURELY DECADENT PRINCIPLE OF COMPETITION. The century-long age of competition is closing, that of coöperation dawning. Trusts in *private* hands are the natural and inevitable phenomena of a *transition period*, "evolutionary links" between competition and socialistic coöperation.

Years ago John Stuart Mill laid down the general principle, which is invulnerable, that "different stages of human progress not only *will* but *ought* to have different institutions. Government is always either in the hands or *passing into the hands* of whatever is the strongest power in society; and what that power is does not depend on institutions, but institutions on it." In view of all these things, let us realize that our aggressive business men, despite the fact that they are actuated by more or less of a selfish motive at present, are nevertheless unconsciously creating

the power and leading us on to the coöperative policy of the future. God will overrule the wrath of man to the praises of the Truth. Let the people, therefore, through their government, take this NEW POWER rising in the land, which is an angel in disguise, into their own hands, and cherish and use it for the higher, nobler and grander development of our common brotherhood of humanity.

READING, PA., February 22, 1898.

VI.

THE PROSE OF JAS. RUSSELL LOWELL.

BY CHARLES H. LERCH.

James Russell Lowell's prose, like his poetry, is not of him or by him, but it is his very self. The man Lowell is of more value than his many volumes of prose or of poetry. There were certain creative forces which made the man Lowell. Some of these are evident, others not so evident. We have the best reason to believe that one of these creative forces, and not the least potent at that, was the very locality or the place in which he lived, from the very soil of which he drew his loftiest inspirations. Elmwood, or even Cambridge, without Lowell in them would lose a good deal of meaning for us. It was the only home which he had in America and it should be kept intact in remembrance of him. The birds should still and forever be allowed to build their nests in the trees and bushes of old Elmwood with the same freedom as when the master-spirit of that place loved to see them do so. Land agents and real-estate speculators are, no doubt, contributors to that general advance of civilization by which sometimes deserted and even desolate places are converted into inhabitable and sanitary abodes; but we wish for once that the advance agent of such civilization would not make his *début* in that locality where the poet and prose-writer loved and sang.

"Cambridge Thirty Years Ago" is a prose narrative that for insight into nature and clearness of interpretation would put Lowell on a level, if not above the level, of such an admirable writer upon these subjects as John Burroughs. Burroughs and White of Selborne have their eyes and senses in general trained simply for the flora and fauna of the localities which they have made famous by the poetic fervor of their prose, but Lowell is all alert and weaves nature into his treatment of the subject so that

very frequently it escapes notice. Cambridge has Harvard College in it, besides the Charles River and its marshes. His account of the place is full and he unites in one whole the nature, the traditions, the quaint manners and language of the good old Cambridge which he loved so well. "Approaching Cambridge from the west," he writes, "you would pause on the brow of Symond's Hill to enjoy a view singularly soothing and placid. In front of you lay the town, tufted with elms, lindens and horse-chestnuts, which had seen Massachusetts a colony, and were fortunately unable to emigrate with the Tories by whom or by whose fathers they were planted. Over it rose the noisy belfry of the College, the square, brown tower of the church, and the slim yellow spire of the parish meeting-house, by no means ungraceful, and then an invariable characteristic of New England religious architecture. On your right the Charles slipped smoothly through green and purple salt-meadows, darkened, here and there, with the blossoming black-grass as with a stranded cloud-shadow." This essay on "Cambridge Thirty Years Ago" in itself furnishes a strong argument against Canon Farrar's wish that Lowell should have written only poetry. What fine, delicate, refined prose would the English language not miss if Lowell had remained all poet!

It was with the eye and instincts of a poet that Lowell wrote prose, and it is this combination in him that makes his essays and addresses delightful reading. To be sure, such a man's poetical zeal sometimes gets the better of his prosaic reason and causes him to break the rules of good prosaic prose. The literary exuberance of the poet occasionally carries the prose writer into regions where the small rhetoricians do not think it safe for those who study the rules of rhetoric to go. Hence we have seen examples of his prose held up to the criticism of the reader with a warning that you must carefully manufacture your figures of speech and all the adornments of your composition, not after the manner of these men who are buoyed upward by their own inward life, but according to the common, good, everyday laws of uninspiring prose. One could weep sometimes when he hears

the teacher of rhetoric before his class dissect some of the passages of Lowell, or Emerson, or Carlyle, and add thereto a bit of inspiring criticism that it is worse than mental dissipation to read them. Still Lowell may not have put his Pegasus under restraint and the steed may have carried him along at too rapid a gait at times. What of it? We can do something better than ferret out errors. We know that he shows a lack of sense of proportion in some instances. He has so much to say and is so anxious to say it that he can not get it all into the conventional paragraph or page. His introductions are long in comparison with the treatment of his theme. The vestibule is more pretentious than the house which he builds.

Lowell's range was wide; he was the master of many literatures; he could write upon many subjects. And yet there is a sense in which he keeps well within the borders of that literary sphere in which we would expect a man of Lowell's tastes to be. Like all great prose writers, he must have a theme, and the realm of knowledge in which he could seek for one was not, for him, inclusive. He was no more an objective prose writer than an objective poet. The times in which he lived called for earnestness and activity and he listened seriously to their summons. The affairs of his country received more than a mere passing notice from his pen.

Lowell's political essays and addresses form by themselves considerable of a prose literature. His views on such matters were not derived from a narrow study and interpretation of the text, but their scope was in keeping with his wide-mindedness in all other matters. They were, therefore, not always received by those of sectarian and insular tendencies with the candor and liberality due to them. In politics he might, perhaps, have been called a Republican, but his vision was not bounded by the profile or horizon of any political party. Thus the Republicans and their organs were not a little chagrined when on one occasion he took great pains to point out what seemed to him the strength and patriotic stalwartness of a Democratic President. "Personally, I confess," he says, "that I feel myself strongly attracted to

Mr. Cleveland as the best representative of the higher type of Americanism that we have seen since Lincoln was snatched from us."

That was enough said for all good Republicans. This assertion was anything but good orthodox Republicanism. According to conventional notions which prevail under such circumstances he was disloyal to his creed, and there was only one thing for him to do, to go over to the party whose leader he eulogized. The writer remembers distinctly how one leading Republican daily took him to task for his heresy. But the catholic temper which is displayed in the address from which these remarks upon Ex-President Cleveland are taken is strikingly in keeping with Lowell's mental development. Whether his view be correct or not we must still admire him for his frankness and fearlessness, even if we do not agree with him.

Many a noble address which he delivered would make excellent reading for those whose political hero is the boss and whose gospel is that preached by the small-minded political organ. His Americanism was also sometimes called into question. But the printed prose here will again come to the rescue. True Americanism, as that word is interpreted by some Americans, means despising and looking with contempt upon everything that is not indigenous to America. That we are glad to say was not Lowell's notion of Americanism. He belonged to that lofty type of statesmen who view things differently from and take issue with a class of journalists who are at once ready to declare war when their notion of what constitutes a true patriotism is infringed upon.

"Take them editors thet's crowin'
Like a cockeral three month's old,—
Don't ketch any on em goin'
Though they be so blasted bold ;
Aint they a prime lot o' fellers ?
'Fore they think on't they will sprout
(Like a peach thet's got the yellers),
With the meanness bustin' out."

But Lowell, as a writer on politics, is not so well known as a

writer on criticism. From a professor of belles lettres at Harvard we have a right to expect lectures and essays upon the great writers. He does not disappoint us. From Chaucer to Thoreau he has sounded almost the whole gamut of literary music, and there is no evidence of uncertain notes. If one would like to read discriminating interpretations and criticisms of the makers of English literature, let him simply turn to the volumes "Among my Books" and "My Study Windows." If you would like to know something of The Philosopher of Concord, or The Sage of Chelsea, or The Wizard of Walden, turn to his pages of prose and read the life-like and, one might say, the life-size portraits of these great and good men. Perhaps those essays on Emerson, Carlyle and Thoreau are nearer to some of us than others, especially to those of us who in our college days were inspired by the bold profile of these men as they stood over against the background of truth. Those who feel grateful to the Philosopher of Concord for inspiring lifts can find no better expression of their own feeling, however unliterary their own expression of that feeling may be, than in Lowell's essay "Emerson the Lecturer." "Search for his eloquence," says Lowell, "in his books, and you will perchance miss it, but meanwhile you will find that it has kindled all your thoughts."

Lowell was still in college when Carlyle's first writings appeared. He no doubt grew into an appreciation of the great Scotchman's powers, but never, we must infer from his words, into an exalted state of feeling over his perversity and ill-humor. A man of such evenness of temper would naturally not take kindly to the fulminations and wailings of Carlyle. It is the dominie spirit in Carlyle that is not congenial to Lowell. "He continues," says Lowell, of Carlyle's later years, "to be a voice crying in the wilderness, but no longer a voice with any earnest conviction behind it."

Thoreau is the third one of this group whose eccentricities and merits do not escape Lowell's critical pen. He did not think that Thoreau's idea of living apart from society was conducive towards developing a healthy frame of mind. He did not think

his contemporary had attained to that originality which he claimed for himself. Lowell's words on originality in this essay are especially significant and happy. "This notion of an absolute originality, as if one could have a patent-right on it, is an absurdity. A man can not escape in thought any more than he can in language, from the past and present. As no one ever invents a word, and yet language somehow grows by general contribution and necessity, so it is with thought. Mr. Thoreau seems to me to insist in public on going back to flint and steel, when there is a match-box in his pocket which he knows very well how to use at a pinch. Originality consists in power of digesting and assimilating thought, so that they may become part of our life and substance. * * * In Thoreau much seems yet to be foreign and unassimilated, showing itself in symptoms of indigestion. * * * A greater familiarity with ordinary men would have done Thoreau good by showing him how many fine qualities are common to the race."

These three studies of his contemporaries are only a few of the many critical contributions which Lowell made to literature. The wit, the learning, the mastery of material displayed by his critical prose, is somewhat astonishing. To be under the literary influence of such a teacher, a creator of literature, was a privilege for the Harvard student in the days of Lowell's professorship. A study of English literature meant for Lowell more than a dissecting of the English language. To him the life of the English was more than the raiment. A knowledge of English was for Lowell getting and keeping oneself in living sympathy with the life and thought of the best writers and thinkers. Perhaps the high-water mark of Lowell's prose was reached when he delivered the address before as distinguished a body of alumni as any university ever graduated, at the 250th anniversary of Harvard College. He was a fitting representative on such an occasion. He was the orator of the ripest culture and a scholar when that word means something more than a man of attainments. He was a personality, very much alive, with whom the truth was everything. He was a part of the making of that literary epoch which we might easily call the Augustan Age of American Literature.

VII.

THE PLACE OF THE GENERAL CONFESSION OF SIN IN THE ORDER OF DIVINE SERVICE.

BY REV. J. F. DE LONG, D.D.

This confession is called "general" because the whole congregation is supposed to unite in making it. It is also expressed in general terms, referring to sin in those rudimental forms in which it is common to all men and ought to be confessed by all, without descending to those particular sins of which only some in the congregation may be guilty. The word "general" also carries with it an implied contrast with private auricular confession to the priest as it prevails in the Greek and Roman Churches. It is usually preceded by a brief exhortation which is intended to instruct the people concerning the duty and necessity of confession as well as to exhort and encourage them thereto. The confession itself consists of two parts, beside the introduction or address to God: the first, a confession of our sins of omission and commission; and the second, a supplication of pardon for the past and of grace for the future.

One noteworthy fact in modern liturgies is the unanimity with which the churches have agreed upon such general confession of sin as the proper introduction of the public worship of the sanctuary. Every Christian denomination of the present day which has published or authorized to be published an Order of Service for Public Worship begins such service with an act of penitential confession and prayer for pardon. So the Reformed Church in all its branches, Swiss, German, French, Dutch and American. So also the liturgies of the Presbyterian Church, both in Scotland and America, among which may be named the Book of Common Order, prepared by John Knox and used by the Presbyterians until 1645; also the liturgies

published in recent years by the several branches of Presbyterianism in Scotland, as well as the private liturgies published in this country by Dr. Shields, of Princeton, and Professor Hopkins, of Auburn Theological Seminary. Of the Episcopal Book of Common Prayer, all its manifold editions since 1552 have this same arrangement, the first edition of Edward VI., published in 1549, being the only exception. The Lutheran Church originally retained the use of private confession to the priest or pastor, and in its earlier history was without a general confession of sin in its service. Later it introduced a confession with absolution after the sermon. But during the last century and a-half the feeling that its confession of sin was in the wrong place has become so general and convincing that one branch of Lutheranism after the other has abandoned this action after the sermon and introduced it in the beginning of the service, and now almost all the principal bodies of Lutherans, both in Europe and America, have in this respect the same Order of Service as the other Protestant Churches. Nor is this arrangement limited to Protestantism. The celebration of the Mass in the Roman Church begins with the Confiteor—the well-known Roman formula of the Confession of Sin. And looking at the steady persistent gravitation of the churches for centuries past toward this order of service, it would seem to be easily within the limits of moderation to predict that this custom of having a general confession of sin with some declaration of grace as preliminary to the rest of the service is destined, at no distant day, to become altogether universal in the worship of the Christian Church.

Now how shall we account for this noteworthy fact? What may be the reasons underlying this steady gravitation of all the churches toward this form of introduction?

First, it will be readily admitted that the *order* of the service—the proper succession of its several parts—is a matter of much importance. A true service is not a shapeless, unorganized mass of devotional acts, thrown together into mere outward juxtaposition like beads upon a Roman rosary without inward connection

or unifying idea. Man's devotional life, as well as every other part of his being, moves within the realm of law; and this implies that in structural outline at least the public service should be an organic whole, that there is an inward order and succession with which the outward order and succession ought to correspond. It implies that every action entering into the service has its own proper place and function, and that all its parts ought to be so arranged that each part preceding would naturally lead on to and prepare the worshipper for that which immediately follows, thus giving the service an easy, natural, organic, onward movement from beginning to end. As an illustration of this principle, I will give an example in which it is violated. The example is given by Dr. Hagenbach in his *Grundlinien der Liturgik*. The old liturgy of the Reformed Church of Basel, Switzerland, had in the opening part of its service a long prayer which contained three elements or topics. The first was a confession of sin which Dr. H. says was very good and also in its proper place, but would well have deserved to constitute a prayer by itself. The second was a petition for illumination and the profitable reception of the divine word, which, he says, was also very good, but should have come in close connection with the didactic portion of the service—the reading and preaching of the word to which it referred. Instead of this, however, it was followed by a series of supplications for all conditions of men which would be in questionable position at this stage of the service in any arrangement, but was doubly so in this, inasmuch as a similar prayer of supplication was repeated after the sermon.

A service so loosely and disjointedly arranged as the above can be neither strong nor pleasing. It can not be strong, for the parts referring to each other, being so widely separated, fail to give each other proper support. Neither can it be pleasing, for the movement is not natural, the outward order not corresponding to the inward unfolding of the devotional idea. Let us contrast with this the opening, penitential part of the service in our Order of Worship or in the Directory. It begins with the exhortation. This naturally leads to the confession and supplication for for-

giveness. The earnest cry of this prayer is met and answered by the declaration of pardon. But this declaration is expressly conditioned upon the exercise of faith in the Lord Jesus. Hence the congregation arises and makes confession of its faith by the use of the Apostle's Creed, and then very appropriately breaks forth into a hymn of praise and thanksgiving to God for the mercy and deliverance authoritatively announced to it in the declaration of pardon. Here is inward connection and unity. One action leads to the other by inward impulse, and the devotion of the worshipper is sustained and carried forward by the spontaneous movement of the service itself. But if a true service be such an organic unity, then the confession of sin has its own proper place in the service, and it will not do to say that one place is as good as another, and that it does not matter where it comes in, only so it comes into the service.

Furthermore, a true service has not only an onward, but also an upward movement. It rises as it advances. Beginning with the humbling of ourselves before God in view of our manifold sins and transgressions, it moves upward until it ends at last in a song of universal praise and divine benediction. This much we might infer even from the broad fact that the Kingdom of God at large, of which this service is a part, is characterized by such upward movement. The same law which governs the growth of a tree as a whole reproduces itself in the growth of its every branch. And so here. The public service of the sanctuary, like the kingdom at large, has an upward movement. The law is preparatory to the Gospel. Lessons taken from the Old Testament precede those taken from the New. The Gospel as the higher properly follows the epistle as the lower, though the opposite arrangement may be and has been defended on the ground that the epistle resting on the Gospel and being a fuller explanation of its contents is the higher and fuller revelation. In the early Church, while four lessons were read in the service, the order was first the law, then prophecy, next the epistle and lastly the Gospel. So with the element of prayer. After confession of sin comes thanksgiving for the mercies and attainments of the past; then it passes on to

supplications for still larger measures of grace and higher spiritual attainments in the future, and at last broadens out into intercessions for all conditions of men, asking for all mankind the same fulness of grace which we have already asked for ourselves. This is the order of thought in the general prayer of the Sunday morning service in the Order of Worship and the Directory. It is also the order of our communion service. It is, moreover, a law of liturgies so plainly felt as to have won for itself universal recognition both in the old dispensation and the new that the divine service should never end with words threatening or foreboding evil—*verbis male ominatis*—but always with ascriptions of praise and divine benediction. In a word, the public service should be like a golden stairway leading sinful prostrate humanity up step by step to the Great White Throne. The first and lowest step—the first act of the sinner in this ascending movement—naturally would be the humble acknowledgment of his sin, followed and answered with the declaration of pardon. On the ground of this general upward movement, we would say the introduction of the divine service should be, not the singing of the doxology nor any hymn of praise, but an act of penitential confession with a prayer for pardon.

Again, that this is the proper introduction of the service is plain from the nature of the case. The first thought of the sinner coming into the presence of the Holy God is of his sins, and the first impulse is confession and supplication for pardon. When Peter, on the Sea of Galilee, caught a glimpse of the out-flashing divinity of Jesus he immediately fell on his knees and said: "Depart from me, O Lord, for I am a sinful man." When the returning prodigal of the parable came to his father his first word was: "Father, I have sinned against Heaven and in thy sight and am no more worthy to be called thy son." And this free, frank, full confession of his sin opened the way for his restoration. This brought him forgiveness, reinstated him as a son in the father's house, and made room for the affectionate fellowship and happy festivities which followed. Nor would it have been possible for this returning prodigal to be fully forgiven and

to be readmitted to all the privileges of sonship in the father's house, if such a sincere, penitent confession had not first been made. Confession is in order to forgiveness, and forgiveness reinstates, opens the way for the bringing of acceptable sacrifices and for the supplication of new mercies. In the nature of the case the confession of sin is the proper introduction of the Divine Service and preliminary to all other acts of worship.

And this is fully confirmed by such intimations concerning the order of public worship as are found in Holy Scripture. In the Mosaic ritual the divinely appointed order of sacrifices was first the sin-offering, then the burnt-offering and lastly the meat or thank-offering, thus indicating the order of the several steps of approach into the Divine presence. To this rule there was only one exception, and that was in the offering brought after the birth of a child. In this case the burnt-offering preceded the sin-offering; and the reason of this remarkable exception to the rule, Lange says, "appears to lie in the fact that at the birth of a child feelings of joyful gratitude are naturally uppermost, the thought of the child's heritage of sinfulness coming afterwards." In all other cases when the several kinds of sacrifice were brought together the fixed order was as above stated. And even when the burnt-offering was brought by itself as an offering which gathered up into itself in abbreviated form the elements of all the sacrifices—even in this case that manipulation of the blood which made ceremonial atonement for sin came first and, Oehler says, was the *conditio sine qua non* of all that followed.

Moreover, in the Old Testament as often as Jehovah especially revealed Himself to His people, or when they were about to draw nigh into His presence, this doing away of sin was a preliminary act. When Jehovah was about to come down on Mt. Sinai in sight of all the people His command to Moses was that he should sanctify the people and be ready against the third day, for on the third day the Lord will come down in sight of all the people on Mt. Sinai. In the celebration of the great religious festivals a day of preparation preceded. Our Saviour Himself, speaking of this very thing, says: "If thou art offering thy gift at the altar

and there rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar and go thy way, *first* be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift." What else does our Saviour say here than that the first thing to do in our approach into the Divine presence, the act preliminary to all other acts of worship, is the putting away of sin, reconciliation with God and man ; or that before we bring our sacrifices of praise and thanksgiving, before we undertake to make supplications for new blessings in the future, we should make humble acknowledgment of our transgressions and shortcomings in the past.

Facts and sentiments such as these, no doubt, underlie this steady gravitation for centuries past toward this usage of beginning the public service with an act of penitential confession.

If now we inquire into the history of this usage we will find that it is peculiarly Reformed. It originated in the Reformed Church, and for a long time was distinctive of the worship of the family of Reformed Churches. As to the Church of the first centuries our knowledge is somewhat limited. The "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles," probably the oldest post-apostolic writing now extant enjoins confession as a regular part of public worship and that it shall precede thanksgiving and the other acts of worship as a preparation. We have, also, the testimony of St. Basil that in his day this custom was widely prevalent. But with the rise of private confession to the priest, in the fifth century, the use of a general confession in the service was discontinued ; and from that time until the Reformation the Christian Church was without a general confession of sin in its service. At the time of the Reformation the Lutheran Church retained the use of private confession to the priest and had no general confession at all in its service, following in this respect Roman usage. But the Reformed Church from the beginning rejected private auricular confession, and substituted in its place a general confession to be made jointly by the whole congregation as a part of the public service. Its place in the service, however, was not everywhere the same. In Switzerland, under Zwingli, Leo Juda and others,

it was placed after the sermon without a declaration of pardon, Under Bucer, Calvin and others it was placed in the opening service and was followed with a declaration of pardon. And here the position of first honor belongs to Martin Bucer and his associate pastors of the city of Strassburg. It has often been assumed by liturgical writers that the idea of such a penitential introduction of the service originated with John Calvin, and that it is another mark of his keen spiritual originality and logic. Even so well-informed and careful a writer as Dr. Shields says in his *Liturgia Expurgata*: "The idea of such a penitential introduction to take the place of private confession and absolution was due to Calvin." But this is a mistake. The first liturgy in which it occurs, at least so far as known to the writer, is the *Strassburg Amt*, prepared by Bucer and his associated pastors in 1524.* But to John Calvin is due the extension and popularizing of this form of introduction throughout the Reformed Churches. In 1538 he prepared his first liturgy for his congregation of French refugees in Strassburg. In this liturgy he adopted this arrangement, and by the influence of his example and advice it very speedily became the accepted order of service in almost all the Reformed Churches, including the Presbyterian Church of Scotland and the Episcopal Church of England. In more recent years it has also become the prevailing order of service in the Lutheran Church and in a measure also of the Roman Church. But for more than two hundred years after the Reformation this usage, which has now become almost universal among churches having an authorized order of service, was limited almost altogether to the Reformed Church. A somewhat fuller statement of facts will show the truth of this claim.

First as to the Roman Church. I stated above that from the introduction of private auricular confession in the fifth century to the Reformation, the Christian Church was without a general confession of sin in its public service. It is, indeed, true that the

* *Grund und ursache der neuerungen zu Strassburg*, written by Bucer to Prince Frederick of the Palatinate in 1524 and published in *Luther's Leben und Schriften* by Walch, Vol. XX., p. 458.

Roman Confiteor made its appearance as early as the tenth century, had come into very general use by the beginning of the sixteenth, and in 1570 was made obligatory throughout the Roman Communion by a decree of Pope Pius the fifth. But the Roman Confiteor, as then used, was not a general confession of sin for the whole congregation. It was only a private personal confession for the priest and his assistants—a part of their official preparation for the celebration of the mass. The Roman Church has an elaborate service of preparation for the officiating priest. It has none for the people. The reasons are plain. First, on account of its doctrine of the necessity of auricular confession to the priest. A direct confession of sins to God, such as is implied in a united confession of the whole congregation, though never so true and worthy, is not sufficient for forgiveness. To the priest has been entrusted the exercise of the power of the keys; he has been appointed of God to judge of the worthiness or unworthiness of your penance, to loose or bind, forgive or retain your sins as the case may be; and unless you confess your sins to him and receive special absolution from him you are not loosed from your sins and have no admission into the Kingdom. Such is Roman doctrine, and it would be inconsistent therewith for the priest to absolve a whole congregation on the basis of a united confession to God alone apart from His priest. Secondly, the celebration of the mass is not a congregational but a priestly act. It is a sacred transaction between the Lord and His priest. The congregation, strictly speaking, is not a party to it. Their prayers and praises are not essential, and the mass can be celebrated just as well in their absence as when they are present. This is the idea underlying private masses. The mass consists essentially of two priestly acts; the first is the producing of the divine victim upon the altar, which is done in the consecration of the elements; the second is the offering of this divine victim unto God in the prayer of oblation as an atonement for the sins of the congregation and for whomsoever it may be intended. These two acts constitute the sacrifice of the mass; and these are both priestly acts in which the congregation as such has no part, for the Roman Church de-

nies the priesthood of all believers. Hence the priest alone comes into really close contact with the holy mystery. He alone enters into the Holy of Holies and offers the awful sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ. The people tarry without and look on with prayerful reverence from a distance even as in the temple worship of the old Testament. For the priest, therefore, the Roman Church provides an elaborate *modum preparandi ad missam* both in the sacristy and after he comes to the altar, that he may be worthy to appear before the Lord and offer the awful sacrifice in behalf of the people; but it provides no similar service of preparation for the people. For the same reason the most solemn parts of the mass are read in a low voice, inaudible to the congregation. And upon the same ground, also, Romanists attempt to justify the use of a dead language in the service, for the mass is essentially a transaction between the Lord and His priest; and as for the people it is not necessary for them to understand it, for the mass is a service rendered for them and not by them. These facts give us the rationale of this part of the Roman service and make it plain why the said Church has an elaborate service of preparation for the priest at the beginning of mass, but not a general confession of sin for the people as it was introduced by Bucer, Calvin and the Reformed Church.

And, now, how with regard to the Lutheran Church? Luther retained the use of private confession and absolution, though he denied its necessity to forgiveness as taught in the Roman Church. But he esteemed it as an institution which, rightly administered, would be most beneficial to the people, and, therefore, earnestly recommended its continuance and diligent cultivation among his followers. He taught it in his catechism, and through his influence it became the established practice of the Lutheran Church in the sixteenth century. Provision is made for it in all its liturgies. Many of them will admit no one to the Holy Communion unless he has first privately confessed his sins to his pastor and received absolution from him. Because of this use of private confession the Lutheran Church felt less need of, and was less inclined to, a general confession in the public service. In addition to this,

Luther and his followers took very high ground concerning the nature of the absolution, investing it, in fact, with the dignity of a sacrament, yea, even going so far as to put it on an equality with Baptism and the Lord's Supper; and they were not willing that the absolution should be given to a promiscuous assembly.

For example, the second liturgy of Wittenberg, published in 1542 and subscribed by Luther himself, speaks on this wise: "Care shall be taken that uniform usage be followed with the confession, that a pastor give separate Christian absolution to each one confessing his sins; and if anywhere it has happened that persons were received to the Holy Sacrament without previous confession, or that a pastor allowed those who were about to commune on the following day to appear before him in a group and gave them the absolution in common, it shall in no wise be." Many other Lutheran liturgies of the sixteenth century contain similar directions. I can, perhaps, quote no better authority for Lutheran usage in the sixteenth century than that of Dr. C. F. W. Walther, for many years the recognized head and leader of the Missouri Synod. In his *Pastorale*, p. 158, he says: "By the advice of Luther private confession was authoritatively appointed in the liturgies of almost all the Churches of the sixteenth century standing in fellowship with the Church of Wittenberg, while no provision was made for a general confession." In a word, the position of the Lutheran Church in the sixteenth century, which is now regarded as the classic period of Lutheran cultus, was to have no confession of sin and no declaration of pardon at all in the public service.

This general statement, however, needs some modification. In the first place, there were some exceptions in southwestern Germany due to Reformed influence. In those countries lying in close proximity to Switzerland the two streams of Protestantism met and modified each other, resulting in a unionistic type of Protestant cultus. Their liturgies try to take a mediating position between the Reformed and the Lutheran types, for which reason Kliefoth calls them "unionistic," and Daniel, "Luthero-Calvinizing." In Wurtemberg, for example, the population was divided,

part sympathizing with the Saxon and part with the Swiss movement. Duke Ulrich, its ruler, called two men, Ambrose Blaurer, a Reformed, and Erhard Schnepf, a Lutheran, and entrusted the work of reforming the Church into their hands, first, however, exacting a promise from them that they would make concessions to each other. The result was, as we would expect, a compromise; and the first liturgy of Wurtemberg, published in 1536, retained private confession in accordance with Lutheran ideas, but also accommodated the Reformed by introducing into the principal service on the Lord's Day a general confession of sin with declaration of pardon, placing it, however, not at the commencement, where Calvin afterwards placed his, but after the sermon, in accordance with the practice of the Swiss Reformed Churches under Zwingli. This first Wurtemberg liturgy became the source of a number of other liturgies; and in this way a general confession of sin was adopted into the worship of some adjoining Lutheran countries, including the Lutheran Palatinate liturgy of 1554. And this accounts for the position of the confession after the sermon in the Reformed Palatinate liturgy of 1563. The people, having become used to that position of the confession while the Electorate was Lutheran, it was retained there in deference to popular custom; but, in order that they might bring it also into harmony with what had by that time become the recognized genius of Reformed cultus, its framers placed another confessional prayer at the commencement of the service, thereby giving the penitential element undue proportion.

But the above general statement that the Lutheran Church had no general confession of sin in its public service needs another modification. For a brief period, in the middle of the sixteenth century, even the Reformed or Calvinistic usage of a penitential introduction of the service won for itself recognition in a few Lutheran liturgies of middle and northern Germany. The first of these was Archbishop Hermann's liturgy of Cologne in 1543. This was the production of Bucer and Melanchthon, who were called by the Archbishop to Cologne specially for that purpose. Bucer prepared the ritual or service part, as Melanchthon himself informs us. This Cologne liturgy afterwards entered largely into

the composition of the English Book of Common Prayer, and there has been considerable sparring as to whether it ought to be accounted Reformed or Lutheran. Dr. Shields, of Princeton, after carefully examining into the whole question, has this to say in his *Liturgia Expurgata*: "It would, in fact, simply be absurd for any party now to lay exclusive claim to the authorship or purport of a production which was compiled by divines noted for their liberal views and union tendencies and with the express design of reconciling the two extremes of the reformation." But since Bucer prepared the service part of this Cologne liturgy, we may truthfully and fairly claim that the general confession of sin and declaration of pardon with which it opens the public service was the introduction of Reformed usage by a Reformed man into the Lutheran Church. The second Lutheran liturgy in which such penitential introduction of the service occurs is the Mecklenberg liturgy of 1552, prepared by Melancthon and Aurifaber; and from this it was adopted into a few other Lutheran liturgies of that period, including the third Wittenberg liturgy of 1565. But it found no permanent home in the Lutheran Churches of Germany. It soon disappeared. Even in Mecklenberg, where it was first introduced, it lasted only for a season. It was not Lutheran, but Reformed; and when, in the course of the seventh and eighth decades, the strict Lutheran party under Flacius and others triumphed over Melancthon and his friends, this Reformed usage in Lutheran Churches was done away with.

Such are the facts. Now, when this Calvinistic and Reformed usage has won for itself universal recognition, and the followers of Luther have themselves adopted it both in Europe and America, being convinced of its eminent fitness and propriety, it would very naturally be pleasing to them to find some early Lutheran liturgies of a pure type on its side, to show that it is a product native to the soil and not an imported article. Several of its well-known writers on this side of the Atlantic have cited Bugenhagen's liturgy of 1524, Döber's *Ev. Messe* of 1525 and the Brandenburg-Nuremberg Order of 1533, claiming that these liturgies change the private personal confession of the priest in

the Roman mass into a general confession for the whole congregation; but, as is plain and admitted by other Lutheran writers, these liturgies did not change the private confession of the priest into a general confession for the congregation, but they simply revised and adapted that confession into a suitable private prayer for the Protestant minister, which he was to offer up silently for himself as a preparation for conducting services. In Döber's Messe he offers up this prayer, *while the choir sings the Introit or first hymn*.* The Brandenburg-Nuremberg Order says: "First, when the priest comes to the altar he shall say the confiteor, or *whatever his own devotions may bring to mind*." This meant a private personal prayer, for it was not the custom of the period to leave any part of the service intended for the people to the uncertain care and discretion of the minister.† The Bugenhagen Order of 1524 is not so clear. It was used very little, and, until quite recently, it was questioned whether such a liturgy ever existed. What has come down to us is very fragmentary. This much is certain, however, that for the principal service on Sunday and on festival days it provides the usual Lutheran service of that period without a general confession of sin at all. In addition to this, however, it provides also a service which seems to be something of a Protestant counterpart of low mass in the Roman church. In this second service there is a place provided for a confession of sin, but no formula of confession is given. Its space is left blank. What this may have been and how used the writer does not know. But, however used, it was, at least, not in the beginning of the service.‡ Therefore the writer is of the opinion that it can truthfully be said that no Lutheran liturgy of the sixteenth century, dominated purely by influences emanating from Lutheran Saxony had a general confession of sin with declaration of pardon in its public service. It was looked upon as Reformed and not Lutheran, and the intense controversial feel-

*Reformation of Worship in Nuremberg, by Rev. Dr. E. T. Horn, *Lutheran Church Review*, Vol. 11, p. 127.

†Grüneisens *Ev. Gottesdienst Ordnung in Wurtemberg*, p. 67.

‡A translation of this Bugenhagen Liturgy by Dr. Jacobs is published in *Lutheran Church Review*, Vol. 10, p. 288.

ing which then unfortunately existed between these two branches of Protestantism had probably much to do with the refusal of the Lutheran churches of the sixteenth century to receive such a general confession into their service.

With the commencement of the seventeenth century however, came a change. Private confession was losing its hold upon the people. Its frequent abuse in the hands of unworthy pastors made it unpopular. Rightly used and improved, it would, unquestionably, as Luther thought, prove a rich blessing to both pastor and people; but in the hands of a degenerate ministry it is a source of much evil. Beside this, the eminent fitness and propriety of such a penitential action by a whole congregation in the service of the sanctuary was being felt, and therefore a general confession of sin with a declaration of grace began to be introduced, at first in addition to private confession, but, by and by, as a substitute for private confession. Its position in the service, however, was not in the beginning, but after the sermon. Everywhere in the Lutheran Church that was the position adopted for this penitential action. And this continued to be its position through the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth century. But to-day this position after the sermon has been almost everywhere abandoned, and the confession placed at the beginning as the introduction of the service.

This third usage of the Lutheran Church in this matter had its beginning here in America. The first American liturgy, prepared by Dr. Muhlenberg, in 1748, led the way. In Europe Dr. Muhlenberg had been used to a confession of sin and absolution after the sermon. When he prepared his first liturgy for this country he inserted it at the opening. What suggested to him this change? We do not know for certain, but, as Dr. Jacobs suggests, probably the English Book of Common Prayer. On his way to America he stayed for six months in London as the guest of his friend and patron, Dr. Ziegenhagen, pastor of the Royal German Lutheran Chapel in that city during the reign of the House of Hanover. In this congregation a German translation of the English Book of Common Prayer was used;

and it is altogether probable that his acquaintance with the service in the Book of Common Prayer during those six months suggested to him and made him realize this improvement of the Lutheran service by transferring the confession to the beginning of the service. Through this Muhlenberg liturgy it has passed into all the Lutheran churches of America except the Missouri Synod. In Europe the beginning was made by the Prussian liturgy of 1822, the liturgy produced and adopted in connection with the union of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches throughout the German Empire ; and to-day it has come to prevail practically in all the Protestant churches of Europe. Thus the Lutheran Church has had three different usages touching this matter of a general confession and absolution in the service. The first was to have none at all ; the second, to have it after the sermon ; and the third is to have it as the introduction of the service where the Reformed Church had it from the beginning.

In conclusion the writer would say that he very gladly acknowledges the great services rendered by the Lutheran Church to the cause of Christian worship, and that he feels grateful to it for holding fast to not a few excellent things which our Reformed fathers were inclined to throw overboard ; but, whatever the relative merits of these two great branches of Protestantism may be in other respects, in respect of this usage of having a general confession with declaration of pardon as the proper introduction of the public service at least, we may fairly claim that Wittenberg has come to Geneva and Luther is paying homage to Calvin.

VIII.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

ETHICAL CONCEPTION OF THE DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY.

During the past year the Presbyterian Churches of this country celebrated the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the Westminster Confession and Catechisms. This has resulted in the production of a considerable amount of Westminster literature. The Southern Church, for instance, has published a neat volume of addresses delivered before the General Assembly at Charlotte, N. C., in May, 1897. A notice of this volume will be found in its proper place in this number of the REVIEW. The *Princeton and Reformed Review* also has contained several articles which owed their origin to this anniversary occasion. Thus, for instance, we have in the July number an interesting paper on "The Place of the Westminster Assembly in Modern History," by Dr. John De Witt, which was first delivered as an address at the anniversary celebration by the Princeton Theological Seminary.

There is in this anniversary literature, as might be expected, a good deal of enthusiastic glorification of the Westminster Standards. The men of the Westminster Assembly, as seen through the medium of this literature, were men without compeers, and their work has no parallel in history. The Westminster Symbols form the ultimate goal of Christian theology; and Christian thought, whenever it goes beyond them, only finds itself in "wandering mazes lost," from which it is ever bound to come back again to the sound words of the Westminster Standards. Such is the tone which runs through much of this new Westminster literature. It is apparently an expression of absolute present satisfaction with a theological work that is two hundred and fifty years old—a work, moreover, that was produced in a time of intense agitation and excitement, and that bears upon its

face the marks of a logical scholasticism that shrinks from no consequences, and that is now well-nigh extinct. To the sober theologian of another denomination all this may look like extravagance; but such extravagances are to be expected on occasions of the kind here under consideration. When celebrating historical events, the eye of the mind is apt to be turned so exclusively to the past, that it fails to perceive the light of the present. To look both backward and forward at the same time, and rightly to appreciate things new and old is a difficult performance; and our Presbyterian friends, in their jubilee essays, have not always succeeded, as we think, in the performance of this difficult task. The past has bulked so largely before their imagination that they have to some extent failed in appreciation of the value of the present.

But after all the most determined adherents of past systems of thought can not entirely rid themselves of the influence of modern ideas. The world of thought is moving, as well as the world of matter. This is true of religious and theological thought, as well as of scientific and philosophical thought. And this general movement of thought involves and carries with it individual minds more or less unconsciously to themselves; so that while they imagine that they are only thinking the thoughts of past generations, they are after all not thinking them as past generations did. One of the evidences of this truth is to be seen in the fact that in the course of time old words and old formulas come to be used in new senses. They no longer express the ideas which they were once intended to express. This is a very common phenomenon in the sphere of religious thought. The same phrases no longer produce the same feelings and ideas which they once produced. We have an illustration of this fact in the manner in which some Calvinistic writers now treat the conception of the divine sovereignty. Notably Dr. De Witt, in the article already referred to, insists that the doctrine of the divine sovereignty must be subordinated to an ethical conception of God; or, in other words, that the divine sovereignty must be conceived ethically. And this he thinks was the original meaning of the

Westminster Symbols; and in this view other writers agree with him. This, we think, is reading into the Symbols an idea which was entirely foreign to the minds of the framers of those Symbols.

Of course, the fundamental idea of the Westminster standards, according to these modern writers, is the idea of the divine sovereignty; but this idea, it is supposed, must be apprehended in the light of the modern conception of the ethical nature of God. "The vital and pregnant idea of the Westminster Confession," says Dr. De Witt, "is the idea that the living and holy God is the one absolute sovereign, realizing in history His eternal and perfect plan, with means by His Providence or without means by His Spirit when and where He pleaseth." It is, then, not the idea of an absolute, heartless sovereignty, or the idea of a mere power which in its exercise recognizes no reason or motive outside of itself as power, that must be supposed to be the distinguishing characteristic of God. God is sovereign; but His sovereignty must be supposed to be exercised in accordance with an ethical character that belongs essentially to the being of God, and that corresponds essentially to the ethical nature of man. "We shall not have this idea (of the divine sovereignty) before our minds in an adequate way," says Dr. De Witt, "unless we emphasize the truth that the God whom it represents is the free personal and ethical God of Holy Scripture. * * * The Biblical representation of deity not merely excludes all those conceptions of Him which convert Him into a gnostic abyss, and place Him in such unrevealed depths that He ceases to be an object of either love or fear, but it clothes Him with individuality of emotion or feeling. * * * It is the free, living, ethical, and emotional character of God, whose sovereignty the idea announces, that gives to the idea its energizing influence when it enters the individual soul."

As thus stated we can not see that there can be any objection to the doctrine of the divine sovereignty. Certainly, God is the sovereign ruler of the universe, who is accomplishing an eternal plan in human history. The idea of monotheism implies that. And a Church which considers it to be its chief task to empha-

size the divine sovereignty does not now seem to have a very difficult or very important calling. There is no being besides God that could presume to dispute with Him the power of His throne. And there are no theologians who question the supremacy of God's power and dominion. The exercise of His power can only be limited by His moral nature, and by nothing else. In this sense the Arminian recognizes the sovereignty of God no less than the Calvinist. And to see some Calvinists go into hysterics over what they imagine to be attacks upon the divine sovereignty, one might suppose that God were actually in danger, like another Kronos, of being dethroned by His own children. Such a fear is not the mark of a Christian, but of a heathen mind. No Christian theologian ever objected to the doctrine of the divine sovereignty when set forth in a Christian sense. But what has been objected to, and what we object to, is the doctrine that the divine sovereignty or power is exercised without any rule of reason or without any feeling of emotion—the doctrine that the deepest thing in God is pure abstract will that is determined by nothing whatsoever but absolute caprice. Such a conception of the divine sovereignty leaves no room for an application of the ethical idea to God. A God who is mere absolute will could not be an ethical God, any more than the force of gravitation could be an ethical power. A God without ethical ideas and feelings would be an omnipotent tyrant to be feared, but He could not be a Father that may be loved. To such a monstrous representation of God we must ever object. But when we are told that the God whose sovereignty is insisted upon, must be conceived, first of all, as an ethical being—a being possessing an ethical and emotional character corresponding to our own highest ethical ideal—a being whose inmost nature is love, then, of course, our objection ceases. The idea which represents the sovereign God as being moved in His activity, not by mere cold formal volition (*arbitrio nutuque*), but by an ethical character belonging to His eternal personality, and intelligible to us, we recognize as the Christian idea of God. And we are glad to see that this idea is gaining acceptance among an ever increasing number of Chris-

tian thinkers. This fact proves to our mind an ever advancing triumph of Christianity over human thought.

But when we are told that this is the original idea of the Westminster standards, we respectfully beg leave to differ. The conception of the divine sovereignty which was held by the Westminster divines was not an ethical conception. It was the conception merely of an absolute power which in its exercise takes no account of anything but its own nature *as power*. This is the ruling idea of God in the Westminster symbols, where the eternal decree and purpose of God are supposed to have no other ground than the absolute pleasure of His will, and no other end than His own glory. In fact, the glory of God is so frequently set forth as the end of all His activity that it must make the impression as if *selfishness* were the supreme impulse of God's nature. The fact that in the Westminster Confession and Catechisms ethical attributes are ascribed to God, such as holiness, righteousness, goodness, does not prove that the conception of God is really ethical, for these terms are neutralized by opposite representations of God's character and conduct. These ethical terms were simply taken from Scripture and externally connected with the concept of God; but the qualities denoted by them were not supposed to constitute the very essence of God. Even in Scripture these terms do not always denote the ethical qualities which the Christian consciousness now connects with them. Just as among the Greeks the phrase "holy and righteous gods" did not convey the ethical sense in which the Christian now understands the character of God, so also it was among the early Semites. The holiness of God at first meant merely His exaltation above the creature, and His righteousness was his sensitiveness to the right performance of ritualistic ceremonies. Hence it will appear how easily Scriptural phrases may be used in regard to the character of God without really connecting with them Christian ideas. This was the case through the middle ages, and largely also during the scholastic period of Protestantism. It has only been in comparatively recent times that the idea of God has been thoroughly *Christianized*, or, to use an expression of H. B. Smith, *Christologized*.

During the middle ages there was an influential class of theologians who, like Duns Scotus, maintained that morality has its source not in the *nature*, but in the *will* of God. That is moral, they said, which God wills to be moral, and that is immoral which God wills to be immoral. Morality, accordingly, is something contingent. It has no ground in the eternal being of God. God is not Himself an ethical being. He is exalted above all ethical distinctions, and His will, which might be otherwise than it is, establishes these distinctions. This was evidently also Calvin's fundamental idea of God. It is only thus that we can understand the emphasis which he continually lays upon God's will. "The will of God," he said, "is the highest rule of justice." And when objection was made to his doctrine of predestination on the ground that it would be unjust for God to punish creatures for the commission of sins which they were by Himself foreordained to commit, Calvin replied, "How could any injustice be committed by Him who is the judge of the world?" The meaning of this is that God as judge of the world is, like the Roman Emperor, Himself above the law which He has ordained, and so does no wrong when He does what would be sin in the creature. The Emperor can violate no law because he is above the law; and so God can do no wrong because His will constitutes the distinction of right and wrong. But surely that is not an ethical conception of God. But Calvin also applies to the predestinating will of God the figure of the potter, which Jeremiah and after him St. Paul apply in a wholly different sense, and contends that God has as much right to create one man for eternal salvation and another for eternal damnation, as the potter has of the same clay to make vessels for high and low uses. That indicates a physical, a mechanical, but certainly not an ethical conception of God. A mechanic may rightfully use the machine which he has built for any purposes he pleases; but may a father so use his child? What does our ethical nature say to that question? The very conception is unethical.

And that, we are convinced, is the conception of God which belongs to the Westminster standards. In fact the determinism

of the Calvinistic system, as we find it accepted in the Westminster symbols, admits of no really ethical conception of God. As He has eternally foreordained all that comes to pass, and therefore sin too, it follows either that sin has no reality for Him, or that He is the author of it. Moreover a God would not be ethical who, in the formation of His eternal purposes or decrees, should take no account of any ethical considerations, but allow Himself to be moved merely by the impulse of His will and with reference to His own glory. A God who should create one man for salvation and another for damnation for no other reason than that He so wills, would not be an ethical God in any intelligible sense. And yet this is the view which Calvinists, and with them the Westminster Symbols, continually take of the divine election. That they themselves somewhat feel the unethicallness and harshness of this doctrine, is evident from the fact they sometimes seek to clothe their ideas in the language of agnosticism, pretending either that God's motives are too deep for our comprehension, or that His morality is entirely different from our morality. Thus one of the speakers of the Charlotte Assembly says: "Why God did not elect to save all men Calvinism does not know. It only knows that such was not His sovereign pleasure." How it knows *this*, we do not know. But we do know that such a conception of God is not ethical in any intelligible sense of the term, and that a God who should thus deal with His offspring could not feel towards them the emotions of a father, and could not be loved. And yet that is the character given to God in the Westminster Confession; and accordingly one of the speakers of the Charlotte Assembly labors to prove that the modern idea of the universal fatherhood of God is all a mistake. In harmony with this unethical conception of God's character in general are some of the Westminster views of His conduct and dealing with men. Thus we are told by one of the Charlotte speakers—and the representation is unfortunately correct—that "Westminster divines assert that the guilt of Adam's first sin is imputed and his corruption conveyed to all the race except the divine Son of Mary;" and we are assured further that "the Confession asserts

with most positive precision the penal substitution of Christ, the imputation of our guilt to Him, His punitive suffering and sacrifice therefore, and the imputation of this satisfaction to believers for their justification;" and finally we are informed that "the Confession holds fast the truth of a particular redemption." This last we presume is supposed to be the crowning glory of the Confession. Now all these conceptions may be mechanical, legal and commercial; but they are certainly not ethical, and the notion of God which they imply is not moral. In what sense could we suppose a God to be moral, who should be willing to damn infants for the "imputed sin" and the "conveyed corruption" of a remote ancestor?

But we are glad to see that such ideas are beginning to be rejected by an increasing number of Calvinistic and Presbyterian divines. They no longer teach infant damnation, but only because they think that they have found out somehow that all dying infants are elect. But even that is a gain. These divines are beginning to feel that the old idea of divine sovereignty is not consistent with the Christian conception of God, and that that idea must now be Christologized in order to make it true. These theologians are more or less under the influence of those modern ideas of the divine fatherhood and of human brotherhood which form so large a part of the teaching of Jesus and distinguish Christianity from every other religion. God, according to these ideas which the modern church has gained by going back to the mind of the Master, is not a being of pure force or will, as void of feeling as the law of gravitation, but He is a being of infinite love—a father who treats all His children with absolute reason and fairness, and justice, and with infinite compassion. God, according to these ideas, is not a selfish God who sacrifices His children to His glory, but a loving father who brings sacrifice in behalf of His children. We are glad, indeed, to see that these ideas are spreading among the theologians of the Presbyterian Church. They have become dominant ideas among Presbyterians in Scotland; and in time they will become dominant also among Presbyterians in America. They may for a while try to read

them into the Westminster symbols; but the incongruity of that will by and by become apparent; and then there will come revision in earnest. And we earnestly hope that God may speed the day when this end shall be realized; for we are especially interested in the Presbyterian Church, as we sustain closer relations to it than to any other. We too are Calvinistic; but we reject from our creed any form of determinism as unethical and unchristian; and we are convinced that no amount of logical juggling can ever relieve the Calvinistic doctrine of election from the charge of determinism. We hold that there is more in Calvinism than its determinism; which we regard as a heresy into which not only Calvin but all the Reformers were led by a blind following of Augustine. Calvinism may remain, but determinism must go.

CALVINISM AND LIBERTY.

In the Presbyterian jubilee literature, referred to in the preceding article, much credit is claimed for Calvinism as a promoter of liberty, both civil and religious. This is in accordance with a fashion set by some casual remarks of a few able historians, and followed without much consideration by a host of others. Mr. Bancroft, for example, speaks of Calvinism as "the system which for a century and a half assumed the guardianship of liberty for the English speaking world;" and Ranke asserts that "John Calvin was virtually the founder of America." In view of such examples Presbyterians and others, who have an interest in Calvinism, may well be pardoned for occasionally speaking with pride of the merits of their system of faith in its supposed relation to the sacred cause of human freedom.

In order, however, that such self-congratulation may not grow into mere senseless boasting, that shall draw upon itself the derision of the world, it would be well to inquire somewhat more closely into the grounds of it. What reason is there for the assertion that Calvinism has been the special nurse of liberty? Undoubtedly some Calvinistic communities have cherished the

spirit of civil and religious freedom, and others have served as occasions, more or less direct, of its promotion. But the same is true also of communities that have not been Calvinistic. And, then, there have been communities holding the tenets of Calvinism that were not conspicuous for any love of liberty. What, then, is the relation between Calvinism as a system of religious and theological thought and the interest of human freedom? Is it a relation of cause and effect, or is it merely a relation of accidental association? Is liberty related to Calvinism as a *propter hoc* or merely as a *post hoc*? And in case there should be supposed to be a causal relation between the two, what would appear to be the precise principle in Calvinism that especially favors the liberty of man? There is more than one principle in Calvinism. In the original system of Calvin himself there was a church principle, a sacramental principle, and a democratic principle, as well as a decretal principle. In the Calvinism of the Synod of Dort, half a century after the death of Calvin, there are *five points*, or principles, all of which, however, may be reduced to the principle of the divine sovereignty. Which of these principles, then, is the one that may be supposed especially to have favored the cause of liberty? The answer which our Presbyterian friends give to this question is that it is the principle of divine sovereignty, or the principle of absolute predestination. "Let the truth of the sovereignty of God be lodged in the minds of the people," says Dr. De Witt, "and let it work there its legitimate conclusion; and pope of Rome, and my Lord Bishop in England, and kingly thrones alike must tremble." The same view substantially is presented by several writers of the Southern Church in their anniversary addresses. The idea is that the conviction of being elect, that is, of being a chosen instrument for the promotion of the divine glory, will work such an exaltation of mind in an individual as will make him unwilling ever to be in subjection to anything lower than God. The slave of God can not be the slave of any man.

This, indeed, may be supposed to be the usual view of the case. The idea of the sole causality and efficiency of God in the deter-

mination of human life implies the thought that the subject is free from the control of every lower influence, and must resent every effort to be brought under such control. This, however, we consider a very defective view of liberty; and we, therefore, do not hesitate to take decided issue with the whole theory here under consideration. We totally deny that, as here understood, Calvinism is directly favorable to the progress of liberty, and we believe that history will bear us out in our position. We hold that, in the nature of the case, no system of fatalism, by whatever name it may be designated, can be favorable to the idea of liberty. Now Calvinism teaches that man is in his own constitution absolutely without moral ability, and consequently without freedom. When the divine grace takes hold of an elect person it works in him irresistibly and makes him into a saint. There is no freedom in this process, except the mere freedom from external constraint. The man is free to yield to divine grace only in the sense that he is not hindered by anything outside of him. But this is not moral freedom; it is merely the spontaneity of the plant or animal, in which the creative will accomplishes its purpose in this absolute way. But how any system of moral determinism could be supposed to favor directly either civil or religious liberty, we can not understand. It is true that the conviction of being a chosen organ of an absolute divine sovereignty may cause a certain feeling of independence of all lower powers, and a certain strength of character, that will yield to no obstacles and give way to no suffering. In this way Calvinism, like Stoicism, may make heroes of a certain kind; and it may make martyrs. But it may also make tyrants. The chosen instrument of God may imagine that he is predestined to be a *master of men*, and that others are predestined to be his slaves. But all this is not in the spirit of liberty. Liberty consists not merely in claiming certain rights for oneself, because of some supposed divine favor, but in allowing the same rights also to others.

If the mere adoption of the doctrine of divine sovereignty, in the sense in which this doctrine has been generally understood

among Calvinists, were sufficient to make a people free, then the Mohammedans ought to be the freest people in the world, for Mohammedanism teaches the sovereignty of God in the most extreme form. "It is the will of Allah," is the stolid expression with which the Mohammedan meets every event in life. Allah is everything, man is nothing. A man goes to heaven or hell as Allah wills. Surely that is a sufficiently large view of the divine sovereignty. But instead of favoring, it crushes out every spark of the feeling of liberty. There is no country in the world in which there is so little of the feeling of personal liberty as in Turkey, where the doctrine of divine sovereignty is accepted in its most exaggerated form. But it may be said that Mohammedanism is a false religion, and that, of course, everything good must there be perverted. We hold, however, that everywhere the like causes must produce like results. But let us pass into the domain of Christendom. St. Augustine taught the doctrine of the divine sovereignty as strongly, if not as consistently, as did Calvin; and yet this did not lead him to respect the rights or the liberty of the Donatists. Nor did Augustinianism during the Middle Ages favor the development of freedom, but it lent itself quite easily to the tyranny of the papacy and the abuses of Roman Catholicism.

And what about John Calvin? He claimed liberty for himself—independence of thought and action both in religious and civil life—but he set up a theocracy at Geneva which repressed the aspirations of personal liberty as much as any oriental despotism ever did. The saints of Geneva were free to think and to act as they were bidden; but if they presumed to think and act otherwise, they soon discovered that there was a limit to their liberty. The story of Michael Servetus shows how much freedom of thought was permitted in Geneva. But it is said that that affair about Servetus happened in accordance with *the spirit of the time*, and that all the Reformers then living approved of it. Calvin was no worse than the rest; but neither was he any better, as he should have been, if all that is sometimes claimed for his system were true. It was the common belief at the time

that it is the duty of the temporal prince to punish heresy and protect and defend the purity of the Church. That is the teaching even of the Westminster Confession (Cap XX., Art. IV. and Cap. XXIII., Art. III.), which, in spite of its Calvinism, shows in this regard no superiority to other confessions of the time; although its teaching on this point is in striking contradiction with the statement contained elsewhere in the Confession, that "God alone is Lord of the conscience." So, then, Calvin only fell a victim to the spirit of the time when he burned Servetus. His belief in divine sovereignty did not raise him above that spirit. It did not make him a champion of liberty. The fact is that he argued in favor of persecution from the example of the Roman Catholics. If Catholic princes show so much zeal against the true religion, he said, how much more ought Protestant princes to show in favor of it!

All this shows that liberty is rather a product of the conflict of ages than of the logic of a system. And history has shown that Calvinists can be as good persecutors as any other class of men. The Calvinists of the Netherlands defended themselves bravely against their Spanish oppressors; but when they were in power, they persecuted Arminians and Mennonites with as much zeal as the Spaniards had shown in persecuting them. And the same was the case in England. They who pleaded for liberty when they were down, forgot to exercise toleration when they were on top. William A. Cox, one of the speakers before the Charlotte Assembly, complains that Cromwell did much injury to the cause of Presbyterianism in England, and says that "he gave to England a government of great power, vigor and wisdom, but which was after all as thorough-going a despotism as that which Charles I. lost his life and crown in seeking to establish." That is doubtless true; but surely it must not be forgotten that Cromwell was as good a Calvinist and fatalist as any that ever breathed in Scotland. There was not much reverence for liberty in the ranks of his Ironsides, but every man of them was a firm believer in the divine sovereignty. And the same story is repeated again in American history. The pilgrim fathers, all of

them good Calvinists, fled to America in order here to enjoy the rights of freedom which were denied to them in their own land; but as soon as they were established here, they proved that they had as little conception of true liberty as had their persecutors at home. In proof of this we need but refer to the story of Roger Williams and of Ann Hutchinson.

Liberty in the true sense, then, is not a deduction from a theological system, but a growth of the ages. And more than one circumstance, and more than one religious community have contributed to its development. There are some elements in Calvinism, in the wider sense, which have undoubtedly contributed to the progress of liberty. The democratic factor which Calvin introduced into the government of the Church is such an element. But this was merely an induction from Scripture, and had nothing to do with the doctrine of Divine sovereignty. In fact, it was rather in opposition to that doctrine, as the notion of democratic equality among men has nothing in common with the notion of the partiality of unconditional election. As a theoretical factor in the development of freedom may be mentioned the comparatively modern doctrine of personality. This, indeed, is a thoroughly Christian conception, but it has been properly recognized only in modern times. It is the conception that every created personality is the realization of an eternal thought begotten of the eternal love of God, and is, therefore, of infinite value, and may never be used as a mere thing either by God or man. Kant has given expression to the practical implication of this conception in the famous maxim: "Always treat humanity, whether in yourself or in another, as a person, and never as a thing." Every child of man is a child of God, and, therefore, has a right to liberty and happiness, which God never violates, and which man may never violate. But this is not a Calvinistic conception, and by no means fits into the scheme of partial redemption, limited atonement and absolute predestination.

But this modern Christian conception of personality and of personal liberty has not been gained without much effort and conflict. It is the product of the struggle of innumerable forces in

the ages of history. Indeed, countless individuals and numerous religious and civil communities have had a share in the work of bringing it to perfection. Catholic and Protestant, Lutheran and Reformed, Calvinist and Arminian, Presbyterian and Independent, Baptist and Quaker, all have had a share in working it out. A large amount of credit is due especially to the smaller religious communities, like the Mennonites and Quakers, who by suffering much for conscience's sake contributed much to the establishment of civil and religious liberty. Let it be remembered that in this country it was not a Calvinist but a Quaker who established the first colony in which perfect religious liberty and equality were to be the law; and that colony was not Massachusetts, but Pennsylvania. The liberty which we enjoy in this country is not the creation of Calvinism, but the product of the association, the conflict, and the attrition of men of many nationalities and many creeds, who were brought together in this land by the providence of God to constitute a new and peculiar nation.

Truly, then, our liberty has been purchased at a great price, and its preservation will require the exercise of eternal vigilance. Some Churches and individuals, indeed, may have something to learn yet in order that they may be able quite to appreciate the boon which in the providence of God has here fallen to their lot, and willing to allow others to enjoy the same boon on the same conditions. In this respect we do not think that our Presbyterian brethren, with all their Calvinism, have reason to boast above other Churches. They are not any more free than others, or any more liberal. Indeed, there is no Protestant Church in the world in which there seems to be less ability to tolerate real freedom of thought than there is in the Presbyterian. When any considerable difference of thought arises in the Presbyterian Church, straightway there is a conflict and an expulsion of one party by another. Men of different theological tendencies can not dwell together in unity and peace. Hence it is that there are nine different Presbyterian bodies in this country, and eleven in Great Britain. How does that agree with the claim that Calvinism especially favors liberty? Verily, before that claim can

be substantiated, the Presbyterian Church will have some things to learn and some things to repent of ; although it may not be true that the Presbyterians alone are sinners in this matter. There may be others, perhaps as intolerant as the Presbyterians, but they at least do not make the same claim to liberality.

EXTENT OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE BIBLE.

There was a time when it was generally believed that the authority of the Bible extends to all matters of human thought. History, geography, science, philosophy and even medicine were all bound to be subject to its teaching ; and the man who in any of these departments of knowledge dared to entertain thoughts different from those which were believed to be authorized by the statements of the Bible, was regarded as a heretic. Thus, for instance, the Bible was once believed to lend its authority to the Ptolemaic system of astronomy, and men like Galileo and Descartes were heretics because they refused to accept this authority. So the Bible was believed to teach that the world was created in six days, about six thousand years ago ; and the modern geologists who refused to accept this teaching, were heretics who sinned against the authority of the Bible.

But in course of time the new science of astronomy and the new science of geology demonstrated the correctness of their principles so clearly that no intelligent person could reasonably refuse to accept them. And what was the consequence ? The theologians somehow discovered that the Bible had always taught the very truths which astronomy and geology now claimed to have brought to light ; and it became fashionable for theologians to be employed in "reconciling" science and the Bible. If geology claims that the earth with its inhabitants was brought into its present condition through a series of long continued periods of development, why, it was said, the author of Genesis knew that long ago ; and that is just what is meant by the "six days" of creation. These "days" were periods of indefinite duration ; and the order of succession in the geological record agrees beautifully

with the order in the Biblical record; and thus the universal authority of the Bible was vindicated. This view has been entertained by some eminent scientists, such as Professors Guyot and Dana, and is still entertained by Sir J. W. Dawson.

But this vindication of the authority of the Bible, it is now claimed by the best Biblical scholars, rests upon a misapprehension of the original sense of the record of creation in Genesis. The older theologians were right when they understood that record to teach that the creation took place in six literal days. The word "day," it is true, may in Hebrew, as in other languages, sometimes be understood in an indefinite sense. But that is not its sense in the first chapter of Genesis. The writer of that chapter meant a literal day. His days of creation are conceived just as literally as is the Sabbath "day," to which the first account of creation is intended to lead up. If the "seventh day" of Gen. 2: 3 is not an indefinite period, then neither are the preceding "days" indefinite periods. Suppose we were to substitute *period* or *age* for *day* in this record, and read as follows: "And there was evening, and there was morning, one *age*." Who can not see the absurdity of such a rendering? It is claimed sometimes that Augustine favored this interpretation. But nothing could be farther from the truth. Augustine says: "What kind of days these were it is extremely difficult, or perhaps impossible for us to conceive, and how much more to say! We see, indeed that our ordinary days have no evening but by the setting, and no morning but by the rising of the sun; but the first three days of all were passed without sun, since it is reported to have been made on the fourth day." (*City of God*, XI., 6, 7.) Augustine then goes on to allegorize, and maintains that what is meant by the "light" of the first day are the *angels*. "There is no question," he says, "that if the angels are included in the works of God during these six days, they are that light which was called 'day,' and whose unity Scripture signalizes by calling that day not the 'first day,' but 'one day'" (xi. 9). This account of the creation of the heavenly bodies on the fourth day has always given trouble to the harmonists, and the usual explanation has been that these

bodies, which of course existed before, first became visible on this day, and assumed their proper functions with relation to the earth. But the record says that God "made" them on this day, just as it says that He "made" the animals on the next day. There are other circumstances in this account, which cause insuperable difficulties to the "reconcilers," and show that the writer of Genesis did not anticipate the scientific conclusions of modern times.

The writer of the first chapter of Genesis knew no science except that which was generally current in his day. His inspiration did not make him an infallible authority in all departments of human knowledge. And the case of this writer is a typical one. If the idea of an all-comprehensive authority of the Bible breaks down on its very first page, it surely can not be maintained elsewhere. The authors of the Bible did not write with the view of communicating infallible knowledge on all possible subjects. Their concern was with religion, and with nothing else; and on religion alone are they an authority. On all other subjects they thought just as their contemporaries thought, and were no more infallible. Hence no infallible knowledge concerning subjects other than religion can be drawn from the Bible. Any such pretended use of the Bible must consequently be an abuse of it, and must tend in the end to bring it into discredit. To suppose, for instance, that historical statements, like those relating to the life of Abraham, or psychological statements, like those relating to demoniacal possessions, must be accepted as absolute truth because they are in the Bible, would tend at last to impair its authority in its own proper sphere.

The authority of the Bible, then, must be limited strictly to the spiritual sphere, or to the sphere of religion and morals. It is only in this sphere that its inspiration can be supposed to have any reality; and here it consists, not in the formulation of abstract doctrines, but in the power of bringing the reader into the same spiritual mood in which the writer was in the moment of composition. Hence the Bible can properly be used only for spiritual purposes; just as a work of art can only be used for æsthetic

purposes. Shakespeare is an authority on æsthetic truth, not on history, geography or medicine. There are many historical, geographical and scientific allusions in Shakespeare's dramas, but these are there not for their own sake, but for the sake of the æsthetic sentiment which is to be expressed through them. Shakespeare evidently believed in witchcraft, and often introduced the professors of the black art into his scenes. Are we therefore bound to believe in witchcraft in order to get the full benefit of Shakespeare's poetry? So with the Bible: in order to get the spiritual impression which it is intended to make upon the mind of the reader, it is not necessary to regard it as infallible in all its statements on all sorts of subjects. But, it may be asked, where shall the line be drawn between the spiritual and that which is not spiritual? We answer frankly that, in our opinion, this is a matter that is not always easy; but we have at least no greater difficulty here than we meet with in other departments of thought. There is a difference between plants and animals, but it is not always easy to draw the line between them. So there is a difference between good and bad actions, but it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the good from the bad. We are often in moral situations in which it is not easy to formulate any judgment, and yet it must be done. All spiritual life has its difficulties, and we should therefore not expect to be saved from all difficulties in our use of the Bible. Every Christian must decide at his own risk what in the Bible is spiritual or inspired truth, profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness and what serves only as *setting* for this truth.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

LAO-TZE'S TAO-TEH-KING. Chinese-English, with Introduction, Transliteration and Notes, by Dr. Paul Carus. Pages, 345. Price, \$3.00. 1898. The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, Ill.

This work, which is appropriately bound in yellow and blue, with gilt top, consists of the original Chinese text and translation of Lao-Tze's *Tao-Teh-King* (*Book of Reason and Virtue*), preceded by a historical and philosophical introduction, and followed by a transliteration of the Chinese words used in the work, with their meanings, critical notes, and a complete index. It seems to be a convenient volume through which to make such acquaintance with the Chinese language and Chinese thought as an American scholar must consider desirable in view of the present increased intercourse with the oriental world. Dr. Carus, who seems to be well fitted for the purpose, has rendered his countrymen a real service by making accessible to them this work of Chinese thought, in which there is much that resembles the teaching both of Buddha and of Christ.

Lao-Tze flourished during the sixth century before Christ. But *Taoism*, or the cult of *Tao*, existed long before him. *Tao* means *Reason*. But the word is used in two senses: first, in the sense of the eternal, immutable reason or law, which constitutes the principle of the universe, in which sense it is equivalent to the Greek *logos* as used by the Stoics and by Philo, and to the Hindoo *vach* (Latin in *vox*); and, secondly, in the sense of the human understanding, which is the infinite Reason individualized in finite form. We thus see at once that those old Chinese thinkers, with all their quaintness, and with the difficulty of their monosyllabic language, had minds like our own, and were interested in questions which engage our own attention. "The philosophy of Lao-Tze, which places the Tao at the beginning of the world," says Dr. Carus, "is the echo of a thinker who was engaged with the same problem as the author of the fourth Gospel. We read in the Tao-Teh-King that the Tao, far from being made by God, must be prior even to God, for God could never have existed without it, and that, therefore, the Tao may claim the right of priority. * * * What a strange contrast! The Logos or Tao (i. e., the eternal rationality that conditions the immutable laws of the world-order) is, according to Lao-Tze prior to God; it is God's ancestor or father; but according to Christian doctrines, it is the son of God, not created but begotten in eternity. At first sight both statements are contradictory, but is not after all the fundamental significance in either case the same?" p. 13. Not exactly, for "the Tao," according to Dr. Carus, "is a principle, not

a personal being, it is an omnipresent feature of reality, a law fashioning events, not a god, nor an essence or a world-substance." But the Logos in the Christian sense is God.

Lao-Tze's ideal of morality consists in realizing the nameless or unnamable Tao. The imitation of Tao is virtue. But virtue is "non-action;" it is "not acting, not making, not doing." "Through non-action everything can be accomplished" This seems to be a strange doctrine. But virtue after all is not inactivity. It is simply allowing the absolute principle of reason or wisdom to act through a person, without any attempt on the part of the person to be or do anything himself; somewhat as the law of gravitation acts in individual masses of matter. Virtue is simply surrender to the nature of things and allowing one's self to be passively controlled by it. To resist this nature of things is the opposite of virtue and leads to destruction. "He who attempts to alter the nature of things," says Dr. Carus in explanation of this Chinese conception of virtue, "will implicate himself in a struggle in which even the most powerful creature must finally succumb. But he who uses things according to their nature, directing their course, not forcing them or trying to alter their nature, can do with them whatever he pleases," p. 18. "Man is required," says Dr. Carus again, "not to have a will of his own, but to do what according to the eternal and immutable order of things he ought to do." This is virtue. And he who understands what is meant by the Christian principle of surrendering one's own will to the will of God, and being led by the grace of God, will have no difficulty in understanding in what sense virtue could be defined as non-action. These quotations may serve to show the interesting character of the work before us. It has a bearing upon the history of religious and philosophical thought universally. And we agree with Dr. Carus "that no one who is interested in (the science of) religion can afford to leave it unread." The words in parenthesis in the preceding sentence are our own. There is a difference between religion and the science of religion—a difference which is real, although even theologians do not always recognize it. In order to be religious one need not to read Chinese classics; but in order to understand the science of religion one ought to read the *Tao-Teh-King* of "the old philosopher," Lao-Tze.

MEMORIAL VOLUME OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY, 1647-1897. Containing Eleven Addresses Delivered before the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, at Charlotte, N. C., in May, 1897, in Commemoration of the Two Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of the Westminster Assembly, and the Formation of the Westminster Standards. Second Edition. Pages 297. 1898. Presbyterian Committee of Publication, Richmond, Va.

This volume opens with an introductory essay treating of the historical framework of the Westminster Assembly. The subjects

of the various addresses, with the names of their respective authors, are as follows: I. The Political History of the Time, by the Rev. H. A. White, Ph.D., D.D.; II. The Religious Situation of the Time, by the Rev. Robert Price, D.D., LL.D.; III. The Westminster Assembly Itself, by the Rev. T. D. Wither-
spoon, D.D., LL.D.; IV. The Doctrinal Contents of the Confession, by the Rev. R. L. Dabney, D.D., LL.D.; V. The Catechisms, by the Rev. G. B. Strickler, D.D., LL.D.; VI. The Polity and Worship of the Standards, by the Rev. Eugene Daniel, D.D.; VII. Relation of the Standards to Other Creeds, by the Rev. James D. Tadlock, D.D., LL.D.; VIII. The Standards and Missionary Activity, by the Rev. Moses D. Hoge, D.D., LL.D.; IX. The Standards in Relation to Current Theology, by the Rev. S. N. Smith, D.D.; The Standards in Relation to Family and Social Life, by the Rev. John F. Cannon, D.D.; The Standards and Civil Government, by the Hon. William M. Cox, A.M.

These papers are all interesting, and serve to give one a pretty accurate idea of the theological atmosphere of the Southern Presbyterian Church at the present time. The Southern Church is probably the most orthodox and the most conservative of all the Presbyterian Churches in this country. The desire of revision has not yet taken hold of the ministers and members of this Church to any perceptible extent. At least this is the conclusion to which any one would be likely to come from the reading of the representative essays contained in this memorial volume. These essays, while all able and interesting, are, of course, not all of equal value. We have read with especial interest those on the doctrinal contents of the Confession and on the Standards in relation to current theology. In the former of these we have, besides an exposition of the contents of the Westminster Confession, a defense of Confessions or Creeds in general. The author holds, and we think rightly, that creeds are a necessity for the Church. But when he puts this necessity on the same ground as that which exists for the translation of the Scriptures, we cannot go with him. The author of this essay holds that "Only the Greek and Hebrew originals of the Scriptures are immediately inspired; the translators must be uninspired." "Therefore," he continues, "these versions (that is, translations into modern languages) are human expositions of the divine originals (and hence in the nature of confessions). Wycliffe's version, Luther's, Tyndall's, are but their human beliefs of what the Hebrew and Greek words are meant by the Holy Ghost to signify." Now, if the case stood thus, then we should like to know how many preachers of the Presbyterian Church, and even how many of the *doctors of divinity and law* who figured on the programme of this Charlotte Assembly, really have an inspired Bible. How many of them could read the Hebrew and Greek originals without the aid of grammar and lexicon, and with sufficient ease to catch

their inspiration? This theory is adopted in order to exalt the doctrine of inspiration; but, to our mind, it is a folly that is unworthy of any mature theologian, and that ought to be abandoned for the sake of the good reputation of the theological profession.

One of the most interesting and at the same time also most amusing of the essays in this volume is that by Dr. Smith on "The Westminster Symbols Considered in Relation to Current Popular Theology and the Needs of the Future." By current popular theology is meant the "New Theology," which has arisen within the confines of Calvinism as a protest against the unchristian elements in the Calvinistic system. The author of this essay has some difficulty in determining what the "New Theology" is, but comes to the conclusion at last that it is *Mysticism, Pantheism* and *Rationalism*, and that it has for its father the famous German theologian Schleiermacher. To say that it comes from Schleiermacher is, of course, considered sufficient at once to condemn it; for he, Dr. Smith tells us, is not sound on a single doctrine. As some of his special heresies are mentioned the doctrine of the *divine immanence in the world*, the doctrine of the *divine fatherhood*, the *emphasizing of the incarnation*, the *centralizing of Christ in theology*, and the acceptance of the *Christian consciousness* as a source of theological knowledge. That these doctrines of Schleiermacher, which the new theology has appropriated from him, are wrong is supposed to be so self-evident a fact that it needs no proof. Is not all this in conflict with the Calvinistic system, and is not that sufficient to warrant its condemnation? Dr. Smith thinks that a *sincentric* theology would be a far better theology than a *Christocentric* theology. And as for any *Christian consciousness*, he simply denies that there is such a thing. Dr. Smith, judging from his portrait—and by the way all the essays of this volume have prefixed to them the portraits of their authors, a thing which is eminently proper in a volume of this kind—seems to be still a *young man*, and it is to be hoped that he will live long enough to be convinced of the untenableness of his present theological position, and of the foolishness of many of his present utterances. There was a time when prominent men in New England spoke and wrote of Schleiermacher, and of anything that was German, in the same vein in which Dr. Smith speaks now. But all that is changed now in New England. And we believe that the time will come when the same change will pass over the mind of the sunny South.

LUTHER, THE REFORMER. By Charles E. Hay, D.D. Pp. 209. Price 40 cents, 1898. Lutheran Publication Society, Philadelphia, Pa.

This work belongs to the Lutheran Hand-Book Series. It presents the life of Luther in brief compass, but omits nothing of essential importance to the general reader. It is clear and vigorous in style and will be read with pleasure by those who are interested in the subject of which it treats. It is not intended,

of course, to displace the larger and more elaborate works upon the life and work of Luther; but neither is it intended as a work merely for the young. It is adapted to the wants of educated men and women generally, who desire information on the subject with which it deals, but have not the time to read the larger works. The work is written by a Lutheran with some degree of predilection, of course, for his hero. This may account for the manner in which some of the deficiencies of Luther are passed over. For instance, in reference to Luther's view of the divine sovereignty as expressed in his treatise against Erasmus on *The Enslaved Will*, in which he teaches the grossest fatalism, and maintains that "all things come to pass of necessity," our author makes the remark that "in estimating the positions here assumed by Luther it is important to remember that they are not the deductions of abstract reasoning," but were maintained in the supposed interest of the Gospel. No doubt; but does that make them any the more true? And what shall be said of Calvin's views, which are the same as those of Luther here maintained? May not the same apology be made for them? We fail to perceive how absurd deductions from Scripture are any better than absurd deductions of abstract reasoning. Luther's refusal of the hand of Zwingli at Marburg is excused on the ground that Luther was conscientiously convinced that the difference between himself and the Swiss Reformer was a deep and vital one that admitted of no compromise. Besides he was somewhat chagrined at the thought that any one should consider him capable of yielding on a subject on which he had given to the world what he considered his final views in a book previously published. On the Lutheran denial of altar-fellowship on the ground of the example and teaching of Luther our author makes the following remark: "That those who bear the name of Luther to-day should be led by his example upon this critical occasion to permanently refuse fellowship at the Lord's table with all who do not accept the strict Lutheran view of the sacred ordinance, can be consistently maintained only upon the supposition that the persons thus excluded really occupy the position attributed to Zwingli and his followers, *i. e.*, that they are insincere in their professions of piety, depisers of God's Word, and inspired by Satan in their stubborn opposition of the truth." This seems to us to be saving the credit of Luther, at this point, at too great a cost to his Christian character. Did Luther really believe that Zwingli and his party were, not merely erring Christians, but bold and defiant enemies of Christ with whom no Christian could have any fellowship? If we were bound to believe that, then we should have to suppose that there was something demoniacal in the character of Luther himself. Such a delusion could hardly have been anything less. But we are inclined to believe that Luther on that occasion yielded to a more common and more human weakness.

HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL, from the Earliest Times to the Destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans, Written for Lay Readers. By Carl Heinrich Cornill, Ph.D., S.T.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Koenigsberg. Translated by W. H. Carruth, Professor of German in the University of Kansas. Pp. 325. Price, \$1.50. 1898. The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, Ill.

Professor Cornill is recognized as one of the most competent Biblical scholars in Germany. He has already become known to the readers of this REVIEW by means of his work on *The Prophets of Israel*, a few years ago. The present work is conceived and executed in the same spirit as the one just mentioned. The object is to meet the wants of intelligent lay readers—men and women who want to know the Bible in the light of modern critical scholarship. Hence, there is no display of critical apparatus. We have only results or conclusions without the process by which they are reached. In language clear and precise the story of Israel is told from the earliest times to the last conflict with the Roman power, in which Israel's nationality forever perished.

In this volume Professor Cornill treats the history of Israel from the standpoint of the Higher Criticism. What his view of the Bible is, and of "Bible History," may be made evident by means of the following paragraph: "I must beg you to forget here all recollections of 'Bible History.' Not on the ground that everything is untrue that is told in the Bible on the history of Israel; but in the Biblical accounts the material has all gone through the medium of popular tradition, and then, again, this popular tradition has been treated and presented by later compilers from special points of view. The Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament do not claim to be history, but books of devotion. It is very characteristic that the Jewish canon itself does not know the designation 'historical books,' but includes the writings which we are accustomed to call the historical books of the Old Testament among the *prophetic*, with a correct perception that we have not in this case historiography but prophecy. That the historian, who is concerned with these books only as historical materials, looks at them with different eye from the Bible reader, who is seeking in them only edification, is a matter of course and cannot be otherwise, and accordingly the historian will often be obliged to draw a different picture of the matters reported in them from that made for devotional purposes by the Biblical writers themselves," pp. 4, 5.

In accordance with this conception of the Bible the history of Israel is written in this volume. The author holds that the traditions of the early times of Israel contain always a kernel of historical reality, but that this historical reality has in many cases been enclosed in a shroud of legendary representation from which it can be disentangled only by historical criticism. For purposes of history such criticism is needed; for edification it is not needed. In agreement with most critics the author holds that

written documents did not exist in Israel to any considerable extent previous to the commencement of the period of the kings. All the information we have concerning events preceding this period must, therefore, be based upon traditions with which the legendary spirit must long have been busy, as, indeed, it was also with much that belonged to later times. In accordance with this principle the author believes, for instance, that Abraham was a historical personage who conducted a colony from the region of the Euphrates to Canaan, perhaps in consequence of political disturbances in the land of his nativity; but that he was in the literal sense the father of the Hebrew race this author does not think can be admitted.

It should be remarked that in the work before us the history of Israel is presented mainly in its political and secular character. This may be due to the fact that the religious side of that history had already been presented in the preceding work on the *Prophets of Israel*. A peculiarity of this history is that there is relatively more attention given to the period between Ezra and Christ than used to be the case in such works in the past. It used to be supposed that during the four hundred years between Ezra and Christ there was no divine revelation, and that for the history of religion that whole period was all a blank. Now, when we know that a number of canonical books belonged to this period, like Chronicles, Daniel and many of the Psalms, and that it was, indeed, a period of intense religious thought and development, it can no longer be thus ignored either by the historian of the Bible or the historian of Israel. And we find, accordingly, that Cornill has treated this period quite fully. In conclusion we allow ourselves, for once, to adopt the common but cheap phrase of the reviewer, and to say that, "without endorsing all that is contained in this book," we commend it to the attention of our readers.

CHARLES PORTERFIELD KRAUTH, D.D., LL.D., Norton Professor of Systematic Theology and Church Polity in the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia; Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, and Vice-Provost of the University of Pennsylvania. By Adolph Spaeth, D.D., LL.D., Professor in the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia. Volume I., 1823-1859. Pages, 425. 1898. The Christian Literature Company, New York.

The subject of this memoir was one of the most remarkable and most influential men of the American Lutheran Church, and the history of that Church could not be properly understood without a knowledge of his life and activity. The author, Dr. Spaeth, who by the way is a son-in-law of Dr. Krauth's, has by its publication put under obligation not merely the Lutheran Church, but the scholars in all the Churches who are interested in the history of American Christianity. We need not say that the biographer's task is well performed in this volume. The author was evidently inspired with enthusiasm for his subject, and the result is a book which to read with interest and profit one need not be a Lutheran.

Of course, in a work of this kind the author disappears much behind the person of his subject. It is not the author's ideas and acts which are set forth in these pages, but those of his hero; who, accordingly, is permitted in a large measure to speak for himself, in letters, newspaper and review articles, and in extracts from books, the author only giving these their proper setting with a view to making them easily intelligible to his readers.

Dr. C. P. Krauth, as portrayed in these pages, was in many respects one of the most fortunate as well as most brilliant of men. Descended from a distinguished Lutheran ancestry he possessed by nature and environment advantages the like of which but few men are permitted to enjoy. His father, Charles Philip Krauth, was for many years professor of theology in the newly established Seminary at Gettysburg, where Charles Porterfield entered the preparatory school at the age of nine years and graduated in theology at the age of nineteen. He seems not to have been a hard student during his college and seminary days, for the reason probably that he gained knowledge so easily that no great exertion was needed. He was, however, an incessant reader, and, possessing a retentive memory, he showed himself to be an accomplished scholar at a very early period in life. He owned a library of seven hundred volumes at an age when most young men are still in college, and he had read and digested it. His library in course of time came to be the largest and best selected private library probably in the United States, and he knew how to use it.

Dr. Krauth's early life was passed during what may be called the formative period of the Lutheran Church. He was born two or three years before the establishment of the Theological Seminary at Gettysburg. When he entered the ministry the Lutheran Church was not as *Lutheran* as it is now. The General Synod had been formed with the Augsburg Confession as its doctrinal basis; but the Confession was held in a rather loose way by many of the ministers, and the general tendency of the Church had been away from her standards. The anxious bench revival system had been introduced and flourished in large sections of the Church. Dr. Krauth himself during the early period of his ministry held "revivals" and spoke of the results of them in the style which was in fashion at that time, although it seems that he early had scruples in regard to some of the means which were then employed in the interest of revivalism. But he had not been in the ministry very long when a tendency in the direction of a more pronounced Lutheranism began to manifest itself. The Church became divided into two camps; one consisting of the "American Lutherans," who held lightly to the Confessional standards and practiced Methodist customs; the other consisting of the "Symbolists," who advocated a return to the symbolical books and the peculiar practices of the Lutheran Church in the time of the Reformation. Dr. Krauth gradually ranged himself with the latter party, and in course of time became its chief apos-

tle and spokesman. It is in this relation that we must look for the significance of his life and work, although the volume before us shows him rather in the process of preparation for his work than in the actual performance of it. For that picture we shall have to wait for the second volume of this memoir, which will, accordingly, be looked forward to with much eagerness, not only in the Lutheran Church, but also among thoughtful men outside of it.

Dr. Krauth studied Lutheran theology until he knew it better than any other man in America knew it. And this constant study made him intensely Lutheran. Indeed, so large did Lutheranism bulk before his soul that he scarcely had an eye for any other form of Christianity. He could see but little good in any other Christian denomination; and in fact it was not often, we suppose, that any other denomination engaged his serious thought. It seems to be a peculiar fatality of all such movements as that in which Dr. Krauth and his associates were then engaged that they can not be kept within reasonable measures. They seem to be bound to be extreme. It was at a time when the first great wave of Methodist revivalism and unchurchly fanaticism, which had rolled over the Protestant Churches of Great Britain and America, had expended its force. There began to be a reaction in favor of the older Church systems. In England during this period we see Puseyism developing itself until it ends in wholesale conversions to Rome. In the Lutheran Church in this country we see the revived Lutheranism developing until it puts on the airs of Romanism itself in the doctrine of "Lutheran pulpits for Lutheran ministers and Lutheran altars for Lutheran communicants." And in other Churches similar phenomena are manifesting themselves. We may say, therefore, that the movement in which Dr. Krauth and his associates were engaged was only a part of a larger movement of the time. In the Lutheran Church the effect was a division of the General Synod and a reorganization of parties according to theological affinities. That division still continues and contributes to an intensity of Lutheran feeling which closes some sections of Lutheranism, at least, against all modern theological ideas, and serves to set the hope of any reunion of Protestantism very far out in the future. What Dr. Krauth thought of union movements may be inferred from the following sentence relating to the union of the Reformed and Lutherans in Germany: "Where their influence prevailed she (the Lutheran Church) had become rotten in doctrine, destitute not only of the power of godliness, but even of the decencies of its forms, and ready, at the command of a royal devotee of Dagon, for a conjunction which she once would have regarded as the adding of a scaly tail and fishy fin to the fair bust of woman; but the bust was as fishy as the tail now, and they were frozen into happy conjunction." The "scaly tail and fishy fin," of course, is the Reformed Church, and the "fair bust of woman" is the Lutheran Church in her original glory as she ap-

pears in the Form of Concord. Any mind that could give such a turn as this to Horace's famous lines to the *Pisos* thereby shows itself to be rather stronger in literature than in Christian charity. And the case shows that the greatest men, and the most illustrious, have their imperfections and their weaknesses, which make them unfit to be models for universal imitation. Dr. Krauth was a great man and rendered the Lutheran Church and the cause of Christianity in this country eminent services, but in our humble opinion he would have been a greater man if he had not been quite as great a *Lutheran*. *Denominationalism* is not inconsistent with Christianity, but *sectarianism* we believe is; and *sectarianism* consists in denying the quality of Christian to bodies of men who manifest the virtues of Christianity as fully as that to which one belongs himself. That Dr. Krauth did this we do not say, but he at least sometimes came perilously near doing it.

THE LIFE OF PHILIP SCHAFF. By David S. Schaff, D.D., Professor of Church History in Lane Theological Seminary. With Portraits. New York, Chas. Scribner's Sons. 1897.

At the close of a series of *Personal Reminiscences* intended for his family as a record of his preparation in Europe for his work in America, Dr. Schaff remarks that "they may furnish authentic material for a biography, if," he modestly adds, "I should be found worthy of one." There are few men better entitled to have their lives recorded, for there are few men to whom it has been given to do a larger or more important work for the Church and Christian society.

Dr. Schaff was an eminent scholar, a man of the most extensive and accurate knowledge. He was also for fifty years a brilliant and successful teacher, whose pupils, numbered by thousands, will ever revere his memory. He was no recluse, confining himself to the study and the class-room. He freely and gladly gave to the world the ripest fruits of his encyclopædic learning and varied experience. He was a voluminous author; a list of his works furnished by his biographer covers no less than eight pages. They constitute a library in themselves. Partly in German and partly in English, some of them have been translated, not only into the languages of western Europe, but also into Russian, Bulgarian, Arabic, Syriac, Persian, and even into Chinese and Japanese. The field they cover is wide and varied. And some of them, especially in the department of Church history, are among the most valuable theological publications within the last half century.

Dr. Schaff exerted a widely extended influence, not only as a professor in two theological seminaries and a writer of many books as interesting as they are learned, but besides he entered with enthusiasm into movements which had for their object the general good of religion and society. He threw his whole soul into any enterprise he took in hand. He was indefatigable in any

cause he espoused. For six years he was Secretary of the New York Sabbath Committee, and through his exertions its influence extended beyond New York to the great centers of population in this country. Not content with this he advocated the cause in Germany, setting it forth before ecclesiastical conventions and other religious bodies. It was a personal appeal from America to the churches of the Continent, nor was it made in vain.

Dr. Schaff felt the deepest interest in all movements looking toward Christian union. He was in full sympathy with the Evangelical Alliance, and later, also, with the Alliance of the Reformed Churches. In their deliberations he always held a prominent place. The sixth meeting of the Evangelical Alliance, held in New York in 1873, was, perhaps, the most successful ever held. This was due in a large part to the energy, tact and organizing skill of Dr. Schaff, on whom the chief burden of responsibility fell.

When the movement for the revision of the English Bible was inaugurated by the Convocation of Canterbury, and it was resolved to invite the coöperation of some American divines, it fell to Dr. Schaff's lot to take the initiative and the leading part in this country. When the American revisers met he was appointed chairman of the body. He was also a member of the New Testament Company. "It was owing to him," says the Committee in its *Historical Account*, "more than to any other, that the work was undertaken in this country. And to him likewise is largely due the success with which the means for carrying it forward have been secured."

Dr. Schaff used to say of himself: "I am a Swiss by birth, a German by education, an American by choice." No man ever was better qualified to mediate between German theology and American thought. By the numerous and original contributions of his pen, by translations from German works, such as Lange's Commentary, and by his instructions in the class-room and in private intercourse, he made Germany, its institutions, science and literature well known to America. No less did he make America known to Germany. By articles in German periodicals and by addresses before German ecclesiastical assemblies he presented the conditions and needs of the German-American Churches, and thus secured contributions of books and endowment funds for Mercersburg and other institutions.

The life of such a man ought to be given to the world. And happily it has been. The son is biographer of the father. It was a delicate task, but one that has been admirably accomplished. By a judicious selection from the *Reminiscences* written for his family, from diaries, notes and letters to personal friends, the book is in large part an autobiography. Dr. Schaff unconsciously but vividly portrays himself. Such a life ought to be an inspiration, especially to those who are just entering on their career. We trust it will find a wide circulation and accomplish much good.

F. A. G.

